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Spirit Christology has emerged as an important focus in recent theology. It of­
fers new perspectives on christology and pneumatology. Can these new perspect­
ives lead to advances in trinitarian theology itself? The classical theologies o f both 
East and West tended to express great reserve about moving too easily from the 
economy o f salvation to ideas about God in se. In the 20th century, Karl Rahner’s 
axiom that the “economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and vice versa helped 
lead to a significant erosion of this reserve, though not without controversy.
Coffey (bom 1934) contributes significantly to reflection on this nexus of 
questions. He explores the relation of Spirit Christology to Logos Christology, ar­
guing that the former need not supplant the latter. He reformulates Rahner’s axiom, 
suggesting ways o f overcoming some o f its ambiguities. He shows that Spirit Chris­
tology offers an “ascending” basis for a “mutual love” pneumatology, in the service 
of a renewed trinitarian theology.
This dissertation presents an analysis o f Coffey’s achievement in its various 
contexts, historical and contemporary. It highlights his methodological balance. It 
argues that his theology represents an important development within the tradition, 
casting new light on issues of pressing contemporary interest.

Introduction
David Coffey argues that a properly formulated Spirit Christology demands a 
reformulation o f trinitarian theology itself. The current work examines this argu­
ment. The purpose of this introduction is threefold: to offer a brief biographical 
sketch o f David Coffey with a comment on how his work in trinitarian theology fits 
in with his other theological interests; to alert the reader to some themes and ques­
tions that can help situate the current study in a wider context; and, finally, to 
identify the specific focus o f the study, its thematic delimitation and some of its 
features.
1. Beyond the Revival in Trinitarian
Theology
Reports of a “revival” of interest in trinitarian theology in recent decades are 
widespread.1 Such reports are in striking contrast to the reports of an earlier genera­
tion telling of a perceived paucity and stagnation in this field o f theological re­
search.2 Such reports of “revival” in trinitarian theology do not imply that prior to
' These reports are often backed up with a listing of important recent publications. Works that 
open with this observation include: Michael Slusser, “The Exegetical Roots o f Trinitarian 
Theology,” Theological Studies 49, (1988): 461—476; Anne Hunt, The Trinity and the Paschal 
Mystery: A Development in Recent Catholic Theology, New Theology Series, vol. (Collegeville 
MN: The Liturgical Press, 1997), vii; Anne Hunt, “Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in 
Trinitarian Theology,” Theological Studies 59, (1998), 197; Gerald O ’Collins, “The Holy Trinity: 
The State o f the Questions,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. 
Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O ’Collins, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
1; Declan Marmion, “Trinity and Salvation: A Dialogue With Catherine Lacugna,” Irish Theological 
Quarterly 74, (2009), 115.
2' It is Karl Rahner who is most directly associated with the pessimistic assessment o f the state of 
trinitarian theology. Rahner famously refers to most Christians as “mere monotheists,” by which he 
means that the understanding of God of most Christians in insufficiently “trinitarian.” See Karl 
Rahner, The Trinity, (New York: Bums & Oates, 1970), 10. Authors who appear to show sympathy 
with this observation include Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, (New York: Crossroad
1
this “revival” there was simply no interest in trinitarian theology. What they do im­
ply is that the trinitarian theology preceding the “revival” was somehow lacking, 
that somehow “pre-revival” trinitarian theology was somehow not “trinitarian” 
enough.
A particular target of criticism was the Roman Catholic neo-scholastic trinit­
arian theology, often regarded as “arid,” “ahistorical,” “unscriptural,” “speculat­
ive,” “deductive,” and “abstract.”3 Further, it was often claimed that theology in the 
“pre-revival” period suffered fragmentation, and that trinitarian theology, nominally 
the heart o f the theological endeavour, remained effectively isolated from questions 
relating to grace, to Christ, to pneumatology, to redemption, to ecclesiology etc.4 
The theology of the Trinity struck many as a series of increasingly subtle defini­
tions and distinctions, apparently unconnected with the rest o f the faith or the rest 
o f theology.5
Publishing Company, 1986), 234; Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and 
Christian Life, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 6; Catherine Mowry LaCugna, “The Trinitarian 
Mystery of God,” in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, ed. Francis Schiissler 
Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992), 152; O’ColIins, “The Holy 
Trinity: The State o f the Questions,” 1-3. O’ColIins, however, offers a nuance: there may be, he 
says, an exaggeration in the claims that the doctrine of the Trinity has been seen as “irrelevant,” and 
cites the trinitarian shape of the formula of baptism and eucharistic prayers.
One o f the most radical versions of the claim that the Western theological tradition is insufficiently 
“trinitarian” is that found in the writings of Colin Gunton who does not hesitate, for example, to ac­
cuse Aquinas (and therefore the tradition which followed him) of holding a “Parmenidean” under­
standing of Being, and allowing this to limit a properly trinitarian understanding o f God. See Colin 
E. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation, and the Culture o f Modernity, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 139.
Karen Kilby notes the irony in the fact that many of the recent publications that together are hailed 
as constituting signs of this “revival” begin with complaints about the neglect of the doctrine. Karen 
Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems With Social Doctrines o f the Trinity,” New 
Blackfriars (2000), 432.
3 Clearly adjectives like “speculative,” and “abstract” need not be pejorative. In TorrelTs work, 
for example, there is a rehabilitation of the word “speculative,” showing that in medieval theology, 
at least, it was synonymous with “contemplative.” In this context, the word “speculative” attains 
mystical dimensions.
See Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, txans. Robert Royal, 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 157.
4 We recall the comments of Rahner about the “isolation” of trinitarian doctrine in “piety and 
textbook theology.” See Rahner, The Trinity, 10-15. O f particular concern to Rahner was the separa­
tion o f the tract on the Trinity from the tract on the One God. It is now viewed as unlikely that blame 
for such a separation can be levelled at Thomas of Aquinas himself
5 Beyond theology proper, it is interesting to note the difficulties faced by preachers in relation to
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Given this dim reading of the field prior to the recent “revival,” it was clear to 
many that what was to be revived was not neo-scholastic theology itself, but some 
other, presumably older form. Here, as in so many other areas, the impulse towards 
ressourcement is strong: one has to look backwards into the tradition in order to 
move forwards.6 Various proposals are put forward. Some suggest that we should 
revive the theology of the earliest church.7 Others urge that we look rather to the 
Greek patristic tradition as a whole,8 or on the contribution of particular Greek 
Fathers.9 Others urge that we rethink the legacy of the Latin theological tradition, 
and argue that, properly understood, it does not suffer from many o f the weaknesses 
attributed to it. Unhelpfully schematic and ahistorical misrepresentations of major
the doctrine of the Trinity. An informative overview of this issue is found in Marguerite Shuster, 
“Preaching the Trinity: A Preliminary Investigation,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary 
Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, Gerald O’Collins, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). Shuster finds that sermons dealing with the Trinity are rare, and often suffer 
from doctrinal imprecision and only loose relation to their biblical sources.
6 Marcellino D ’ambrosio, “Ressourcement Theology, Aggiomamento, and the Hermeneutics of 
Tradition,” Communio 18, (1991): 530-555.
7 Some of the Spirit Christologists mentioned in this study advocate a return to pre-Nicene Spirit 
Christology. Catherine LaCugna regrets the development of the “rupture” between theologia and 
oikonomia that followed the “Arian” controversy, pointing attention to pre-Nicene theology as a use­
ful model for a revival of trinitarian discourse. See LaCugna, Godfor Us: The Trinity and Christian 
Life.
8' Karl Rahner presents his proposals as a retrieval of “Greek” emphases, overcoming mistaken 
Latin emphases. See Rahner, The Trinity, 15-21.
9 John Zizioulas’ attempts to establish a basis in the Cappadocians for urging that “person” be put 
before “substance” has been very influential in Western theology. See John D. Zizioulas, Being as 
Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church, (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1985). Thomas Weinandy looks instead to Athanasius as an underestimated source 
for trinitarian thought. See Thomas Weinandy, The Father’s Spirit of Sonship, (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1995). For a brief discussion of Weinandy’s attempted retrieval o f Athanasius, see below at p. 
174f.
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figures such as Augustine10 and Aquinas11 should be set aside, and these figures 
should be looked at anew.12 It is argued that rediscovering the work of major trinit­
arian thinkers in the Latin tradition will revitalise theology as a whole.
That there is a “revival” o f interest in trinitarian theology is surely to be wel­
comed. One o f the arguments that this study makes is that David Coffey’s theology 
does not, however, fit comfortably into a “revival” reading of the recent history of 
trinitarian theology. His is not so much an attempt to revive one or other o f the 
great syntheses, whether patristic or medieval, but rather -  in dialogue with voices 
from the tradition -  to set out the parameters of a new synthesis, one that explicitly 
draws out the implications of Spirit Christology for trinitarian theology. An initial 
appreciation o f this might be gained through looking at the outlines of his theolo­
gical itinerary, to which we now turn.
(a) Introducing David Coffey
David Coffey was bom in New South Wales in 1934. His basic philosophical 
and theological studies were carried out at the Catholic Institute o f Sydney. In 1958
10 The work of Michel Bames and Lewis Ayres is prominent in the attempt to restore historical 
balance to the reading of Augustine’s theology. Michel René Bames, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” 
Augustinian Studies 26, (1995): 51-79; Michel René Bames, “Augustine in Contemporary 
Trinitarian Theology,” Theological Studies 56, (1995): 237-250; Michel René Bames, “One Nature, 
One Power: Consensus Doctrine in Pro-Nicene Polemic,” Studia Patristica 29, (1997): 205-223; 
Lewis Ayres, ‘“ Remember That You Are Catholic’ (Serm. 52.2): Augustine on the Unity of the 
Triune God,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 8, (2000): 39-82; Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its 
Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004). Lewis Ayres is about to publish Augustine's Trinitarian Theology.
The revival o f interest in Augustine’s theology of the Trinity as a positive resource has penetrated to 
systematic theology too. For instance, Edmund Hill has published a book on the Trinity that is 
entirely based around the presentation of Augustine’s De trinitate: Edmund Hill, Mystery of the 
Trinity, Introducing Catholic Theology, vol. 4, (San Francisco: Harper, 1986).
11 See, for example, Gilles Emery, Trinity in Aquinas, (Naples, Florida: Sapientia Press of Ave 
Maria College, 2003); Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of 
Trinitarian Theology, Challenges in Contemporary Theology, vol. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); 
Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Wort, Gilles Emery, The Trinitarian Theology 
of Saint Thomas Aquinas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
12 Lewis Ayres expresses a rather negative opinion of current systematic theology’s engagement 
with its past. It depends too often on unsustainable schématisations that fail to capture the true leg­
acy of theological traditions, but that encourage systematic theologians to think of their job as that of 
choosing from an “menu of options.” See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth- 
Century Trinitarian Theology, 386.
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he earned his Licence in Theology (STL) and was ordained to the priesthood for the 
Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney. By 1960 he had achieved his doctorate in Sacred 
Theology (STD) at the Catholic Institute o f Sydney, with a dissertation in biblical 
theology: a study of the concept of truth in the Johannine writings. After a short 
time serving in Sydney parishes, he was appointed to the faculty at the Catholic In­
stitute o f Sydney. From 1964 to 1966, he studied under Michael Schmaus and Karl 
Rahner at the University of Munich. From 1967, Coffey was again at the Catholic 
Institute o f Sydney, serving as Dean of the faculty from 1970 to 1975, and as Pres­
ident o f the faculty from 1976 to 1981. In 1975 he was involved in the foundation 
o f the Australian Catholic Theological Association (ACTA)13 and served as its first 
president. From 1976, he also worked as part-time member of the Divinity School 
at the University of Sydney. From 1981 to 1990 he taught at St. Peter’s Centre in 
Canberra for the further education of clergy.14
In 1991, he spent a semester as visiting professor at the Aquinas Institute at 
the University o f St. Louis, Missouri, and after a few further years at the Catholic 
Institute o f Sydney he was appointed, in 1995, to the Presidential Chair in Catholic 
Systematic Theology at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a post he 
held until 2005.15 Coffey was appointed Professor Emeritus at Marquette in 2006. 
Since his retirement from full-time teaching, Coffey has continued working, publ­
13 This body of Australian Catholic theologians was set up to work with the Australian Catholic 
Bishops Conference on matters of mutual interest, and sometimes functions in an advisory capacity 
to the bishops.
14 This centre was set up to address what was perceived as the rather unsatisfactory state of theolo­
gical formation o f Australian Catholic priests, a situation that became clear in the years following 
the Second Vatican Council when awareness o f the changes brought about by that council remained 
rather slight among the clergy there. The situation among religious sisters and lay people was rather 
more positive, and some have described this as a cause o f tension in the Australian Catholic Church 
between the laity and religious women on the one hand, and priests on the other. Part o f the explana­
tion for the failure of priests there to update their theology lies with the many pastoral responsibilit­
ies of a falling population of ordained men.
15 Coffey interrupted his tenure of the presidential chair for one year in 1997 to work at Catholic 
Institute of Sydney. In 1999 the name of the presidential chair at Marquette was changed to William 
J. Kelly Chair in Catholic Theology.
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ishing a number of important articles. He is currently preparing a new edition of his 
1979 book Grace: The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit. In addition, he has been assisting in 
the establishment of an archive of his work at Marquette University.16
(b) Coffey and Trinitarian Theology
Coffey’s theological journey did not begin with an explicit consideration of 
the Trinity, a fact not without importance in grasping the shape o f Coffey’s theo­
logy. Coffey wrote:
Like many of my generation, in my undergraduate studies I took a course on 
the Trinity that left me puzzled as to what conceivable relevance this topic 
could have for the rest of theology (apart, perhaps, from that of the Incarna­
tion) or for the challenge of the Christian life.17
Note that the relevance Coffey sought was primarily expressed in terms of relev­
ance to the “rest o f theology.” As a student he perceived that the Trinity “perhaps” 
had some connections with the Incarnation. Clearly the theology to which he was 
exposed exemplified the very fragmentation o f which Rahner and others 
complained.18
This “puzzlement” continued to exercise Coffey. As a young lecturer teaching 
the theology of grace, he manifested an unusual interest in the connections by 
which this tract was related to pneumatology, to christology and to the Trinity. How 
is the Holy Spirit involved in “grace”? How is the Holy Spirit involved in the In­
carnation? How is the “grace” of Christ related to the “grace” o f human beings? 
Such queries led him, reading Mühlen, to wonder at the loss o f the patristic theme 
o f an involvement of the Holy Spirit in the anointing o f Jesus, a loss that Mühlen 
documents but does not explain. It led him, reading Rahner, to enquire after the 
pneumatological possibilities in transcendental theology.19 Coffey’s enquiries
IS' Coffey has not provided any comprehensive overview of his theology as a whole, but useful re­
cent comments are found in David Coffey, “Vive La Difference: A Response to Donald Gelpi,” 
Pneuma 29, (2007): 106-123; David Coffey, “A Promising Development in Christology: An 
Address to the Sydney Heretics Club,” (2009). The latter paper is yet to be published.
17 David Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 3.
18 See above at p. If.
19 For comments by Coffey on his profound debt to Rahner, whom he acknowledges as his “prin­
6
brought him to consider the key role that the Holy Spirit plays not just in the 
“grace” received by ordinary human beings, but also the importance o f pneumato- 
logy in relation to Christ.
In 1971, Coffey published an article on “grace” as the gift o f the Holy Spirit,20 
and, in 1979, published a book length study o f the same matter.21 In the book we 
already see a sustained attempt at overcoming the “fragmentation” that he evidently 
had encountered in his own theological training. The book takes the anointing o f Je­
sus with the Holy Spirit as the major key to an understanding o f grace. He discusses 
a wide range o f issues of pertinence to trinitarian theology throughout that work, 
and offers there an early version o f his two-model approach to the Trinity.22
cipal theological influence” see Coffey, “Vive La Difference: A Response to Donald Gelpi,” 121— 
122.
20 David Coffey, “The Gift of the Holy Spirit,” Irish Theological Quarterly 38, (1971): 202-223.
21 David Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, Faith and Culture, vol. 2, (Sydney: Catholic 
Institute o f Sydney, 1979).
22 It is worth noting that it is only in the final chapter of the current study that I come to the matter 
of his two-model approach to the Trinity. My effort has been to smooth the path towards an under­
standing o f what I take to be Coffey’s central line of thought. In Coffey’s own writings we en­
counter ingenious solutions to complex problems sometimes before we are clear on what the prob­
lems are. This is partly due to the fact that Coffey himself did not always in his early writings 
appreciate all of the implications of the positions he was elaborating. Often his later writings can be 
understood precisely as attempts to work out the implications of positions implicit in his earlier writ­
ings. In my attempt to smooth the path towards an appropriation of what I believe his final position 
to be, I have preferred to alter the order of his presentation substantially.
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In the years following that publication, through a series o f articles,23 Coffey 
continued to explore these themes, gradually refining his approach, and taking in­
creasing distance from the scholastic style in which his earlier attempts had been 
expressed.24 In 1999, he published Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine o f  the Triune God 2 ' 
This is Coffey’s major work on the Trinity. It takes up and develops his earlier 
work on pneumatology and christology and explores its application to trinitarian 
theology. It has proved not to be, however, Coffey’s “last word” on the Trinity, as 
Anthony Kelly had predicted.26 He has continued to publish on these topics since
23 See especially: David Coffey, “The Incarnation: Fact Not Myth,” in Volume 1: Faith and 
Culture, Faith and Culture (1978); David Coffey, “The Teaching of the Constantinopolitan Creed on 
the Holy Spirit,” in Volume 6: Issues for the Australian Church, ed. Neil Brown, Faith and Culture 
(Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1982); David Coffey, “The Pre-Existent and Incarnate 
Word,” in Volume 8: Contemporary Questions, ed. Margaret Press, Faith and Culture (Sydney: 
Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1983); David Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 
Theological Studies 45, (1984): 466—480; David Coffey, “A Proper Mission of the Holy Spirit,” 
Theological Studies 47, (1986): 227-250; David Coffey, “Christian Anthropology,” in Volume 14: 
Bicentennial Reflections, ed. Neil Brown and Margaret Press, Faith and Culture (Sydney: Catholic 
Institute of Sydney, 1988); David Coffey, “The Palamite Doctrine of God: A New Perspective,” St. 
Vladimirs Theological Quarterly 32, (1988): 329-358; David Coffey, “Our Return to God Through 
Christ in the Spirit,” Compass 23, (1989): 33-36; David Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual 
Love of the Father and the Son,” Theological Studies 51, (1990): 193-229; David Coffey, “Review 
of Anthony Kelly, the Trinity of Love: A Theology o f the Christian God,” Pacifica 4, (1991): 229- 
232; David Coffey, “Faith in the Creator God,” in The New Catechism: Analysis and Commentary, 
ed. Murray Andrew, (Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1994); David Coffey, “The Common and the 
Ordained Priesthood,” Theological Studies 58, (1997): 209-236; David Coffey, “The Theandric 
Nature of Christ,” Theological Studies 60, (1999): 405—431.
24 Important texts of interest to those who would trace Coffey’s changing attitude to scholasticism 
are found in Coffey, “The Gift of the Holy Spirit,” 204 -2005; Coffey, “A Proper Mission of the 
Holy Spirit,” 243-244; Coffey, “Vive La Difference: A Response to Donald Gelpi,” 121-123.
2i Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God. Reviews o f this book are found at 
Anthony Kelly, “Review of ‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God’,” The Australasian 
Catholic Record 77, 365-366; Bruce Marshall, “Review of ‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the 
Triune God’,” First Things (2000): 58-59; David Moss, “Review of ‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of 
the Triune God’,” Reviews in Religion and Theology 7, (2000): 506-507; Mark Medley, “Review of 
‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God’,” Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology, 
http://www.interpretation.org/reviews/q4-01/minor.htm (accessed 1 July 2009); Katherine Tanner, 
“Review of ‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God’,” The Journal of Religion 81, (2001): 
483—484; David Brown, “Review of ‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God’,” Journal of 
Theological Studies 52, (2002): 486—488; Paul Molnar, “Review of Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of 
the Triune God By David Coffey,” Scottish Journal of Theology’ 55, (2002): 244—247; William 
Thompson-Uberuaga, “Review of ‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God’,” Theological 
Studies 63, (2002): 617-619; Fred Sanders, “Review o f ‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune 
God’,” Theology Today 59, (2003): 628-630. An article that appeared at the same time as the book, 
drawing on its conclusions is Marie Farrell, “Reclaiming the Spirit,” The Australasian Catholic 
Record 76, (1999): 270-280.
26 See Kelly’s review, cited above.
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that book, giving further development to one or other point.27 In his more recent 
writings it has been the theme of the Holy Spirit that has often provided the primary 
focus o f this theology. An important addition to his published output is found in the 
Pére Marquette lecture that he delivered on the occasion o f his retirement from 
Marquette University in 2005.28
The purpose of this brief biographical sketch was to make clear that at its ori­
gins Coffey’s theological approach to trinitarian theology is shaped by a particular 
set o f theological themes not ordinarily the fo c i o f trinitarian theology: the Holy 
Spirit in relation to Christ and, in dependence on this paradigmatic case, grace as 
the gift o f the Holy Spirit to ordinary human beings. These themes continue to run 
through and defined Coffey’s theological project.29
27 David Coffey, “The Spirit of Christ as Entelechy,” Philosophy and Theology 13, (2001): 363- 
398; David Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” in Advents of the Spirit: An Introduction to 
the Current Study of Pneumatology, ed. E. Hinze Bradford and D. Lyle Dabney, (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 2001); David Coffey, “In Response to Paul Molnar,” Irish Theological 
Quarterly 67, (2002): 375-378; David Coffey, “The Roman ‘Clarification’ of the Doctrine of the 
Filioque,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 5, (2003): 3-21; David Coffey, “The Whole 
Rahner on the Supernatural Existential,” Theological Studies 65, (2004): 95-118; David Coffey, Did 
You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology, Pére 
Marquette Theology Lecture, vol. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005); David Coffey, 
“Trinity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, ed. Declan Mannion, and Mary E. Hines, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Coffey, “Questio Disputata: Response to 
Neil Ormerod and Beyond,” Theological Studies 68, (2007): 900-915; David Coffey, “Questiones 
Disputatae: A Trinitarian Response to Issues Raised By Peter Phan,” Theological Studies 69, (2008): 
852-874.
28 This lecture is published in extended form as Coffey, Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When 
You Believed?: Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology. This work is reviewed at Donald L. Gelpi, 
“David Coffey’s ‘Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?’: A Review Essay,” 
Pneuma 28, (2006): 322-334; Elizabeth T. Groppe, “ ‘Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You 
Believed?’ Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology,” Theology Today 63, no. 2 (2006): 280.
29 Some of Coffey’s other writings, not directly pertinent to my theme, but of interest to those who 
would gain an overview of Coffey’s theology include David Coffey, “The Salvation of the 
Unbeliever in St. Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Maritain,” The Australasian Catholic Record 41, 
(1964): 179-198, 265-282; David Coffey, “Natural Knowledge of God: Reflections on Romans 
1:18-32,” Theological Studies 31, (1970): 674-691; David Coffey, “The Charism of the 
Theologian,” in Volume I: Faith and Culture, Faith and Culture (1978); David Coffey and John 
Hill, “Demythologization: For and Against,” in Volume 1, Faith and Culture (1978); David Coffey, 
“The Resurrection of Jesus and Catholic Orthodoxy,” in Volume 4, ed. Neil Brown, Faith and 
Culture (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1980); David Coffey, “A Reply to Bishop J. 
Culiinane on the Resurrection of Jesus,” The Australasian Catholic Record 58, (1981): 181-190; 
David Coffey, “A Further Reply to Bishop J. Culiinane on the Resurrection of Jesus and Catholic 
Orthodoxy,” The Australasian Catholic Record 58, (1981): 392—400; David Coffey, “Death as a 
Question o f Negative Theology,” in Volume 5: Reflections on Faith and Culture, ed. Neil Brown, 
Faith and Culture (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1981); David Coffey, “A Reply From 
Darley Road,” Colloquium 14, (1982): 36-42; David Coffey, “Evangelical Catholicism,” Australian
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2. General Themes
At this point, I introduce some general themes that underlie this study. These 
themes are (a) the plausibility of trinitarian theology itself and (b) the debated status 
within trinitarian theology of “immanent Trinity” talk.
(a) The Plausibility of Trinitarian Theology
How should theology deal with the caution o f recent biblical scholarship 
about the matter of finding a direct basis in biblical texts for the doctrine o f the 
Trinity? In the past the matter was simpler. One might invoke the baptismal com­
mand o f Jesus in Matthew 28:19 as a direct teaching by Jesus o f the doctrine o f the
Catholic Record 61, (1984): 158-163; David Coffey, “The Claim of Catholicism,” in Volume 11: 
Believer, Christian, Catholic: Three Essays in Fundamental Theology, Faith and Culture (Sydney: 
Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1986); David Coffey, “A Case for Christianity Vis-a-Vis the Other 
World-Religions,” in Volume 11: Believer, Christian, Catholic: Three Essays in Fundamental 
Theology, Faith and Culture (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1986); David Coffey, “Rational 
Justification o f Belief in God,” in Volume 11: Believer, Christian Catholic: Three Essays in 
Fundamental Theology, Faith and Culture (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1986); David 
Coffey, “Mary, Prototype of Salvation,” Prudentia Supplement: Idea of Salvation, (1988): 95-104; 
David Coffey, “The Church as Community,” in Volume 17: Gospel in Word and Action, ed. Neil 
Brown, Faith and Culture (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1990); David Coffey, “Priestly 
Representation and Women’s Ordination,” in Volume 20: Priesthood: The Hard Questions, ed. 
Gerald P. Gleeson, Faith and Culture (Sydney: E.J. Dwyer, 1993); David Coffey, “Congar’s 
Tradition and Traditions: Thirty Years on,” Prudentia Supplement: Tradition and Traditions, (1994): 
51-59; Coffey, “The Common and the Ordained Priesthood”; David Coffey, “Rahner’s Theology of 
Fundamental Option,” Philosophy and Theology 10, (1997): 255-284; David Coffey, The Sacrament 
of Reconciliation, ed. John D. Laurance, Lex Orandi, vol. (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 
2001); David Coffey, “The ‘Unities’ of the Episcopal Office,” in Unfailing Patience and Sound 
Teaching: Reflections on Episcopal Ministry in Honor o f Rembert G. Weakland, ed. David A. 
Stosur, (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2003).
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Trinity.30 This is no longer possible. Contemporary biblical scholars no longer hold 
that there is any formally trinitarian discourse in the bible.31 These reservations are 
now taken for granted by a broad range o f theologians/2
The historical methodology today brought to the readings o f  scripture aims in 
the first place at uncovering what we call its “literal meaning.” This term will be in­
voked repeatedly in this study. It denotes the meaning intended by the human au­
thors o f scripture inasmuch as this can be reconstructed by the tools o f historical-
30 As recently as 1952, Ludwig Ott, to give an example, was willing to draw the basics o f the doc­
trine of the “immanent Trinity” from this verse. He wrote:
The Mystery of the Trinity is most clearly manifested in the mandate of Jesus to go and 
baptise. Mt. 28, 19: ‘Going therefore, teach ye all nations, baptising them in the name of 
the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.’ That there are here three persons, 
emerges as regards the Father and the Son from their relative opposition, as regards the 
Holy Ghost from the fact that He is completely co-ordinated to the Two Persons, which 
would not be if spirit here meant merely an essential attribute. The unity of essence of the 
Three Persons is  indicated in the singular form ‘in the name’ (elg t o  ovopa). The genuine­
ness o f the passage is guaranteed by the unanimous tradition of all manuscripts and 
translations.
See Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, (Rockford, Illinois: Tan Books & Publishers, 
1974), 56.
It is not suggested that the theological tradition as a whole ever sought to justify the doctrine of the 
Trinity exclusively on the basis of this verse of Matthew. What is suggested is that this verse gave 
traditional textbook theology an apparently simple basis for claiming that Jesus taught the doctrine 
of the Trinity. The great representatives of the Western tradition were more subtle in their ap­
proaches to the bible.
31 This can be quickly be verified by looking up the term “Trinity” in biblical reference works, 
where the term is not generally found, or if it is, is treated very briefly with statements about how 
the biblical data is related to trinitarian belief. See, e.g., Daniel N. Schowalter, “Trinity,” in The 
Oxford Companion to the Bible, ed. Bruce M. Metzger, and Michael D. Coogan, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993).
Arthur Wainwright, who devoted a book-length study to the question of the Trinity in the New Test­
ament, argues that rather than speaking of doctrine of the Trinity in the bible we might speak o f the 
“problem” of the Trinity there. New Testament authors were aware, he claims, that the claims being 
made with Jesus would need to be reconciled with Jewish monotheism. Their attempts to deal with 
this “problem” may be set in continuity with the later “doctrine” o f the Trinity. See Arthur W. 
Wainwright, The Trinity in the New Testament, (London: S.P.C.K, 1962).
32 Rahner writes that the scriptures “do not explicitly present a doctrine of the ‘immanent’ 
Trinity,” Rahner, The Trinity, 22. William Hill writes that “it is not possible to discern in the New 
Testament texts themselves anything amounting to an explicit revelation of the Trinity immanent in 
the Godhead.” William J. Hill, Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation, 
(Washington: Catholic University of America, 1982), 3. Catherine LaCugna writes: “there is no doc­
trine of the Trinity in the New Testament.” LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, 
22. John Farrelly phrases the situation more optimistically as an “implicit revelation” of the Trinity 
in the New Testament. M. John Farrelly, The Trinity: Rediscovering the Central Christian Mystery, 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 4 0 - 44. It would not be difficult to mul­
tiply examples of this sort.
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critical biblical exegesis.33 We might take trinitarian readings of texts in the Hebrew 
scriptures such as the identification of Word and Spirit in Genesis 1; or the Trinity 
in Genesis 18 as examples. The Fathers sometimes saw in these texts reference to 
the Trinity. Scripture scholarship today would not see such references as part o f the 
“literal meaning” o f these texts. Does the primacy of scripture stretch to the read­
ings o f scripture made by the Fathers and if  so, on what basis? What is the signific­
ance of the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity was elaborated in the patristic age, 
sometimes on the basis of readings of scriptural texts that would not command the 
agreement o f scholars today?
The issues raised here are complex, and cannot form the direct concern of this 
study. Nevertheless, it is useful to mention them at the outset. The solution to such 
issues will certainly involve a broadening o f the understanding o f how scripture 
functions as source in theology and how it is related to the development of doctrine 
in the church. As we will see below, some theologians insist on the primacy o f the 
bible in ways that effectively rule out doctrinal development. The result of this pos­
ition is that trinitarian theology loses its plausibility. In order to counter this, one 
must go beyond any simple appeal to the bible as exclusive source. The primary 
source must be seen to be not the bible as such, but the Christ event as a whole.
33 On the “literal” meaning of scripture and its distinction from “literalist” readings of scripture 
see Pontifical Biblical Commission, “The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church,” http:/ 
/www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/PBCINTER.htm (accessed 19 May 2009); Joseph A Fitzmyer, The 
Biblical Commission’s Document 'the Interpretation o f the Bible in the Church': Text and 
Commentary, Subsidia Biblica, vol. 18, (Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1995). That doc­
ument refers to Thomas S. Th. I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1 on the primacy of the “literal” sense. The same 
source is quoted again by the Catechism of the Catholic Church §115-116.
Ayres and Fowl, in an article criticising the Pontifical Biblical Commission document’s privileging 
of a narrow understanding of the “literal sense” of scripture, argue that the quotation from Thomas 
has been misrepresented. They criticise the PBC document for this, but not the CCC text for drawing 
the same inference. They recognise a difference o f authority between the PBC text and the CCC, and 
presumably regard it as safer to criticise the one, but not the other. See Lewis Ayres and Stephen E 
Fowl, “(Mis)Reading the Face of God: The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church,” Theological 
Studies 60, (1999), 519.
In general, the assumption that I make in this study is that the literal sense of scripture is that discov­
erable by the historical study of the texts, but that the literal sense is not the only valid meaning of 
those texts: the literal sense is dynamically related to later theological understandings. The issue of 
how one might judge between such later theological understandings is a further question, the answer 
to which would include reference to the use o f those texts in the church’s liturgical and prayer prac­
tices, as well as the church’s official magisterium etc.
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And the Christ event is not the “Jesus” event. Christ and the Holy Spirit are be­
lieved to be present in the church throughout the ages, the Spirit guiding us “into all 
truth” (Jn 16:13). Once we embrace some such broader understanding of “Christ 
event” and its mediation, it becomes clear that Enlightenment historiography cannot 
offer an adequate guide for theology in its appropriation o f the biblical witness.
The issue o f how precisely the biblical texts function as source in theology is 
more decisive for trinitarian theology than for most other areas o f theology. The ad­
ded difficulty for theology of the Trinity has been stated above: the inconvenient 
datum that the biblical authors are not now held to have themselves directly ex­
pressed a doctrine o f the Trinity. I f  the bible is the source o f theology, i f  the bible is 
now read in a historically sensitive way, then the matter o f rooting trinitarian theo­
logy in the bible comes to be seen as a rather complex task, more complex today 
than hitherto.
I believe that a good place to begin unravelling these34 issues is at one re­
move from the traditional concerns of trinitarian theology. This study begins there­
fore with christology.35 While it may be the case that the New Testament authors do 
not directly present a doctrine of the Trinity, it is undoubtedly the case that those 
authors intend to present reflections on the identity and significance o f Jesus as the 
Christ. The current study follows this order o f presentation: beginning with christo­
logy, it ends with trinitarian theology. David Coffey’s theology is consistent with 
this orientation, and draws our attention to christology as the systematic starting 
point for trinitarian theology. This choice should not be regarded as obvious. Tradi­
tionally the link between trinitarian theology and christology has been weaker than 
one might expect.36
34 I recognise the need to distinguish the epistemological order from the ontological order, the via 
inventionis from the via doctrinae. That is why I italicised the word “these.” In reflecting on other 
issues, christology may not be the best starting place.
35 In its ordinary uses, I will use lower case “c” for “christology.” In special cases, however, such 
as “Logos Christology” and “Spirit Christology,” I will capitalise the word for the purposes of 
emphasis.
36, O ’Collins notes that “[i]n the ‘bad old days’ one could write a christological study and largely 
leave out the Trinity, and -  vice versa -  one could write a trinitarian study that made little or no ref­
erence to Jesus of Nazareth.” See O’Collins, “The Holy Trinity: The State of the Questions,” 3.
Another Australian theologian, Anne Hunt writes that:
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Coffey’s focus on the christological point of departure for trinitarian theology 
has a particular focus: the pneumatological dimensions o f the Christ event. His 
christology may, therefore, be located within the context o f recent theological in­
terest in “Spirit Christology.” A brief word may be suitable here in order to clarify 
the importance o f  this theme for trinitarian theology.
I f  it is true that “classical” trinitarian theology paid surprisingly little attention 
to Jesus, it paid even less attention to the trinitarian implications of the relation of 
the Spirit to Jesus. The effort to give an account of the pneumatological dimensions 
of the Christ event is generically referred to as “Spirit Christology,” and represents 
an area o f considerable interest in recent theology.37 If  christology looks, as urged 
above, to be the best starting point for trinitarian theology, then surely a Spirit 
Christology might be expected to be an even more fruitful subject of research, inas­
much as it has something to say not just about the “second divine person” (as later 
theology would call the Logos) but also about the “third divine person” (again post- 
biblical language). The question thus arises: does Spirit Christology offer a point o f 
access to trinitarian theology suited to the assumptions o f  contemporary theology? 
Coffey’s suggestion that not only does it offer a point o f access, but that it offers 
the best point o f access is a central concern o f this study.
The specific focus of this study, accordingly, is the examination of the traject­
ory o f thought by which Coffey links Spirit Christology with trinitarian theology. 
This is examined from the methodological and systematic points o f view. This is 
not, therefore, a general study of the theology of David Coffey, nor even of his
development of the classical christological doctrine, while undoubtedly grounded in Chris­
tian faith in the triune God and designed to protect the realism of Christian faith in Jesus’ 
humanity and divinity, followed in the direction established in the development of trinitari­
an doctrine and took a strongly metaphysical turn that left it strangely remote from its trin­
itarian origins and bearings and, moreover, from the mystery of Jesus’ life, death and resur­
rection. The explicit connection of the doctrines o f Trinity and Christology is in fact by no 
means to be presumed [....]
See Anne Hunt, Trinity: Nexus of the Mysteries of Christian Faith, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis
Books, 2005), 56-57.
37 See below at p. 3 If.
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Spirit Christology, his pneumatology or his trinitarian theology. The presentation 
offered has the specific purpose of showing how Coffey takes Spirit Christology as 
an economic starting point for trinitarian theology.38 Specifically, it focusses on 
how Coffey finds the basis in a pneumatologically-focussed reading o f the story of 
Jesus for a “mutual love” pneumatology and how this in turn calls for modifications 
in trinitarian theology itself.
To date the most substantial presentation o f Coffey’s work is that o f Ralph 
Del Colie.39 The latter presents Coffey’s work in significant continuity with the 
neo-scholastic tradition, even as it pushes beyond the limits of neo-scholasticism. 
This means, however, that Del Colie chooses to begin “in good scholastic fashion 
with the [...] intra-trinitarian relations.”40 In my study, I invert the order, and begin 
with the “economy of salvation” and specifically with Spirit Christology. Del 
Colie’s book, further, was published in 1994, and is no longer comprehensive in its 
treatment. Anne Hunt notes that Del Colle’s treatment o f Coffey needs updating 
and that a “thorough assessment” of Coffey’s contribution is needed.41 While the 
current work may not be “thorough” in its assessment, within its limits it aims at 
filling a real need by contributing to the reception o f this important theologian’s
38 See o. 56 on p. 24 below for an expression of caution about the use of the term “starting point” 
in theology generally, and in Coffey’s theology in particular.
39 Ralph Del Colle, Christ and Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian Perspective, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). Del Colle devotes just one (lengthy) chapter to David Coffey’s 
theology, but the book as a whole serves to sets Coffey’s work in context, and examines its impact 
and significance.
Another book that makes significant reference to Coffey’s work is Edward Kiknartin, Christian 
Liturgy: Theology and Practice: I. Systematic Theology o f Liturgy, (Kansas: Sheed & Ward, 1988). 
This book, however, simply assumes many of Coffey’s positions without attempting to explain 
them. Kilmartin’s interest is in the application o f Coffey’s theology to questions of liturgical theo­
logy. He also takes the liberty of proposing modifications to Coffey’s thought without clearly stating 
where and why he does so. Like Del Colle, Kilmartin assumes a starting point in the “immanent 
Trinity.”
The current study more faithfully follows the itinerary that the later Coffey clearly indicates: begin­
ning with the biblical data about the “economy of salvation” and moving towards the “immanent 
Trinity,” and then back to the “economic Trinity.”
40 Del Colle, Christ and Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian Perspective, 97.
41 See Hunt, Trinity: Nexus of the Mysteries of Christian Faith, 71.
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work.42 Beyond its value to the appropriation o f Coffey’s contribution, it is hoped 
that this study might also provide some valuable impulses to the question of how 
trinitarian theology emerges from a pneumatologically-informed christology.
(b) The Status o f the “Immanent Trinity”
I now draw attention to a second general theme: the status o f the doctrine of 
the “immanent” Trinity. Theology of the “immanent” Trinity pushes beyond the 
christological starting point that I have specified to statements about God in se. If, 
as stated above, it is already a complex matter to fmd a direct statement o f the 
Trinity in the bible, it is all the more difficult to find a directly biblical basis for talk 
o f the “immanent Trinity.”43
This being so, what is the status o f “ immanent Trinity” talk? In contemporary 
theology we find voices strongly in favour o f the doctrine, and voices strongly 
against it. Among those in favour of the doctrine we find two extreme tendencies: 
some theologians support it precisely because it isolates talk o f the Trinity from talk 
o f the economy of salvation,44 while others look to it for what appears to be the op­
posite reason: in order to draw lessons from this doctrine for human living.45 Per­
haps we can speak of the first attitude as an “apophatic” approach to the “immanent 
Trinity;” and o f the second as the “cataphatic” approach to the “immanent Trinity.”
We will see instances of the “apophatic approach” to the theology of the “im­
manent Trinity” in the course of this study. The basic feature o f  this approach is 
that it sees the doctrine of the “immanent Trinity” as an attempt to avoid saying too
42 The importance of Coffey’s contribution is only beginning to be recognised. One recent book 
notes “Coffey is one of the most influential proponents o f a revitalized Spirit-christology that em­
phasizes the Spirit’s constitutive role in the Incarnation.” See F. LeRon Shults and Andrea 
Hollingsworth, The Holy Spirit, Guides to Theology, vol. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B 
Eerdmans, 2008).
43 The theological attempt at describing God in se, that is, prescinding from God’s action in the 
economy of salvation, is generally dated to the 4th century.
44 The purpose of the “immanent” Trinity, therefore, is to ensure that theology does not comprom­
ise a proper sense of God’s transcendence and freedom. See, for example, Paul Molnar, “The Trinity 
and the Freedom of God,” Journal for Christian Theological Research 8, (2003): 59-66.
45 I make reference below to the example of Leonardo Boff.
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much about God. The various distinctions and definitions associated with tradition­
al theology are viewed as serving precisely to set out a grammar that discourages us 
from thinking of God as a “being,” discourages us from reducing God to the com­
prehensible.46 In contrast to this, we also find theologians who appear to manifest a 
kind of “cataphatic” approach to the “ immanent Trinity.” I have mentioned the al­
leged isolation of the tract on the Trinity within the received theology, and specific­
ally the paucity in the inherited neo-scholastic tradition o f explicit consideration on 
the doctrine’s relevance to the whole range of Christian experience. Attempting to 
overcome this isolation and lack of clear application o f traditional trinitarian theo­
logy, many rich attempts have been made to show how, far from being irrelevant, 
the doctrine o f the Trinity throws light on a broad range of fields o f human life.
A curious feature of some such efforts is the extent to which many of these ef­
forts draw directly on the conceptual apparatus that evolved in discussion of the 
“immanent Trinity” and attempt to show how these apply to the world of our exper­
ience. Terms like “person,” “perichoresis” are found to be richly suggestive as 
guidance for ordinary human situations and interactions. It is often urged that trinit­
arian theology offers a model for human life in all o f its richness. I will cite a pas­
sage from Leonardo Boff to illustrate this approach:
Seeing people as image and likeness of the Trinity implies always setting 
them in open relationship with others; it is only through being with others, 
understanding themselves as others see them, being through others, that 
they can build their own identities. Personal incommunicability exists only
Some patristic texts insisting on the incomprehensibility of God are assembled in Olivier 
Clément, The Roots of Christian Mysticism: Texts and Commentary, (London: New City, 1993), 26- 
34.
One recent example of this interpretation of the purpose o f the doctrine of the “immanent Trinity” is 
that of Karen Kilby. She argues that in the case of Thomas o f Aquinas, the veiy purpose of his “im­
manent Trinity” theology is to show how comprehensively we do not understand God. Kilby, 
“Perichoresis and Projection: Problems With Social Doctrines of the Trinity”; Karen Kilby, 
“Aquinas, the Trinity and the Limits of Understanding,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology (2005): 414-427.
Matthew Levering has sought to offer some nuances to Kilby’s position. See Karen Kilby, 
“Response to Matthew Levering,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, (2007): 55-57; 
Matthew Levering, “Friendship and Trinitarian Theology: Response to Karen Kilby,” International 
Journal o f Systematic Theology 9, (2007): 39-54. Another recent response to Kilby is found in Alan 
Darley, “To What Extent Can Aquinas’ Understanding o f the Trinity be Termed ‘Apophatic’?,” 
Quadlibet Journal, http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/darley-aquinas.shtml (accessed 25 May 2009).
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so as to allow communion with other people. In the light of the Trinity, be­
ing a person in the image and likeness of the divine Persons means acting as 
a permanently active web of relationships: relating backwards and upwards 
to one’s origin in the unfathomable mystery of the Father, relating outwards 
to one’s fellow human beings by revealing oneself to them and welcoming 
the revelation of them in the mystery of the Son, relating inwards to the 
depths of one’s own personality in the mystery of the Spirit.47
Interesting to note is the range of reactions this kind of reflection provokes. For 
some, such attempts to throw trinitarian “light” on human interactions is inspiring, 
edifying and fruitful. For others, such talk appears to be uncontrolled, perhaps even 
fanciful.48
Note the important difference in focus between the traditional theologies of 
the “immanent Trinity” on which such attempts draw, on the one hand, and the 
more recent attempts at demonstrating the doctrine’s relevance, on the other. In re­
cent theology, the focus on the theological notion of “person,” for instance, often 
leads towards pictures of the “inner” life of the Trinity as an interaction of distinct 
persons.49 This is in strong contrast to the attempts made in traditional theology to
47, Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society, Liberation and Theology, vol. 2, (Kent: Bums and Oates, 
1988), 149.
48, Such a reaction will in turn not be comprehended by those who manifest the first kind of reac­
tion. Neil Ormerod recognises the possibility o f this kind of mutual incomprehension when he writes 
o f the mistake of covertly introducing “interpersonal categories into the Trinitarian relationships”:
This may seem an odd objection to make. Given the large-scale adoption of such categories 
in modem Trinitarian theology, an interpersonal consideration of the Trinitarian life is be­
ing hailed as a major advance in theological thought. But there is a problem concealed 
here. [...]
See Neil Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, Marquette Studies in Theology, 
vol. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005), 130. Another problem that Ormerod would 
find in talk such as that found in BofFs is the appeal it makes to the imagination. Again, many 
would regard an appeal to the imagination as an excellent thing, but Ormerod is concerned to pre­
serve a kind o f “intellectual asceticism” that controls exuberant language. The principal target o f his 
complaints about an appeal to the imagination is Hans Urs von Balthasar, but he would find ele­
ments o f this “problem” in B off s writing too. See Ibid., 28-29.
49 Another theologian who urges what I call an “apophatic” approach to the “immanent” Trinity is 
Phillip Cary. The latter has argued that recent theology misconstrues the purpose o f the theological 
task when it thinks of understanding the “inner self’ of God as a proper objective in theology. Such 
an approach is deeply modem, and thus alien to the sensitivities of the “classical tradition.” He 
denies, furthermore, that the notion of an “inner self’ is a helpful construction, even in ordinary 
human relationships. This article also denies substantial differences between Eastern and Western 
theology such as those assumed by Rahner and his followers. The substantial differences, he thinks, 
are between the “classical tradition” (East and West) and modem theology o f the form proposed by 
Rahner. See Phillip Cary, “On Behalf of Classical Trinitarianism: A Critique of Rahner on the 
Trinity,” The Thomist 56, (1992): 365M05.
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avoid anything that might threaten the heritage of monotheism.50 If  it true that the 
doctrine o f the “immanent Trinity” developed as a series o f measures designed, in 
part at least, to exclude too clear an analogy being drawn between human persons 
and divine persons, it is curious to note how significantly eroded this reserve has 
been in much recent theology. A sign of this erosion is the easy embrace of images 
o f the Trinity as a “community” or a “family” in contemporary homiletics. Such 
language would surely horrify the sustainers o f the “classical” approach.
Questions of the status of the doctrine o f Trinity, and theology of the “imman­
ent Trinity” in particular are, in brief, o f central importance in contemporary trinit­
arian theology. I will argue that David Coffey’s contribution to this node of ques­
tions is significant. Coffey’s theology might strike some readers as a sustained 
defence of the theology of the “immanent Trinity” by some, and others as yet an­
other instance o f the erosion of this doctrine. The current study shows how both ap­
proaches miss the point. The key to understanding Coffey’s approach to the “im­
manent Trinity” lies in his reformulation o f Karl Rahner’s Grundaxiom, such that 
judgement on his approach to the “immanent” Trinity is bound up with the precise 
role he gives to this doctrine in his theology as a whole.
One should think of Coffey as offering a new reading of the function of “im­
manent” trinity discourse. As we will see in Chapter Four below, Coffey applies an 
insight from Lonergan’s analysis of cognitive structure to the matter, and distin­
guishes three levels of discourse about the Trinity. He places the theology o f the 
“immanent Trinity” as the second stage in a three-part itinerary, building on the 
first stage (the biblical mediation of the Christ event), and dynamically oriented to­
wards the third (a deeper appropriation of the economy o f salvation). In this way, I
30- Note that in some recent authors, in contrast, the term “monotheism” is self-evidently negative. 
We have cited Rahner’s references to “mere monotheism.” Boff is a httle more careful by speaking 
of “rigid” or “a-trinitarian” monotheism. See Boff, Trinity and Society, 20-23. For Moltmann, on 
the other hand, the word “monotheism” is unequivocally negative: it is the opposite of trimtarianism. 
In the words of Ted Peters, Moltmann denies “that Christianity should be monotheistic at all.” See 
Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life, (Louisville: Westminster: 
John Knox Press, 1993), 103. In the cases alluded to above, in contrast, the heritage of monotheism 
is regarded as a cornerstone of both religious and intellectual responsibility.
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argue, his work offers a solution to the impasse sketched above. I noted that a 
weakness in many attempts to demonstrate this relevance o f trinitarian discourse 
lies in the attempt to draw categories from the theology o f the “immanent Trinity,” 
and apply these to matters of practical concern in the world, and that such a cata- 
phatic manoeuvre appears to contrast with the apophatic intention o f traditional ap­
proaches to the “immanent” Trinity.
Coffey’s identification of three levels (rather than Rahner’s two) o f trinitarian 
discourse, I argue, helps redefine the debate about the “immanent” Trinity and 
overcome the impasse. Consider the following long quotation from Deus Trinitas, 
where Coffey considers the:
question about the legitimacy of theologies of the Trinity based on concepts 
belonging to the immanent Trinity. A case in point is Leonardo Boffs 
Trinity and Society. This book attempts the laudable task of presenting the 
Trinity in the light of liberation theology. In so doing, it adopts as central 
the concept of perichoresis, the interpenetration of the three divine persons 
of the immanent Trinity, seeing this as the model for liberation in human 
society. Boff maintains that this concept provides ‘impulses to liberation.’
Like many, Coffey is critical of the methodological framework that is implicit in
such a direct use o f the theology of the “immanent” Trinity. He continues:
This may be true, but, if so, it is hardly true in a very effective way, seeing 
that we have no experience of the interaction among the persons of the im­
manent Trinity. The desired impulses come more strongly from the New 
Testament, and in a more sophisticated form from the doctrine of the econ­
omic Trinity, from the teaching that all human beings are created equal be­
fore God and are destined to be his children in Christ, and therefore broth­
ers and sisters of each other, in the power of the Holy Spirit. Our statements 
about the immanent Trinity may be formally correct, and therefore do cor­
respond, albeit in a highly inadequate way, to the reality of God, but for us 
they lack the experiential content that is necessary as a basis for a theology, 
granted that today any theology seeking acceptance must be able to evince 
pastoral relevance. Experiential content is acquired by completing the three- 
stepped process outlined above, by returning to the biblical data and from 
there developing a theology in dialogue with the tradition and with the con­
tributions and questions of the present age.51
Here we see not just that Coffey is aware o f the issue, but that he sees that an an­
swer lies in relocating much discourse about the “relevance” of the Trinity from the 
level o f the “immanent Trinity” to what he calls the “economic Trinity.” Chapters
51' Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 20.
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Four and Five below show how Coffey’s re-formulation o f Rahner’s Grundaxiom 
both allows a positive function to “immanent” Trinity talk, but also ensures that 
such talk retains a soteriological orientation.
(c) Some Applications
Two others areas of particular interest to contemporary theology should be 
briefly mentioned here, so as to alert the reader at the outset to the implications of 
Coffey’s project, and by extension of the current study. The first is the matter o f the 
filioque, which continues to represent a node o f disagreement between Eastern and 
Western churches. Coffey’s theology proposes itself as a way o f transcending the 
impasse by placing them in a new light. While I do not fully explore Coffey’s 
achievement from this point o f view, I hope to indicate the value o f further engage­
ment with his positions in relation to this important matter.
The other area where Coffey’s theology could be expected to make an import­
ant contribution, one of urgent interest in the early years o f the 21st century, is the 
question of the theology of religions. A number o f high profile attempts by Catholic 
theologians at exploring a pneumatological basis for a theology o f religions have 
run into difficulty precisely on the question of their relation to the Christ event. 
Coffey’s pneumatological christology offers, I believe, a very promising attempt at 
overcoming some of the difficulties that have characterised the recent attempts o f 
thinkers like Dupuis, Haight and Phan. While the current study does not specifically 
address these matters, it does set the context for a more direct appropriation of 
Coffey’s contribution to this debate, one on which he has him self published import­
ant reflections.
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3. The Structure of the Work
I present the core of Coffey’s argument in two parts, the first is christological 
and pneumatological in focus (Chapters One to Three) and the second is more 
specifically trinitarian (Chapter Four and Five).
The christologically and pneumatologically focused first part takes the shape 
of a three-stage argument. This structure is suggested by the following important 
statement o f Coffey’s:
[1] I f  Jesus is brought into being as the divine Son in humanity through the 
Father’s radical bestowal of love, which love is the Holy Spirit and [2] i f  the 
response of Jesus is a love for the Father which ultimately is a return of the 
same Spirit, [3] then in the immanent Trinity, the Holy Spirit exists as the 
mutual love of the Father and the Son.52
It is possible that some readers will read this statement and wonder why I have de­
scribed it as “important.” In order to show its importance, I will devote a chapter to 
each of its three component parts (Chapters One to Three), and highlight where 
each of them differs from “classical” theology. As I present it, Coffey’s theology is 
in dialectical relationship with the “classical” tradition on a number o f important 
points. It is precisely in pushing beyond the limits o f the “classical” tradition that he 
makes his important contributions.
The second part of this presentation, Chapters Four and Five, takes up the data 
from this christologically and pneumatologically focused first part and probes its 
significance for trinitarian theology. Chapter Four focuses on Coffey’s reformula­
tion o f Rahner’s Grundaxiom (that the “economic Trinity” is the “immanent 
Trinity” and vice versa).53 Chapter Five focuses on the elaboration o f the two-model 
approach to the Trinity. This I characterise as an attempt to show the dialectical re­
lationship between the positions suggested by Spirit Christology and those de­
veloped in the “classical” synthesis o f christology and trinitarian theology. This ap­
52' Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 479-480; Coffey, “A Proper Mission 
of the Holy Spirit,” 234.1 have added the numbers for ease of reference.
53 This is stated in various places. See, for example, Rahner, The Trinity, 22.
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proach has among its other benefits the offer of a framework for moving beyond the 
filioque impasse. Throughout my presentation, I invoke the voices o f past and 
present representatives of the “classical” synthesis to help frame the issues.54
David Coffey’s theology, in brief, offers rich and stimulating contributions to 
a number o f areas of pressing current interest. It is, to be sure, an expression o f the 
recent “revival” of trinitarian theology, but I argue that it is one that is better under­
stood an attempt to take a further step in trinitarian theology. The seeds of this “fur­
ther step” are found precisely in his attempt to elaborate a “trinitarian” Spirit Chris- 
tology responsive to the complete biblical witness, but also to the theological 
tradition. We turn now to the core o f  this Spirit Christology: the theme o f the 
anointing o f Jesus.
54 Particularly helpful has been the work of the contemporary Australian theologian Neil Ormerod. 
The latter was initially appreciative of Coffey’s contribution, devoting a Masters’ Thesis to Coffey. 
Neil Ormerod, “The Holy Spirit -  Feeling of God: The Theme of the Holy Spirit as the Love of the 
Father and the Son in the Writings of David Coffey and Its Dialectic Revival Within a 
Contemporary Transcendental Anthropology” (Melbourne College of Divinity, 1988). Note: I have 
not been able to consult this unpublished work.
More recently Ormerod has positioned himself as Coffey’s most vocal opponent. See Neil Ormerod, 
“Wrestling With Rahner on the Trinity,” Irish Theological Quarterly 68, (2003): 213-227; 
Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition-, Neil Ormerod, “What is the Task of 
Systematic Theology?,” Australian EJournal of Theology, http://dlibraiy.acu.edu.au/research/ 
theology/ejoumal/aejt_8/ormerod.htm (accessed 20 July 2009); Neil Ormerod, “Questio Disputata: 
Two Points Or Four? -  Rahner and Lonergan on Trinity, Incarnation, Grace, and Beatific Vision,” 
Theological Studies 68, (2007): 661-673; Neil Ormerod, “The Goal of Systematic Theology,” Irish 
Theological Quarterly 1A, (2009): 38-52.
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1. The Anointing of Jesus as 
“Starting Point”
1. Introduction
The key to Coffey’s trinitarian theology is found in his pneumatology, and the 
key to his pneumatology in his Spirit Christology. The current study follows the 
“ascending” logic of Coffey’s argument as it moves from Spirit Christology to 
pneumatological conclusion and from there to trinitarian theology. The starting 
point for this “ascending” path is Coffey’s experiment in Spirit Christology, so I be­
gin there.55
£5 A preliminary note on the terms “starting point” and “ascending theology” may help allay some 
possible confusion with the terminology. By “starting point” here is intended the starting point of 
Coffey’s argument, rather than the starting point for pneumatology or trinitarian theology as such. 
As we shall see, Coffey accepts the basic validity of the classical tradition and situates his efforts 
within the ongoing evolution of theology. Coffey sets out an argument for what he regards as an im­
portant step forward in theology. Talk of “starting point” here, as will become clear, does not imply 
that he attempts to stand outside or prior to the classical tradition. He does not, as Neil Ormerod ap­
pears to believe, set aside the theological tradition and return to the biblical data and attempt a theo­
logy ex novo on that basis. See Ormerod, “The Goal of Systematic Theology,” 47.
Similar points need to be made in relation to “ascending” method. As we will see, Coffey seeks to 
synthesise the “yield” of descending and ascending theologies. He does not counter-pose the two, as 
though “ascending” theology inevitably sweeps away “descending” theology. Assuming the basic 
validity of “descending” theology, rather, Coffey seeks to develop an “ascending” theology that ad­
dresses some of the lacunae and weaknesses o f descending theology. What precisely Coffey intends 
with the term “ascending” theology and how he relates it to “descending” theology will be directly 
addressed below at p. 109f.
Caution about such ambiguous terminology as “starting point,” “ascending” and “descending” is al­
ways necessaiy. See, for example, Nicholas Lash, “Up and Down in Christology,” in New Studies in 
Theology, ed. Stephen Sykes and Derek Holmes, (London: Duckworth, 1980); Edward Krasevac, L., 
‘“Christology From Above’ and ‘Christology From Below’,” The Thomist (1987): 299-306; John 
McDade, “The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery,” Heythrop Journal 29, (1988), 184; Terrence 
Tilley, “Remembering the Historic Jesus: A New Research Program?,” Theological Studies 68,
(2007): 3-35.
All of these points call for, and will receive, further elaboration. This note aims simply at en­
couraging the reader to suspend judgement on how precisely terms like “starting point” and “ascend­
ing” are to be interpreted. While Coffey’s theology is strongly engaged in dialogue with many o f the
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I have already introduced three important statements that will guide our ex­
ploration of Coffey’s experiment in Spirit Christology and the suitability of this as a 
basis for an argument in trinitarian theology.56 Before looking specifically at the 
first o f these, let us look at the three together, so as to discern the general shape of 
the argument under examination.
The first statement is as follows: “Jesus is brought into being as the divine Son 
in humanity through the Father’s radical bestowal o f love, which love is the Holy 
Spirit.”57 This pregnant statement forms the focus o f interest for the current chapter. 
Whereas the first statement addresses the reception of the Holy Spirit that brings 
about the human existence of Jesus, the second addresses the return o f the Spirit by 
Jesus to the Father: “the response of Jesus is a love for the Father which ultimately 
is a return of the same Spirit.” This second statement is considered in Chapter Two. 
For ease of reference, we might call these two statements respectively Thesis A and 
Thesis B n  The broader argument under consideration takes these theses as 
premisses and from them draws a conclusion. The argument is that //Thesis A and 
Thesis B are true, then we are in a position to draw an important conclusion about 
the Holy Spirit from the force o f these two statements. This conclusion, which we 
will call Coffey’s pneumatological conclusion, is that the Holy Spirit should be 
understood as the mutual love o f  the Father and the Son. It is discussed in Chapter 
Three below.
voices o f contemporary theology, one needs always to be attentive to his specific use of such terms. 
In order to understand his theological proposal, careful attention to his use of terms will be essential.
56, See p. 22 above.
57 This and the quotations in the rest of this paragraph come from Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of 
the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 479-480. They are quoted also in Coffey, “A Proper Mission o f the Holy 
Spirit,” 234.
58 Coffey does not speak of Thesis A and B, or give these the same structuring function that I give 
them in the current study. By adopting this terminology, I intend, however, to give prominence to 
what I take to be a central structuring argument in Coffey’s thought.
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2. Preliminary Clarifications
Before setting Thesis A in context, it will be well to offer some basic clarifica­
tions about its intention. The first clarification relates to the type o f discourse in­
volved. In Thesis A we find a theological interpretation o f the biblical theme o f the 
anointing o f Jesus.59 Note that by “anointing” here, Coffey is referring not only to 
biblical texts about the baptism of Jesus, or Acts 10:38, Romans 1:4, but also and 
crucially to Luke 1:35, which places the anointing at the very moment of coming 
into being of Jesus as a human being. Jesus receives the Holy Spirit from God in an 
“anointing.”60 This reception is somehow foundational o f his very existence as 
Son.61 Because o f this anointing, Jesus is marked out as the “Christ.” Coffey’s theo­
logical interpretation of the biblical theme o f anointing involves understanding it as 
a “bestowal” o f “love,” a love which is the Holy Spirit.62 It is as a result of this 
anointing that Jesus is “brought into being as the divine Son in humanity.”
Note that Coffey’s theological interpretation o f the anointing involves trinit­
arian talk of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. He does not intend with this use o f the 
vocabulary of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, to suggest that the biblical authors them­
selves intended to speak of three distinct trinitarian persons such as would only 
have been possible in the light of a fully-developed trinitarian theology. He knows
59 It is of course recognised that the biblical texts can themselves be understood as theological in­
terpretation. For the sake of simplicity, however, the distinction may be accepted, with “biblical” 
standing for the literal meaning of biblical texts, and “theological” standing for post-biblical inter­
pretations of these texts going beyond the ‘literal’ meaning.
60 This final text is important, since without it the danger of ‘adoptionism’ is real. Coffey dis­
cusses the biblical background to the theme of anointing and its patristic reception in Coffey, Grace: 
The Gift o f the Holy Spirit, 120-144.
61 He writes that in his theology, there is “no element of adoptionism, since the humanity o f Jesus 
is declared not to have existed prior to the anointing.” See Ibid., 120.
62 Chapter Three below explores how the term “love” here is to be understood.
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the importance of distinguishing between the literal meaning o f biblical texts and 
biblical themes on the one hand,63 and later theological interpretations o f those 
texts, on the other.64
In relation to the specific matter o f the interpretation o f biblical anointing 
texts, the question of the distinct personal being o f the Son and the Holy Spirit 
arises. Does the fact that doctrinal clarity on the distinct personal identity o f the 
three divine persons came only in the fourth century mean that we should be scep­
tical about any trinitarian interpretation o f the biblical theme o f the anointing?
Coffey is aware not only that there is no developed doctrine o f the Trinity in 
the New Testament, but also that there is not even clarity in the New Testament on 
whether or how the Holy Spirit should be thought o f as distinct from God or, in­
deed, from Christ. Coffey agrees with those scholars that hold that the term “Holy 
Spirit” in the New Testament, when read historically, should probably be presumed 
to be equivalent to “Spirit of God,” that is, the “power of God,” or “Yahweh him­
self apprehended in his action.”65 Where New Testament references to the Holy 
Sprit are personal, he accepts that it is probable that such references were intended 
by their authors as pointing to the personal dynamic action of God as such, rather 
than the Holy Spirit as distinct.66
63 On the “literal meaning” of biblical texts see above at p. 11.
64 The reader need not infer that such interpretation is arbitrary. One might see here the work of 
the Holy Spirit, who guides the church into all truth (John 16:13).
65, Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 11. For a general overview of the bib­
lical understanding of the “Spirit of God” see Ibid., 10-11. Elsewhere Coffey writes “It is not pos­
sible for any part of the Bible to present the same doctrine o f the Holy Spirit as that of the First 
Council of Constantinople.” Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f the Holy Spirit, 128; Coffey, “The Palamite 
Doctrine of God: A New Perspective,” 350; Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the 
Father and the Son,” 210.
For a general overview of biblical meanings of the term “Holy Spirit” see Geoffrey Lampe, “Holy 
Spirit,” in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bble: Volume 2: E-J, ed. George Arthur Buttrick, 
(New York: Abingdon Press, 1962); Eduard Schweizer, ‘Tlveupa, HveupaxiKoc, nveco, EKjrveto, 
©sojrvsooioc;,” in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament: Volume 6: Tie -  P, ed. Gerhard 
Friedrich, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968); F. W. Horn, 
“Holy Spirit,” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary: Volume 3: H - J ,  ed. David Noel Freedman, (New 
York: Doubleday, 1992).
66 Coffey distinguishes between the question of the personhood (ontological) and the personality 
(psychological) o f the Holy Spirit. Since the New Testament does not penetrate, he thinks, to an on­
tological level of discourse, there is no question o f there being any recognition in it of a distinct per-
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If  Coffey is indeed clear that at the level o f the literal meaning of the biblical 
texts, a fully developed trinitarian reading would be anachronistic, the question 
arises: is he confusing matters by bringing post-New Testament ideas about the dis­
tinction o f Father, Son and Holy Spirit to a reading o f New Testament texts in 
which such a distinction is only obscurely, if  at all, present? The answer is simply 
stated: in using the trinitarian language of the Father bestowing the Holy Spirit on 
the Jesus as Son, Coffey is self-consciously offering a theological interpretation of 
the biblical theme of the anointing of Jesus. Recognising a certain primacy o f the 
literal meaning of biblical texts does not mean ruling out the possibility of a theolo­
gical interpretation of those texts. I will have occasion to comment further on the 
how he handles the biblical data and the complex manner in which he construes the 
relationship between this and the theological interpretation he advances. At this 
stage, it is sufficient to note that in offering a trinitarian reading of the biblical
sonhood of the Holy Spirit. What traces of a recognition o f a personality of the Holy Spirit there are 
in the New Testament are linked with the “personality” of God or with the “personality” of Christ:
no distinct personality is awarded him. The content of the experience of the Holy Spirit re­
mains either the Father or Christ; inasmuch as the Father is transcendent and hence inef­
fable, in practical terms this content must simply be said to be Christ. After the Resurrec­
tion, then, the Holy Spirit has a personality, but it is the personality o f Christ.
See Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 11. See also Coffey, “The Holy Spirit 
as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 212.
There are, however, the beginnings of an awareness of a real distinctness of the Holy Spirit in the 
occasional use of personal pronouns of the Spirit, even in the New Testament. The direction o f de­
velopment of doctrine regarding the Holy Spirit is towards the recognition of distinction, eventually 
frilly recognised by the Council of Constantinople (381). The direction of thought in relation to Jesus 
is, conversely, towards unity with God, which flourishes in the homoousios of the Council of Nicaea 
(325).
For expressions of caution about the attribution of even “personality” to the Holy Spirit, see 
Schweizer, ‘TIveupa, nveupariKoc, nvsco, Ekjtvsco, ©sojrveuaxog” 433-434.
We might note in passing an important early step in the development towards an awareness o f the 
distinctness o f the Holy Spirit, already evident in some New Testament writings, namely the beginn­
ings of an association of the Holy Spirit (the dynamic action of God in the world) with the risen Je­
sus. After the Resurrection, Jesus is understood by the church’s earliest communities to have been 
transferred to the realm of the Spirit, so that the continuation of the gifts that God makes through Je­
sus Christ is understood to be mediated by a Spirit that now has taken on the personality of Jesus. 
See Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ”. Coffey refers for this point to J.D.G. Dunn. See 
James D.G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of 
Jesus as Reflected in the New Testament, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975), 318- 326, 350- 357.
Thus we explain the New Testament references to the “Spirit of Christ.” Just as the Spirit is identi­
fied with the action of God, so too is the Spirit now identified with Jesus Christ.
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theme o f the anointing of Jesus, Coffey is not engaged in ahistorical eisegesis. With 
this first clarification, I have introduced the theme o f the relation of the biblical 
texts to the theological interpretation o f those texts, a theme to which we will 
return.
A second clarification addresses the relation between Coffey’s theological in­
terpretation in Thesis A and the theological interpretations o f the classical trinitari­
an tradition. Although the language employed in Thesis A is that of classical trinit­
arian theology (Father, Son and Holy Spirit, understood as distinct divine persons), 
this language is used in a way that differs in some key respects from that o f the 
classical theological tradition. The more obvious o f these will be here mentioned.
First, note the shape of Thesis A itself. Classical christological statements typ­
ically begin with the idea of the pre-existing divine Son and go on to speak o f the 
Incarnation o f this Son as Jesus.67 The subject here is the pre-existing divine Son. 
This reflects a logic that contemporary theology describes as “descending.” 
Coffey’s statement, in contrast, begins with Jesus (rather than the Eternal Son) and 
describes what happens to Jesus as a result o f the bestowal o f the Spirit. The subject 
here is Jesus. Contemporary theology describes such a structure, beginning with Je­
sus and ending (so to speak) with the Son as “ascending.”
Second, note that the Holy Spirit is portrayed as centrally involved in this ac­
count o f how Jesus is brought into being as “divine Son in humanity.” In this too 
Coffey’s statement diverges from the classical approach in Christology, which does 
not generally invoke the Holy Spirit in accounts o f the Incarnation.
Third, Coffey’s reading of the biblical theme o f the anointing o f Jesus em­
ploys some unusual expressions: Jesus is said to be “brought into being” as divine
67 The “Second Letter of Cyril of Alexandria to Nestorius,” which was accepted as official church 
teaching at the Council of Ephesus (431), exemplifies the typical shape o f the statements of classical 
Christology: “we affirm that the Word, having united to himself according to the hypostasis {hath' 
hupostasin) the flesh animated by a rational soul, became man in an ineffable and incomprehensible 
manner and was called the Son of man.” Translation in The Christian Faith: Doctrinal Documents 
of the Catholic Church, ed. Josef Neuner and Jacques Dupuis, 6th Revised and Expanded Edition 
ed., (New York: Alba House, 1996), 64. Note that the subject is the Word and that no reference to 
the Spirit is made.
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Son “in humanity.” As we will see, in speaking of the divine Son “in humanity,” 
Coffey is referring not just to the idea of hypostatic union, but rather to the effect of 
this union on the humanity of Jesus:68 the sanctification o f that humanity by the 
Holy Spirit, such that that nature becomes “theandric.”69
The task now for the remainder of this chapter is to set Coffey’s Thesis A in 
two contexts. First, I will comment on a broader issue: the relation o f “Spirit Chris- 
tology” to “Logos Christology.” This is important for a number o f reasons, not least 
o f which is the fact that Coffey’s distinctive stand on this matter -  a matter directly 
pertinent to our topic -  helps us find points of comparison and contrast with some 
other theologians writing today. Second, I look at something more specific: the 
question o f the grace of Christ.
3. Spirit and Logos Christology
Recent theology often distinguishes two major approaches to the mystery of 
Christ: Spirit Christologies and Logos Christologies,70 both o f which are said to fmd 
their origin in the New Testament. Logos Christologies build on the use o f the sym­
bol o f  Logos or Word of God found in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. This 
Logos, or “incamational,”71 approach to christology came to dominate christologic- 
al thought (and thereby trinitarian thought) for reasons that I will review. In Logos 
Christologies, the subject, i.e. the one who becomes incarnate, is the divine Logos.
68 In training his attention in this way on the human Jesus and on the activity of the Holy Spirit 
Coffey is not unique: contemporary christology offers many examples o f theologians who, in differ­
ent ways, suggest parallel orientations. The specificity of Coffey’s contribution lies, as we will see, 
not at the level o f these general orientations, but in the way in which he reflects on the sanctifying 
effects of the Holy Spirit on the humanity of Jesus.
6,1 See below at 86f.
70 Roger Haight, for instance, writes that “[m]uch o f present-day christology can be divided 
between Word or Logos christologies and Spirit christologies.” Roger Haight, The Future of 
Christology, (New York: Continuum, 2005), 168.
71 The Johannine Logos becomes “flesh” (John 1:14), so Johannine christology is thought of as 
incamational.
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The second form o f christology under consideration, “Spirit Christology,” has 
attracted the attention of theologians over the last few decades.72 Spirit Christology 
is so called because o f the close attention it pays to the relation of the Spirit with Je­
sus the Christ, often appealing to the idea o f the Holy Spirit sanctifying the human 
Jesus as the Christ (= anointed one). For Spirit Christology, the idea o f “anointing” 
often occupies a place analogous to, though not identical with, that o f “Incarnation” 
in Logos Christology. Since Spirit Christology is said to find its biblical ground in 
the synoptic gospels, especially in texts such as the baptism accounts, Spirit Chris- 
tologies are often thought of as the fruit o f synoptic christologies, and as such are 
sometimes thought of as a scripturally-based alternative to Johannine Logos 
Christologies.
Even on the basis o f this brief sketch, we can see in Coffey’s Thesis A the 
outline o f what is identifiably a Spirit Christology.73 Jesus, he writes, is brought into 
being as “divine Son in humanity” through an anointing or “bestowal” with the 
Holy Spirit. The subject in this statement is the human Jesus, a subject brought into 
human existence through anointing, and the biblical symbol o f the Holy Spirit is ap­
pealed to in the explanation of the divine element in Christ.
72 Rosato writes: “cross-disciplinary theological studies are converging on the most ancient of 
Christologies, the Pneuma-sarx Christology of early Christianity.” See Philip Rosato, J., “Spirit 
Christology: Ambiguity and Promise,” Theological Studies 38, (1977): 423-449.
The literature evidencing this revival of interest in Spirit Christology is vast, and by no means uni­
form. Alongside the authors given direct attention here see Harold Hunter, “Spirit Christology: 
Dilemma and Promise (1),” Heythrop Journal 24/2, (1983): 127-140; Newman, Paul, A Spirit 
Christology: Recovering the Biblical Paradigm, (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 
1987); John J. O ’Donnell, “In Him and Over Him: The Holy Spirit in the Life of Jesus,” 
Gregorianum 70, no. 1 (1989): 25—15; Harold Hunter, “The Resurgence of Spirit Christology,” 
EPTA Bulletin 11, (1992): 50-57; John McDade, “Jesus and the Spirit,” The Month 27, (1994): 498- 
503; Clark H. Pinnock, Flame o f Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit, (Dowers Grove, Illinois: IVP 
Academic, 1996); Robert Imbelli, “The New Adam and Life-Giving Spirit: The Paschal Pattern of 
Spirit Christology,” Communio: An International Catholic Review 25, (1998): 233-252; Denis 
Edwards, Breath of Life: A Theology of the Creator Spirit, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004); 
Steven Studebaker, “integrating Pneumatology and Christology: A Trinitarian Modification of Clark 
H. Pinnock’s Spirit Christology,” Pneuma 28, (2006): 5-20; Dermot Lane, “Pneumatology in the 
Service of Ecumenism and Inter-Religious Dialogue: A Case o f Neglect?,” Louvain Studies 33,
(2008): 136-158.
73 David Coffey did not use the term “Spirit Christology” of his work initially, but embraced it 
after Ralph Del Colie described it as such.
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Coffey, however, as we will see, does not construe the relationship between 
Logos Christology and Spirit Christology in terms o f alternatives, such that one 
must choose between one and the other. Coffey’s variety of Spirit Christology, fur­
thermore, is distinctively a trinitarian Spirit Christology. Since these are qualities 
that distinguish his efforts from some other recent attempts at Spirit Christology, 
some closer attention should be given to them here.
(a) Spirit and Logos Christology in Historical Context
Perhaps the easiest way to present the relationship between Spirit and Logos 
Christologies is by appeal to historical narrative. According to Coffey’s version of 
this narrative, “early Spirit Christology” developed in the period directly following 
the New Testament period, a period which had not yet arrived at a clear sense of the 
divine personhood of the Holy Spirit,74 and therefore remains -  in its theology at 
least -  pre-trinitarian.75 What characterised this early Spirit Christology was the at­
tempt to account for the “divinity” of Jesus in terms of the scriptural idea of the 
Holy Spirit rather than the Logos.
Coffey holds that the earliest forms o f such post-biblical Spirit Christology 
depend on a reformulation of biblical flesh-spirit two-stage Christology. Biblical 
flesh-spirit two-stage Christology, it will be recalled, presented Jesus as having 
passed, in the resurrection, from “flesh” to “spirit,” as may be found, for instance, 
in Romans l:3 f  and 1 Peter 3:18. In such New Testament christologies, the terms 
“flesh” and “spirit” had represented modes of existence. Thus, prior to his resurrec­
74 As we will see below, there was considerable ambiguity about how the term “Holy Spirit” was 
to be understood. The clear distinction that later theology sometimes posits between Logos and 
Spirit Christology can tend to break down once we recognise the fact that the terms “Spirit” and 
“Son” were sometimes used interchangeably. For a general introduction to early forms of Spirit 
Christology, see M Simonetti, “Note di cristologia pneumatica,” Augustinianum 12, (1972): 201— 
232; J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, (Peabody: Prince Press, 2004), 142-145.
75 Del Colie, Christ and Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian Perspective, vii. See also Myk 
Habets, “Spirit Christology: Seeing in Stereo,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 11, (2003): 199— 
234. The distinction between pre-trinitarian, trinitarian and post-trinitarian Spirit Christology is im­
portant if one is to avoid collapsing all Spirit Christologies together. See note 109 on p. 43 below.
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tion, Jesus “was” according to the “flesh,” but after God raised him, he “moves” to 
the realm o f the “spirit.” In such accounts “spirit” had stood for the realm of the 
power o f God but not yet specifically to the Holy Spirit as divine person.
Gradually, however, Coffey points out, in early post-biblical reflection, the 
meanings o f the terms “flesh” and “spirit” began to change. Under the influence of 
New Testament reflections on pre-existence, interpretations o f Jesus were com­
pelled to reckon with the question o f how to understand Jesus prior to his birth. 
Rather than thinking of “flesh” and “spirit” as modes o f existence, these words 
came to be interpreted as principles o f  being.16 Thus, early Spirit Christologists 
“took early Two-Stage Christology of the New Testament and transformed it by in­
terpreting it ontologically in the light o f the late New Testament Christology of pre­
existence.”77 As a result o f this effort, Spirit came to be understood as principle of 
being, rather than as a mode of existence. This inverted the original order o f “flesh” 
to “spirit” found in the two-stage New Testament christologies with “Spirit” now 
being used to explain the divine status o f the pre-existent Jesus.78 There is, then, a 
significant change of emphasis between the New Testament two-stage christologies 
and the early Spirit Christologies, such that the latter begin to consider the Spirit as 
a candidate “explanation” for the divine element in Jesus.
Thus, in Coffey’s view, the possibility o f early Spirit Christology lies not dir­
ectly in the New Testament texts referring to the anointing o f Jesus, but in a new in­
terpretation of the Holy Spirit’s role as a pre-existent principle o f being. Neverthe­
76 Coffey cites a famous text from Ignatius of Antioch’s Epistle to the Ephesians 7 to illustrate the 
tendency to take “flesh” and “spirit” as “distinct but compatible principles of being”: “there is one 
physician composed of flesh and spirit, generate and ingenerate, God in man, authentic life in death, 
from Mary and from God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord.” See Coffey, 
“Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” 316.
77 Ibid., 315.
78 The texts that Coffey refers to here are 2 Clement: “Christ the Lord, who saved us, being first of 
all spirit, became flesh.” (PG 1:341); Tertullian, Adversus Praxeam 27 (PL 2:190), where we find 
that —  in Coffey’s paraphrase — the Word who is spirit “clothed himself with flesh in the womb of 
the Virgin”; and Cyprian who writes that at the “Incarnation the Son of God ‘descended in the Vir­
gin and as holy spirit clothed himself with flesh’ {Liber de idolorum vanitate. 11 (PL 4:458-79). 1 
would suggest that the second two texts owe something also to the fact o f the very ambiguity of the 
symbol Holy Spirit, a blurred distinction between the terms Son and Spirit.
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less, this more developed sense of the meaning o f Spirit does not yet prove that an 
understanding o f the Spirit as distinct personal identity has yet been reached. An 
important factor in understanding early Spirit Christologies is the great ambiguity 
surrounds the use of the term “Spirit.” Questions, for instance, about how to recon­
cile New Testament references to the Spirit o f God and the Spirit o f Christ re­
mained unanswered. In many cases, what precisely is meant by authors of the peri­
od remains unclear.79
In the period between the New Testament and the Council o f Constantinople, 
however, greater clarity was achieved in relation to the Holy Spirit. Pneumatologic- 
al development reached a decisive point with the Council o f Constantinople’s 
teaching that the Holy Spirit is “Lord and Giver o f Life” to be “worshipped and 
glorified with the Father and the Son.”80 There was no longer at this point any un­
clarity about the belief that the Holy Spirit was to be conceived as a distinct divine 
person.81 Ironically, the context for this development was set by the growing influ­
ence not of Spirit Christology, but rather that of Logos Christology.
For Coffey, the development and affirmation o f Logos Christology is best 
understood in the light o f apologetic and dogmatic concerns. As we will see, the 
apologetic concerns led to the translation o f the Johannine idea of Logos from the 
functional language of the New Testament to the ontological language of the Hel­
lenistic culture in dialogue with which the early church was conducting its theolo­
gical reflection. The dogmatic concerns were soteriologically motivated: a strong
19 Denis Edwards summarises the ambiguities around the use of the term “Holy Spirit” as fol­
lows: “In this period, there is often no clear distinction between Christ and the Spirit; nor is it always 
clear that the word spirit is referring to the human spirit, to God in an undifferentiated way, or to one 
o f the trinitarian persons.” See Edwards, Breath of Life: A Theology of the Creator Spirit, 76. Such 
ambiguity is welcomed by some contemporary theologians. See for instance the view of Geoffrey 
Lampe, for points to the benefits of a “flexible” understanding o f “Holy Spirit” at Geoffrey Lampe, 
Godas Spirit, (London: SCM Press, 1977), 211-213.
80 See Coffey, “The Teaching of the Constantinopolitan Creed on the Holy Spirit”
81 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus -  God and Man, (London: SCM Press, 1973), 176. Coffey points 
out that the idea o f the distinct personhood of the Holy Spirit could not have been found in the New 
Testament for the simple reason that the ontological notion of “person” was not available to the bib­
lical authors; the “seeds” of the doctrine, however, are there. See Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The 
Doctrine of the Triune God, 12.
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Logos Christology presented itself as more suitable to the task of excluding any 
drift towards adoptionist christologies which would have been interpreted as under­
mining the significance of Christ and the Christ event as interpreted by the church.
I begin with the apologetic concern. The apologetic concern motivating the in­
creased influence of Logos, rather than Spirit, Christology was the church’s desire 
to communicate the message about Jesus in terms amenable to the Hellenistic cul­
ture of the day. In its use of the Johannine term Logos, it was all but inevitable that 
this term would quickly come to be interpreted in the ontological categories fa­
voured in that intellectual milieu. In this, the emerging meaning o f the term Logos 
differed in register from that found in the New Testament, where, in Coffey’s view, 
it had been intended in a functional manner only.82 Evidence o f the translation of 
this concept from functional-Semitic into ontological-Hellenistic categories is first 
found in the writings o f Justin Martyr, who understood and presents the symbol o f 
the Logos o f  the Johannine Prologue in ways that bear the mark of Middle 
Platonism.83
Far from engaging in any simplistic critique of the hellenisation o f Christian 
belief,84 Coffey adopts a balanced approach to the translation from a functional to 
an ontological interpretation o f Logos: it brings both challenges and benefits for 
theology. The challenges associated with this new approach lie on the soteriological
82 Coffey takes this view even more seriously than most biblical scholars, going so far as exclud­
ing an ontological interpretation of the Johannine Logos as divine. Historically speaking, Coffey be­
lieves, the author of the Johannine Prologue must have understood the Logos not as a pre-existent 
divine being, but as a pre-existent human being such as the “son of man” in Daniel 7. See below at 
p. 36.
83 Ibid., 15.
Coffey provides us with no specific reference to the work o f Justin here. In the period between the 
New Testament and Justin, we see adoption of this term by Ignatius o f Antioch, though in purely 
economic terms, without, that is, the ontological resonances that we find in Justin. In the latter’s 
writing, the term Logos resonates with Stoic, neo-Platonic as well as Christian meaning. See Hill, 
Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery o f Salvation, 31. On Justin’s trinitarian thought see 
Willy Rordorf, “La Trinité Dans Les Écrits De Justin Martyr,” Augustinianum 20, (1980): 285-297.
84 The judgement of Quasten on the question of Hellenisation is well-expressed. Speaking of the 
Apologists, he writes that they were not “Hellenizers in Christian garb. It is rather more correct to 
“speak therefore of a Christianization of Hellenism but hardly of a Hellenization of Christianity.” 
See Johannes Quasten, Patrology, Volume 1: The Beginnings of Patristic Literature, (Westminster: 
Christian Classics, 1983), 187-188. See also H.D. McDonald, “Development and Christology,” Vox 
Evangelica 9, (1975): 5-27.
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and pneumatological level, and will be commented on below. On the positive side, 
this transition can be understood as an authentic development o f human reflection 
on the mystery o f Christ. To illustrate this, Coffey borrows the term “immanent dia­
lectic o f thought” from Jacques Maritain to indicate that the dynamic underlying the 
innovation introduced by Justin, even if  it was perhaps “concealed from” Justin 
himself,85 was nevertheless a valid and fruitful one. Irrespective of how Justin him­
self understood his use of the term Logos, later generations adopted and further de­
veloped it in an ontological sense, and alongside the challenges implicit in this 
transition, the benefits should not be underestimated.
Coffey presents the logic behind this transition on two levels. On a first level, 
there was a transition from the Semitic cultural world to the Hellenistic cultural 
world. Coffey embraces the view that the focus o f attention in the New Testament 
is not on God in se but rather on God pro nobis. Biblical discourse is, for Coffey, 
functional rather than ontological in style,86 as would be expected from the Semitic 
rather than Hellenistic culture that produced biblical discourse.87 In the literal mean­
ing o f biblical texts, we find consideration not of God’s eternal being in se but 
rather a celebration and contemplation of God’s work of salvation pro nobis.
In the functional language of the bible, Coffey holds the unusual view that the 
Logos o f John 1:14 was understood by its author to be pre-existent, but a pre-exist­
ent divine man.s& The author did not assume the kind o f ontological division
85 Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 14.
86 This language is associated with the work of Oscar Cullmann, The Christology of the New 
Testament, (London: SCM Press, 1963). See Coffey, “The Incarnation: Fact Not Myth,” 17-20; 
Coffey, “The Pre-Existent and Incarnate Word.”; Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune 
God, 12-14.
87 This is not to say that biblical discourse is without ontological importance. Matthew Levering 
argues at length for the ontological importance o f biblical discourse. See Levering, Scripture and 
Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology.
88 Coffey, “The Incarnation: Fact Not Myth,” 17-20; Coffey, “The Pre-Existent and Incarnate 
Word,” 12-13; Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 12-14. One has to be careful 
to grasp precisely what Coffey is suggesting. It is that we do not have evidence that the New Testa­
ment authors intended to speak of a pre-existent divine Son, ontologically different to human beings. 
Fred Sanders misreports Coffey’s view, suggesting that Coffey finds no evidence in the New Testa­
ment o f a pre-existence of “Christ.” See Sanders, “Review of ‘Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the 
Triune God”’.
Matthew Levering recognises that Coffey’s view is not heterodox in itself, since Coffey allows that
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between humanity and divinity that later generations brought to this text. It is only 
in the post-New Testament interpretations o f this text that the Logos came to be 
understood as a pre-existing divine being, the self-expression of God, who becomes 
human.
On one level, the translation from functional to ontological language was a 
matter o f finding appropriate expression to protect the truth expressed in the biblic­
al texts. This is what we might call the apologetic motive. For Coffey, such a trans­
lation was necessary, as without it “the message of the gospels could not be pre­
served.”89 That such translations occurred was to be expected. The fundamental 
reality, after all, is the experience of Christ in the resurrection, rather than the writ­
ten form in which that reality was appropriated and expressed.90 The original 
paschal experience is such that it can be expected to receive different translations 
into human expression: firstly and authoritatively in the New Testament, but also 
progressively through the history of the church.
Discussing this process of translation, Coffey acknowledges the addition of 
elements not explicitly present in the bible, but interprets these as enrichments of 
the translation. Thus, the New Testament offers one translation, authoritative and 
criteriological, one suited to the functional language and thought forms dominant in 
the Semitic world. A subsequent translation embraces the different possibilities of
later interpretation towards a view of the Logos as a pre-existent divine Logos, is itself a valid devel­
opment. Levering however notes that Coffey’s view on this matter does not find support among bib­
lical scholars. See Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian 
Theology, 146f.
Coffey is aware of the biblical scholarship and mounts a detailed defence of his view, which is 
found especially in Coffey, “The Pre-Existent and Incarnate W ord” The responsibility o f the theolo­
gian, Coffey insists, is to be informed about the current state of scripture scholarship, but this does 
not mean that the theologian may not differ from the consensus, as long as that view is well-groun­
ded and well-reasoned.
89 Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 15. The allusion here, clearly, is to the 
danger that Jesus Christ might be understood to be creature, a conclusion that would undermine for 
the Greek mind the New Testament’s confidence (expressed there in Semitic terms) that Jesus is sa­
viour. The motivation here expressed is soteriological.
90 We may recall here the theology of revelation evident in Vatican II’s Dei Verbum, which re­
places any propositionalist approach with an approach based on God’s self-communication.
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expression offered by the Greek ontological worldview and can be regarded as, in 
some ways, an enrichment o f the original translation.91 Coffey expresses this in the 
following terms:
This New Testament doctrine of the Trinity, as we may call it, is not some­
thing given to the first Christian communities in the first instance in words.
It is given in the event of Christ as experienced in the power of his Resur­
rection. The words are found only later, to give appropriate expression to 
this transcendental experience of salvation.92
The development of an ontological interpretation o f the Christ event is therefore, in 
the first place, understood in terms of the ongoing process o f translating the mean­
ing of the Christ event into ever more suitable language.93
On another level, the “immanent dialectic” that led Justin and those following 
him to interpret the biblical symbol o f  the Logos in ontological terms should be 
understood as more than merely a question o f finding the most suitable language to 
communicate meanings already grasped. It should also be taken as representing a 
deeper penetration into the theological meaning of this salvation history. The soteri- 
ological meaning which is emphasised in the New Testament is now interpreted as 
uncovering a properly theological meaning: the Christ event reveals not just God’s 
saving action, but something o f God in Godself.
The transposition from the functional categories o f the New Testament to the 
ontological ones of later patristic thought may best be understood as an act o f “her- 
meneusis.”94 In this act of hermeneusis there is both an intellectual as well as a spir­
91, Coffey recognises that while something is gained with such a translation, something is also lost. 
What is lost is the connection between being and action that Semitic thought forms offered. The dis­
advantage of this subsequent Hellenistic translation is, therefore, that it encourages a distance 
between theology and soteriology.
91 Ibid., 12.
93 Coffey writes: “Revelation is not words dropping like rain from heaven. It is always man’s at­
tempt to understand and express; the divine element of it is simply grace. Hence these attempts, even 
when normative as in the bible, can always be improved on.” Coffey and Hill, “Demythologization: 
For and Against,” 35.
94 See, for example, Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 202; 
Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 14. Coffey is influenced in his use o f the 
term “hermeneusis” especially by E. Schillebeeckx. He expands on this theme especially in his 
somewhat controversial writings in defence o f the orthodoxy of the Dominican writer’s approach to 
the resurrection o f the body of Jesus. See especially Coffey, “A Reply to Bishop J. Cullinane on the 
Resurrection of Jesus” ; Coffey, “A Further Reply to Bishop J. Cullinane on the Resurrection of 
Jesus and Catholic Orthodoxy”; John Cullinane, “Review Article: The Resurrection of Jesus and
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itual ascent from the world to God.95 The dynamic by which such a richer transla­
tion comes about is evidence that the church continues to engage with the mystery 
of Christ as a living, rather than simply as a past event. The section quoted above 
continues:
Thus, the ultimate (eschatological) salvation that comes from God and con­
sists, as we would say today, in his very self-communication, actually came 
to them in the person of Jesus, not, however, from Jesus as he was re­
membered in the ‘flesh’ (sarx), but rather from the same Jesus as he exists 
and acts now, in the ‘spirit’ (pneuma). Therefore, for them the concept of 
God that they had inherited from Judaism had to be expanded to include 
both Jesus (confessed now as ‘the Christ’) and the Holy Spirit. Baptism, the 
rite of entry into the community of salvation, was performed not just in the 
name of God, but ‘in the name of Jesus Christ’ (Acts 2.38), or, to put it 
more comprehensively, ‘in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the 
Holy Spirit’ (Mt 28.19).96
The translation from biblical categories to ontological categories is thus understood 
both as an expression of dialogue or inculturation, but also as representing the at­
tempt at a deeper understanding of the meaning of the Christ event and the ongoing 
experience o f the Spirit in the church than may perhaps have been found in the 
earlier translation found in the New Testament.97 This may be held without preju­
dice to the unique authority o f scripture, which in all cases retains foundational and 
criteriological value.
Catholic Orthodoxy,” The Australasian Catholic Record 58, (1981): 91-100; John Cullinane, 
“Resurrection and Orthodoxy: Response to Dr Coffey’s Reply,” The Australasian Catholic Record 
58, (1981): 290-299. Since the question of Coffey’s approach to the bodily resurrection of Jesus in 
itself does not impact on our topic it is safe to ignore it here.
95 This fact “more than justifies the recent trend to ascending Christology among Catholic as well 
as Protestant theologians.” Coffey contrasts his approach to that of Karl Barth, who relies on an 
“outmoded exegesis, for example, in regard to John 1.14” to justify a view of the Trinity rooted dir­
ectly in the New Testament itself. See Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 19.
96 Ibid., 12. A small detail may be noted in the way Coffey approaches the two forms of baptism 
documented in the New Testament. The second is described as being more “comprehensive” than 
the first. This represents a simple instance of a pattern that we find throughout Coffey’s thought: two 
positions may be true, but one may be more “comprehensive” than the other. This is the basic rela­
tion that he will present between the procession and the return model of the Trinity. See Chapter 
Five below.
97 John Farrelly expresses a similar attitude when he writes that “the early church began to realize 
that it needed to interpret Jesus’ ministry in a trinitarian context to be able to understand its meaning, 
source, effect, and uniqueness. The mystery o f the Trinity is no superfluous appendix to Jesus’ min­
istry, but this ministry in its depth. We cannot understand the source of the proclamation he offers us 
or the salvation he offers us except through a full trinitarian interpretation.” Farrelly, The Trinity: 
Rediscovering the Central Christian Mystery, 130.
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Beyond the apologetic motivations and immanent dialectic propelling theolo­
gical development towards a deeper penetration of the mystery of Christ, Coffey is 
also alert to the influence of certain dogmatic concerns that helped confirm the shift 
away from early Spirit Christology and towards an ontologically conceived Logos 
Christology. The necessity of a decisive move beyond the functional modes of exp­
ression associated with the New Testament and implicit still in early forms o f Spirit 
Christology came to centre on the issues first, o f adoptionism  and then, of subor- 
dinationism. In part, the issue of adoptionism98 had already been addressed in the 
New Testament itself," but this work continues throughout the early period of 
christological reflection. The challenge o f responding effectively to the issue of ad­
optionism led the church eventually to prefer accounts o f the uniqueness of Jesus 
structured around the idea of the Logos, rather than that o f the Spirit. From this 
point of view, the difficulty with the early Spirit Christologies was that they did not 
appear to offer convincing ways to account for the unicity o f Jesus. Thus, if what 
explains the divine element in Christ is the particular presence of the Holy Spirit, 
then what grounds are there for believing that the Holy Spirit might not be equally
98 The term “adoptionism” is sometimes used to describe an early christological position, such as 
may have been held by the Ebionites. The terms is also sometimes used to describe a later more 
“Nestorian” approach, sometimes called “Spanish Adoptionism,” which is quite a distinct tendency, 
and is mentioned briefly below at note 133. By adoptionism here, 1 refer to the earlier form of 
adoptionism.
99 Concern at the possibility of soteriologically inadequate adoptionist christologies is evident in 
the New Testament. In places, Paul speaks of Jesus being made Son at the resurrection. The gospels 
provide different narrative starting points, backing progressively away from this adoptionist sugges­
tion. The earliest gospel, Mark, pushes Jesus’ sonship back to the beginning of his public ministry, 
with Jesus appearing to be declared Son at his baptism. The gospels o f Matthew and Luke move 
this starting point back to the conception of Jesus. The Fourth Gospel begins in a time outside time, 
with a pre-existent Logos.
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present to other human beings?100 On the face o f it, Logos Christology offers a way 
around this perceived difficulty, with the claim that God’s “only Son” has become 
incarnate in Jesus.
(b) Spirit and/or Logos Christology
The rise of this ontologically interpreted Logos Christology had a profound ef­
fect on the fortunes o f early Spirit Christology. Simply stated: Logos Christology 
eclipsed the early Spirit Christology.101 For all its apologetic and theological ad­
vantages this development had the disadvantage that it tended to obscure any partic­
ular role for the Holy Spirit in relation to Jesus.102 As a result of the church’s con­
cern about adoptionism, any role attributed to the Holy Spirit in relation to Christ 
tended consequently to be understood as second in importance to Christ’s identity 
as Logos incarnate.103 This reading is apparently strengthened by New Testament 
references to Jesus sending the Spirit (John 15:26), since Jesus here appears to have 
authority over the Spirit rather than gaining his authority from the Spirit.104
Having stated this difficulty, we should also note that the emergence o f a 
strongly developed symbol of the Logos is also historically linked to what should 
be considered a significant gain for pneumatology. The adoption o f the Logos was 
the historical motor that led to the (indirect) affirmation o f the Holy Spirit as dis­
100 John McDade writes that in the post-New Testament period the Spirit ceased being the “decis­
ive category in Christology” because of a “repeated suspicion that Spirit Christology is likely to be 
an ambiguous and inadequate account of Jesus’ identity.” McDade, “Jesus and the Spirit,” 498. He 
offers three rules that together determine christology: one must give a “maximal” account of Jesus, 
one must not compromise monotheism, one must not compromise the humanity of Jesus. It appears 
that Spirit Christology is most likely to fall at the first of these hurdles, while Logos Christology is 
more likely to fall at the third.
101 Del Colie writes that “orthodox trinitarianism is in part the result of the displacement of Spirit- 
christology by Logos-cbristology in the ancient church.” See Del Colie, Christ and Spirit: Spirit 
Christology in Trinitarian Perspective, 92.
1<K It is important to emphasise that it “tends” to obscure this role. It does not necessarily obscure a 
particular role o f the Holy Spirit. The key issue for a trinitarian Spirit Christology, such as what we 
find in David Coffey’s work is how to hold to the validity and fruitfulness of Logos Christology, but 
also to find a particular role for the Holy Spirit in the understanding of Christ.
103 This point is expanded below at p. 52f.
IM It may also be suggested that the universal quality of the Logos idea as found in Justin left little 
space for the idea of a Spirit.
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tinct person, equal with Father and Son in divinity at the Council of Constantinople 
(3SI): as soon as the matter of the oneness in being of the Logos with God was ad­
dressed by the Council of Nicaea (325), the matter o f the Holy Spirit inevitably rose 
to prominence. The existence from earliest times of formulae o f prayer, and espe­
cially baptismal formulae,105 invoking God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, saw to 
that. While the explicit teaching of the Council o f Constantinople relates to the 
equality in divinity of the Holy Spirit, it implicitly but decisively canonises the un­
derstanding of the Holy Spirit as a distinct divine person. The reality o f the hypo­
static distinction of the Holy Spirit is given clear expression in the idea of “proces­
sion” (“he proceeds from the Father”).
The reader might recognise the historical irony here, an irony unveiled by 
Coffey’s reading of the history, but one about which he does not directly comment. 
On the one hand, the story of the affirmation of Logos Christology is the story of 
the lamentable displacing and obscuring o f the Spirit in christology. On the other 
hand, the affirmation of Logos Christology in fact set the stage for what in some 
ways might appear to be a more robust pneumatology than was possible in the peri­
od o f the early Spirit Christologists: it declares not just the equality in divinity of 
the Holy Spirit but also the hypostatic distinctness o f the Holy Spirit. The outcome 
o f this history, then, is ambiguous. The Holy Spirit is now recognised not just as co­
equal in divinity with the Father and the Son, but also is recognised as a distinct 
person. This recognition however comes at a cost: the rise o f Logos Christology ob­
scured the early Spirit Christologies, and consequently left theology without a clear
105 According to William Hill, in some cases, the retention of reference to the Holy Spirit was due 
to little more than “a sense of reverence for the traditional [baptismal] triadic formula.” Hill, Three- 
Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation, 32.
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sense o f a distinct role of the Spirit in the Christ event or, more generally, in the 
economy of salvation as a whole.106 In effect, the theological locus o f pneumatology 
moves from christology to trinitarian theology.
Despite these challenges it is clear that Coffey’s basic attitude towards the de­
velopment of this idea of trinitarian persons is positive. He sees in it an instance of 
doctrinal development.107 Lest this position appear unworthy o f mention, it will be 
valuable to review briefly an alternative approach, that exemplified by those au­
thors whom we can call post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists.108 These authors con­
ceive of Spirit Christology primarily as the retrieval o f the ancient Spirit Christo­
logy that we have discussed above.109 Among these authors we include Hendrikus
106 And, since there is no other ground for building a pneumatology than the economy of salvation, 
it threatens to leave pneumatology itself without a clear starting point. This is the guiding theme that 
frames Coffey’s treatment of the issue of the proper mission o f the Holy Spirit as found in Coffey, 
Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology, 10- 
42.
107 The idea that there could be doctrinal development was clearly held in the fourth century, but 
came to be doubted in the period between Vincent of Lerins (+ c. 445) and Bossuet (1627-1704). In 
more recent theology a range of approaches to this question have emerged, and a “presumption in its 
favour” is judged to have been established. See J.H. Walgrave, “Doctrine, Development of,” in New 
Catholic Encyclopedia: Volume 4: Com — Dyn, ed. Berard Marthalar, (Detroit: Thompson Gale, 
2003).
Coffey thinks that there should be no difficulty for Catholics in accepting that positions not explicit 
in the New Testament can be made explicit in later theology. He roots the plausibility of doctrinal 
development in the teaching that scripture and tradition are one single source. He cites Dei verbum 
§9 to this effect in Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 14. See also Coffey, “The 
Claim of Catholicism,” 46.
108 The distinction between pre-trinitarian, trinitarian and post-trinitarian Spirit Christology is im­
portant if one is to avoid collapsing all Spirit Christologies together. The term “post-trinitarian” 
Spirit Christology is found in Del Colie, Christ and Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian 
Perspective, vii. See also Habets, “Spirit Christology: Seeing in Stereo”. Steven Studebaker cites 
Haight as a prominent example of “Spirit Christology conducted without adherence to traditional 
trinitarian theology. See Studebaker, “Integrating Pneumatology and Christology: A Trinitarian 
Modification o f Clark H. Pinnock’s Spirit Christology,” 7.
One author who fails to distinguish the different types o f Spirit Christology, concluding that no 
Spirit Christology is compatible with Christian orthodoxy is Harold Hunter. Hunter, although he 
states that there is no consensus between authors as to what precisely is meant by Spirit Christology, 
consciously reserves the term for those authors whose work displays among other traits the rejection 
o f classical trinitarianism. Hunter, “Spirit Christology: Dilemma and Promise (1),” 127.
There is no good reason, however, to reserve the term Spirit Christology to authors who reject clas­
sical trinitarianism.
109 See p. 32f. above.
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Berkhof, Geoffrey Lampe and Roger Haight.110 This comparison will allow us to 
make some preliminary observations about Coffey’s general attitude towards theo­
logical tradition and development of doctrine.
Alongside many similarities between the broad lines along which Coffey and 
these post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists construct their accounts of the rise and 
decline o f early Spirit Christology, there are also important differences. These dif­
ferences depend to a large extent on the ways in which the fruits o f historical re­
search are handled, and the way in which the primacy o f scripture is understood. 
The question of how historical research impacts on pneumatology and trinitarian 
theology arises because, as stated above, contemporary theology differs from tradi­
tional theology in its recognition that one cannot depend on the literal meaning of 
biblical texts for clear guidance about the distinctness o f  divine persons. In this con­
text, the question of the theological weight of the literal meaning of biblical texts 
gains particular significance. If scripture retains primacy within theology,111 and if 
the literal meaning o f biblical texts is granted a criteriological function,112 then the 
question arises: what is the impact of these positions on pneumatology and trinitari­
an theology? How do we deal with the absence o f a clear idea of trinitarian persons 
in the New Testament?
We have seen that Coffey’s approach to these matters allows for the validity 
o f doctrinal development, such that certain interpretations o f the biblical data are al­
lowed authoritative function in theology. The approach exemplified by Berkhof, 
Lampe and Haight is rather different. These authors offer substantially the same ac­
count o f the “literal meaning” of the symbol “Holy Spirit” in scripture as we find in 
Coffey, but they do so with a different emphasis. Where Coffey had been content to 
concede that there is not yet a developed sense o f the personal distinctness o f the
,l0' Hendrikus Berkhof, The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, (London: Epworth Press, 1965); Lampe, 
God as Spirit; Roger Haight, “The Point of Trinitarian Theology,” Toronto Journal of Theology 4, 
(1988): 191-204; Roger Haight, “The Case for Spirit Christology,” Theological Studies 53, (1992): 
257-287; Roger Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1999).
111 Dei Verbum §24.
112 On the “literal meaning” of biblical texts, see above p. 11.
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Holy Spirit, these authors go beyond this to imply that the biblical text somehow 
specifically mandates an exclusion o f  any idea o f personal distinctness. Geoffrey 
Lampe writes o f the Old Testament understanding o f God as Spirit:
In speaking now of God as Spirit we are not referring to an impersonal in­
fluence, an energy transmitted by God but distinct from himself. Nor are we 
indicating a divine entity or hypostasis which is a third person of the God­
head. We are speaking of God himself, his personal presence, as active and 
related.113
These authors hold that the same understanding continues to obtain in the New 
Testament. As they present it, any change in this basic scriptural understanding of 
the Holy Spirit would betoken a downgrading o f the status of the Holy Spirit. Their 
argument is that, given Jewish monotheism, if  the Holy Spirit was to be understood 
as in any way distinct from God, then this could only mean that the Spirit was 
inferior.
While Berkhof, Lampe and Haight present a broadly similar narrative of the 
rise and fall o f early forms of Spirit Christology as that found in Coffey, they mani­
fest a significantly different attitude towards these events. Where Coffey was pre­
pared to find both challenges and opportunities in these developments, the post-trin­
itarian Spirit Christologists discussed here adopt a more negative view o f this story. 
The rise o f ontologically conceived Logos Christology is understood by these au­
thors as a grave mistake in the history o f theology. Haight, for instance, presents 
this mistake as a misunderstanding of the literary device o f personification found in 
the bible. “Personification,” as Haight explains it, involves qualities o f God some­
times being presented as though they were persons. What Coffey regards as doc­
trinal development, namely, the emergence o f the idea of divine persons, Haight re­
gards as the mistaken “hypostatization” of what the biblical authors would never 
have thought o f as ontologically distinct in any sense.114
113 Lampe, God as Spirit, 208. See also Berkhof, The Doctrine o f the Holy Spirit, 13-17; Haight, 
Jesus Symbol of God, 447—448.
114 Haight writes of the process of “personification” being transformed into “hypostatisation.” See 
Ibid., 257,437-238,475. Haight writes: “Jewish tradition was quite familiar with the personification 
o f various symbols representing God’s action in the world. A most influential example of this is the 
personification of God’s wisdom or Sophia. But whereas personification is recognized as figurative 
speech, hypostatization represents a certain literalization of it. Hypostatization means the making of
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Apart from the matter of the loss o f the biblical perspective, these post-trinit­
arian Spirit Christologists lament the damaging effects o f the outcome of this loss 
o f the biblical perspective. These authors object to what they see as the challenge to 
biblical monotheism implicit in the “hypostatization” o f the symbols of Son and 
Holy Spirit. Let Lampe voice their concerns:
The adoption of the concept of the pre-existent Son as the dominant model 
for Christology meant not only that “Spirit” came to be reduced in meaning 
from a way of speaking about God in his activity to a name for a third, and 
something like an extra, divine hypostasis, but also that the Logos became 
conceptualised in human terms as Jesus. One effect of this was to make it 
seem plausible to give to the term “person,” which in its theological use re­
ferred to purely relational distinctions within the divine unity, the full 
meaning which it received in Boethius’ definition: “an individual substance 
of a rational nature.” The Christian concept of God then becomes inescap­
ably tritheistic; for three “persons” in anything like the modem sense of the 
word “person” mean in fact three Gods.115
Berkhof writes with frustration about the very existence of the idea o f divine 
persons:
the confused and confusing phrase “the three persons of the Trinity” is still 
used. It is no use to maintain it any longer, especially since this formula 
from the very beginning has functioned not as a power of unity but as a 
source of confusion.116
This idea represents for him an innovation, unfounded in scripture.
The fact that these authors regret the emergence of an idea of “person” under­
stood as indicating some sort of distinction in God does not mean that they under­
stand themselves to be rejecting the church’s teaching on the Holy Spirit. The
an idea or a concept or a figure of speech into a real thing or entity.” Ibid 475.
115 Lampe, God as Spirit, 135-136.
116 Berkhof, The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 115. A defence of the language of “person” and its co­
herence with the biblical tradition may be found in Lawrence B. Porter, “On Keeping ‘Persons’ in 
the Trinity,” Theological Studies 41, (1980): 530-548.
An interesting article has recently been published documenting an unusual reluctance among Dutch 
theologians to deal with the theme of the Trinity. See Gijsbert and Stephan Van Erp Van Den Brink, 
“Ignoring God Triune? The Doctrine of the Trinity in Dutch Theology,” International Journal of 
Systematic Theology (2009): 72-90. In that article, Berkhof is said to have played an important role 
in establishing this Dutch reluctance to deal with the theme of the Trinity. It is interesting that for 
Berkhof, an important reason motivating his position is the desire to read Jesus in terms of his hu­
manity. As a project, therefore, he shares something with Coffey’s view, especially as the latter 
emerges in Chapter Two of this study. It is not important for current purposes to attempt a sustained 
comparison and contrast of the views of Coffey in relation to these thinkers. There are nevertheless 
significant points in common, but even more significant points of contrast between them.
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church council that most directly addresses the question of the Holy Spirit, the 
Council o f Constantinople (381), is understood by them as an important achieve­
ment. The achievement of this council, however, as they read it, was to ensure that 
the Spirit o f God was understood to be truly divine, against the Pneumatomachians 
and in defence o f the soteriological claims of Christianity. This was, in B erkhof s 
view, the main import of Athanasius’ teaching. The latter had written:
If the Holy Spirit were a creature, we would have no fellowship with God in 
him; in that case we would be connected with a creature and we would be 
alien to the divine nature, so that we in no sense would have fellowship 
with it.117
The emphasis in Athanasius’ teaching and in that o f the Council o f Constantinople 
thus lies, Berkhof claims, on the divinity of the Holy Spirit. He is not equally influ­
enced by the fact that the Holy Spirit, thus understood to be divine, is understood 
by the Council Fathers to be hypostatically distinct. That being the case, the asser­
tion by the Council that the Holy Spirit is divine amounts, for Berkhof, not to a re­
cognition o f the divinity of the third person, but to an assertion that God’s action in 
the world is truly divine (in some sense), or -  to use a typically Haightian exp­
ression -  that it is truly God who acts in the world.
Nor do these authors believe themselves guilty o f doing away with the doc­
trine o f the Trinity. Rather, they see themselves as helping do away with the confu­
sions introduced into that doctrine by the idea o f a tripersonal God. It would be 
worth enquiring whether what they propose might not suitably be regarded as a 
form of epistemologically motivated modalism. Thus, for Haight, there is still some 
value in the doctrine of the Trinity as long as we don’t take the language of persons 
literally. He writes:
one may understand the doctrine of the trinity as religious language, as not 
affirming two and then three distinct and coequal elements within the God­
head, but as affirming a dramatic view of a God who saves. God symbol­
ized as Father, Son, and Spirit is one God [....]118
ll7' Epistula I ad Serapionem, 24. He also quotes Basil the Great, Epistulae, no. 8, par. 10 to the 
same effect.
118 Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, 485.
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Whatever one might make of such an approach to the doctrine of the Trinity, it 
should be clear that it is not trinitarian in the ordinary sense o f this word. There is 
thus clear warrant for characterising such approaches as “post-trinitarian” Spirit 
Christology.
I argue that the difference between Coffey and the post-trinitarian Spirit 
Christologists lies not in their respective openness to the yield o f historical study as 
such, but in broader questions o f theological method. In the case o f the post-trinit- 
arian Spirit Christologists here reviewed the literal meaning o f biblical texts is ac­
corded not just primacy but also a criteriological function such that meanings that 
go beyond the literal meaning o f biblical texts are judged deficient.119 Historical 
method does not of itself mandate such a judgement.120 In Coffey’s theology, the at­
tempt to establish the literal sense of the biblical texts is equally important, but he 
allows for the possibility of the development o f doctrine in post-biblical times. He 
critically reads this development with the historical-mindedness that contemporary 
theological method requires.
I19' There appears to be a curious form of sola scriptura in operation here. While such a stance may 
not be surprising when found in authors like Berkhof and Lampe, it is more unusual to find it in a 
Catholic author like Roger Haight.
120 Lonergan thinks of responsible history taking place between the extremes of “anachronism” and 
“archaism.” He writes:
[...P]rior to the emergence of historical-mindedness, one had the alternatives of anachron­
ism and archaism. The anachronist attributed to scripture and to the Fathers an implicit 
grasp of what the Scholastics discovered. The archaist, on the other hand, regarded as a 
corruption any doctrine that was not to be found in the plain meaning o f either scripture or 
of scripture and patristic tradition.”
See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1975), 312. It 
would seem that the post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists tend towards archaism. However one might 
judge the details of Coffey’s historical reconstruction, it should be judged successful in escaping 
either of these extremes.
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I do not here imply that nothing in Coffey’s historical narrative is open to 
question. Historians o f doctrine might wish to raise issues with Coffey’s narrat­
ive.121 The point here is, rather, that Coffey’s approach is no less historically- 
minded than that o f the post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists.
I f  the post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists deny the validity of the doctrinal de­
velopment that flourished as the doctrine of the Trinity, it is more due to some form 
of archaism (privileging of the literal meaning o f  biblical texts and excluding the 
validity o f later developments in interpretation) than to any greater openness on 
their part to the fruits of historical method as such.
Coffey’s contribution to the matter o f Spirit Christology and Logos Christo- 
logy, however, is not limited to a defence of Logos Christology and the related doc­
trine o f the Trinity. In point of fact, what I am calling Thesis A  shows his intention 
to move beyond the classical theology in a number o f significant ways. As the com­
ments above have made clear, in his reaction to the great councils, Coffey sees both 
positive and negative aspects in the classical approach. He accepts the classical 
theology that develops from the councils as somehow a datum  for theology, but he 
does not think that theology is thereby limited to the ongoing explication of those 
councils. His theology is not an apologetic for classical theology. The doctrinal 
definitions are neither simply end nor simply beginning.122
I argue that Coffey’s motivation for proposing a move beyond the traditional 
theology o f the Trinity is itself biblically motivated, though he does not embrace 
what I have called the “archaism” of the post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists. As it 
happens, there is an important sense in which Coffey does take the biblical texts as 
criteriological, though it is not at all the same sense in which they were taken as cri-
123 Ayres, for instance, notes that Coffey is among the few recent systematic theologians to note the 
important challenges to the standard readings of the debates of the fourth century, though Ayres is 
unhappy with his engagement with the implications of these challenges. See Ayres, Nicaea and Its 
Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, 385.
122 Here we recall Rahner’s famous title: “Chalcedon: End or Beginning.” Karl Rahner, 
“Chalkedon -  Ende Oder Anfang?,” in Das Konzil Von Chalkedon Vol. 3, ed. A. Grillmeier and H. 
Bacht, (Wurzburg: 1954).
49
teriological by the post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists. For Coffey, many of the dif­
ficulties with the classical theology of the church derive lfom its unbalanced appro­
priation o f the biblical witness. I have already stated that Logos Christology tends 
to regard itself as rooted in Johannine christology, while attempts at Spirit Christo­
logy tend to root themselves in synoptic christologies. For Coffey it was the domin­
ance o f Logos Christology that led to the historical neglect123 of the resources of 
synoptic christology. He finds in the following words o f Edward Schillebeeckx a 
confirmation o f this concern:
From the Council of Nicaea onwards one particular Christological model -  
the Johannine -  has been developed within very narrow limits and one dir­
ection; and in fact only this tradition has made history in the Christian 
churches. For that reason the course of history has never done justice to the 
possibilities inherent in the synoptic model; its peculiar dynamic was 
checked and halted and the model relegated to the “forgotten truths” of 
Christianity.124
Coffey accepts the challenge implicit in Schillebeeckx’s diagnosis, and attempts in 
his theological project to address this imbalance, not by substituting the synoptic 
model for the Johannine one, but rather by working towards a synthesis o f the two. 
He expresses confidence that the results o f his enterprise will ultimately be accept­
able as long as they are firmly based on the New Testament itself. In 2005, Coffey 
comments in retrospect on the impact o f Schillebeeckx’s diagnosis on his own theo­
logical project. He writes of the conviction that the:
Gospel according to John was not the only Gospel: the New Testament can­
on contained three additional ones; and a truly balanced trinitarian theology 
required that it be based on the entirety of the word of God, not just on one
123 It might be better to express this neglect of certain dimensions o f the New Testament witness in 
more benevolent terms. Roger Haight obliges: speaking of the appropriation by theology of the full
range o f New Testament christological approaches he writes that “[i]n the past, these differences 
were not emphasized, but seem to have been considered accidental to the overwhelmingly central 
point that Jesus was the Messiah, the Christ of God, who eventually came to be recognized as the 
Logos and Son incarnate. It is characteristic of our historically conscious culture to recognize the 
real differences in the various appreciations of Jesus that were generated in different communities, 
by different authors, writing in different situations, with a different set of interpretive categories, to 
address different questions or problems. The differences among New Testament christologies are 
such that these many christologies cannot be reduced to one overarching paradigm; to do so would 
be precisely to negate the distinctiveness of each one.” See Haight, The Future of Christology, 167.
,24 Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 
570. Coffey refers to this observation of Schillebeeckx in Coffey, “A Proper Mission of the Holy 
Spirit,” 231; Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 222; Coffey, 
Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology, 46- 
47.
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part of it. I was confident that nothing contrary to orthodoxy would emerge 
from this exercise, because just as different theologies coexist within the 
one canon of Scripture, so too could different theologies that were logically 
and historically dependent on them.125
We have not yet explicitly come to Coffey’s trinitarian theology as such, but 
Coffey’s intention to follow through the Spirit Christology project to its trinitarian 
consequences is clear.
The terms “synoptic” and “Johannine” are here used as a kind o f shorthand. 
All four gospels are complex documents and no one o f them can be reduced to a 
single position on the coming to be Christ o f Jesus. Much less can the three synop­
tic gospels be accurately summarised by a statement o f the involvement of the Holy 
Spirit in the anointing o f Jesus. These terms will function as a shorthand not for the 
gospels as a whole, but just for their use o f Logos vs Spirit explanations of the “di­
vine element” in Jesus. Further ahead, we will see that Coffey returns to John’s gos­
pel in the development of his own trinitarian model. We should not, in brief, take 
these terms too strictly.
In brief, though Coffey would count himself among Spirit Christologists, he is 
clear in his rejection of any simple return to pre-Nicene Spirit Christologies.126 
Coffey argues that a Spirit Christology that includes a Logos Christology is better 
than one that conceives of itself as an alternative explanation of the divine element 
in Christ. Conversely, a Logos Christology is illuminated by a trinitarian Spirit 
Christology.127 Coffey’s Spirit Christology recognises the positive value o f Logos 
Christology that developed, and the doctrine of the Trinity that grew from it. He ac­
cepts the church’s development of a belief in the Holy Spirit as distinct third divine 
person as expressed in those same councils. He regrets, however, the obscuring of 
the Spirit Christology perspective that the New Testament also offers. His theology
125 Coffey, Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: Some Basic Questions for 
Pneumatology, 47.
I2i' See Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 105; Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the 
Trinity,” 315-338.
I27, Ibid., 317-319. The term “trinitarian” here, as elsewhere in this chapter, simply means accept­
ing o f the idea of three divine persons, not in the literal meaning of the New Testament texts, but as 
a valid development on the basis of those texts.
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represents an attempt systematically to reconcile the divergent strands in New Test­
ament christology, and to do this in dialogue with classical christology. A trinitarian 
Spirit Christology, for Coffey, will be more comprehensive in its appropriation of 
the biblical witness than either the traditional Logos Christology or a post-trinitari­
an Spirit Christology that too rashly denies the positive developments that flour­
ished as the doctrine of the Trinity.
Let these comments suffice as an introduction to Coffey’s project of develop­
ing a trinitarian Spirit Christology. We now move closer to the matter at hand by 
briefly setting his Thesis A in a narrower context: the question o f the grace of 
Christ.
4. The Grace of Christ
How the Western tradition dealt with the matter o f the grace o f Christ can be 
thought o f as an application o f the preference for Logos Christology described 
above. Thesis A states that the anointing with the Holy Spirit brings about the “Son 
in humanity.” Comparing this with the Western approach to the question o f the 
grace o f Christ will help bring out the distinctiveness o f Coffey’s proposal and fur­
ther clarify some of the systematic issues that his proposed synthesis with the clas­
sical position will have to face.
(a) Grace and Christ in the Western Tradition
The specific question of the “grace o f Christ” in the Western tradition asked 
whether Jesus received grace, and how such grace was related to his divine being. 
For the Western tradition, the issue o f the grace o f Christ was a complex one. We 
have already noted the church’s concern to avoid any christology that would ac­
count for the divine in Christ simply in terms of grace. Among the advantages of 
Logos Christology was the clarity it brought to the question o f the unicity o f Christ. 
In establishing this unicity, the difference between Jesus Christ and other human
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beings was understood to be established by the Incarnation of the Logos in person, 
and not by the “quantity” o f grace received. Logos Christology thus presented itself, 
among other things, as an effective protection against any form o f “degree” christo­
logy.128 The theological tradition, for these reasons, tended to treat talk of grace in 
relation to Christ only with caution.
Despite this caution, the theological tradition did not conclude that Christ did 
not receive grace. Instead it distinguished two graces in relation to Christ. The first 
o f these graces was the grace of the Incarnation itself, identified with the assump­
tion o f a human nature by the Eternal Son. An influential reflection on the question 
o f the grace o f Christ is found in the thought o f St. Augustine, who explored an 
analogy between the gracing of the human nature o f Jesus and the gracing o f ordin­
ary human beings. Augustine argued that just as the human nature o f Jesus did not 
deserve to be assumed by the Logos as Christ, so too ordinary human beings do not 
deserve to be reborn as Christians. The Incarnation itself is thus thought of as a 
grace received by the human nature o f Jesus.129 If  the first grace was the grace of 
the Incarnation, the second grace130 was the grace that the tradition associated with 
the anointing o f Jesus. Reflection on this second grace o f Christ was linked to the 
reflection that the humanity of Christ received by grace all that the divine nature of 
Christ had by nature.131 Thus, the biblical theme o f the anointing o f Jesus was inter­
preted as reception by his human nature o f all that as Son he had by virtue o f his di­
vine nature.
128 Paul Molnar accuses Coffey of adopting what he calls (following Gunton) Rahner’s “degree 
Christology,” along with a number of other errors. For Molnar’s concerns about Coffey’s christo­
logy and some responses to these concerns, see below at p. 90f.
129 See Augustine, De Praed Sand. 15, quoted by Thomas in ST, ID, q. 2 a. 10 sed contra. See 
also Augustine, Enchiridion, 36. English at Augustine o f Hippo, The Augustine Catechism: 
Enchiridion of Faith, Hope and Love, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Bruce Harbert, The Augustine 
Series, vol. 1, (New York: New City Press, 2002), 66-67.
130 This terminology should not be confused with that used by Yamold, where he speaks of cre­
ation as a first gift and “grace” as a second gift. Edward Yamold, The Second Gift: A Study of 
Grace, (Slough: St. Paul Publications, 1974).
131 This step was traditionally attributed to Ambrose and Augustine, though on uncertain textual 
evidence. See T.E. Clark, “Hypostatic Union, Grace of,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia: Volume 7: 
Hol ~ Jub, ed. Berard Marthalar, (Detroit: Thompson Gale, 2003).
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On this basis, the traditional christology of the West structured its discussion 
o f the grace o f Christ around the distinction of two graces: the grace that was the 
Logos in person, and the graces received by the human nature of Christ.132 The gra­
cing o f the human nature o f Jesus was understood to be analogous with the grace 
received by ordinary human beings. The first grace was termed the “substantial” 
grace of Christ (the grace o f union, identified with the eternal Son) was unique to 
Jesus Christ, while the other graces were termed the “habitual” or “sanctifying” 
graces, graces that Christ shared with all other human beings.133
It is not difficult to see that such a structure represents an attempt to accom­
modate the impulses that lie behind a Spirit Christology within the dominating 
paradigm of a Logos Christology. The plain fact is that the New Testament does 
give us accounts of Jesus receiving the Holy Spirit at baptism, o f the Holy Spirit 
resting on him, driving him, guiding him, and later speaks of his having a role in 
sending the Holy Spirit (from which it is concluded that he possessed the Spirit). 
Having adopted the Logos as the primary explanation o f the divine element in Je­
sus, it was to be expected that the tradition would have to find some way of accom­
modating the gift of the Holy Spirit. References, then, to the Holy Spirit resting on 
Jesus and remaining on him and so on were understood as references to “habitual” 
sanctification, and this was regarded as “accidental.”
With this framework in place, theology fielded questions about why, or indeed 
whether Jesus Christ might need “habitual” grace. Since the assumption of the 
human nature by the Logos appeared to be sufficient to explain his divinity, such 
questions were often answered with reference to the perfection of Christ’s human 
nature. According to the doctrine of Chalcedon, the hypostatic union did not in­
132 The discussion of the grace of Christ in the second sense, i.e. the grace received by the human 
nature o f Jesus Christ came to be of some importance in the refutation of the 8th century Spanish 
Adoptionists, who claimed that the eternal Son was Son by nature, but the human nature of Jesus 
was Son by adoption only, a position that was regarded as a form o f Nestorianism. The tradition re­
sponded to this idea much as it had to the classical form of Nestorianism by excluding any speech of 
two sons: there is only one Son, the person of the Eternal Logos.
133 On this matter, see also Gary D. Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the 
Holy Spirit, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 146-147.
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volve a confusion of the human nature o f Jesus with the divine nature. The argu­
ment was that if  ordinary human beings are perfected by habitual sanctifying grace, 
then will not the same be true of Jesus Christ as perfect man?134 A second answer to 
this question appealed to the idea of Christ as mediator o f graces to ordinary human 
beings. Christ is mediator o f grace, and so it was appropriate that he should possess 
grace so as to be able to communicate it to ordinary human beings.135
Most interesting, given that the ultimate focus of the current study will be on 
trinitarian theology, was a third answer. A point from the classical trinitarian theo­
logy of the West was invoked to respond to this christological matter. The Western 
theology o f the Trinity held that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the 
Son: the filioque. If grace is thought o f as the gift o f the Holy Spirit (even if  by ap­
propriation136 only), then it was thought to be fitting that the order (taxis) implied 
by the filioque be reflected in the case o f the gracing of Christ. Hence, the Son (in­
carnate in Jesus) was understood to send the Holy Spirit not just on the church, but 
even on the human nature that he himself had assumed. The order o f activity of the 
second and third divine persons was understood in this theological tradition to be 
fixed by the filioque'. since the Son was involved in sending the Spirit, the Son must 
come first.137 Following this line of reasoning, it was clear that the grace of union 
(invoking the Logos) must precede the sanctifying grace (appropriated to the Holy 
Spirit). There will be occasion to return to this final point in the context of a discus­
sion o f the relation of christology and trinitarian theology. For the moment, we can 
at least note that the idea of deducing conclusions for christology from premises in 
trinitarian theology will today strike many as untenable from the point of view of 
theological method.
134, In Summa theologiae, in q. 7, a. 1 ad 1 Thomas writes: “the soul of Christ is not essentially Di­
vine. Hence it behooves it to be Divine by participation, which is by grace.”
135 See Summa theologiae EH q. 7, a. 1 responsio.
136 There will be occasion to offer some brief comments on the strategy of appropriations in trinit­
arian theology below at p. 142f.
137' Coffey presents this very issue as an important stimulus for his development of his two-model 
approach to the Trinity. See Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 470. See below 
at p. 183f. We will return to the issue of Coffey’s approach to filioque below at p. 126f and p. 177f.
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(b) Coffey’s Proposal: the Priority o f Sanctification
Compare this traditional approach to the question o f the grace of Christ, as 
sketched above, with what we have seen presented in Coffey’s Thesis A. Thesis A, 
to recall, is that “Jesus is brought into being as the divine Son in humanity through 
the Father’s radical bestowal of love, which love is the Holy Spirit.”138 We have 
already noted some features of this statement: that it is a theological interpretation 
o f the biblical texts rather than simply an attempt at capturing the literal sense of 
those texts; that it begins with Jesus; that it focuses on the activity o f the Holy Spirit 
bestowed by the Father; that it identifies the means by which the humanity of Jesus 
is brought into being as divine Son in humanity.
Against the background sketched above, we can begin to appreciate the most 
distinctive feature of this statement, namely that for Coffey the activity of the Spirit 
is somehow anterior to the assumption of the humanity o f Jesus by the Son. Coffey 
had already elaborated this position in his book Grace: The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit, 
where he acknowledges that for Thomas and the tradition following him, the grace 
o f union precedes the habitual grace of Jesus. In the “ascending” theology that 
Coffey develops, instead, Jesus’ “habitual grace precedes the grace o f union.”139 
The basis for this radical position is found in the biblical theme o f the “anointing o f 
Jesus.”
[...W ]e see the action o f the Holy Spirit on Jesus as fu st creating his hum an­
ity, then sanctifying it, and then uniting it in person to the pre-existing di­
vine Son, in the order not o f  time but o f  nature and understanding. Here the 
sanctification o f  Jesus’ humanity (the resultant sanctity being identical with 
his habitual grace) is a necessary stage tow ards his unity o f  person w ith the 
Son, w hich is the grace o f union. H ence in this theology the habitual grace 
o f  Jesus is m ore firm ly established than in Thom ism , and is related m ore in­
tim ately to the grace o f  union.140
138 Coffey, “The ’Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 479—480. Quoted also Coffey, “A 
Proper Mission o f the Holy Spirit,” 234.
13J' Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 109.
140 Ibid. Coffey develops this position in dialogue with the very different interpretations of the 
anointing o f Jesus advanced by Scheeben and Mühlen. Thanks to his “bestowal” model of the 
Trinity, to his distinction between the in fieri and in facto esse dimensions of the Incarnation, Coffey
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The specific and proper activity of the Holy Spirit in relation to the coming into be­
ing o f Jesus as Son o f God in humanity is, according to Coffey, sanctification and 
then unification. The Holy Spirit, he argues, sanctifies the human nature of Jesus 
such that what is assumed in the hypostatic union is already made holy by the Holy 
Spirit. The Holy Spirit then brings about the unity in person o f that sanctified hu­
manity with the Eternal Son.141
In brief, Coffey is suggesting that the biblical theme of the anointing of 
Christ allows for a logical priority of the work o f the Holy Spirit in bringing about 
the Incarnation, a logical priority of sanctification over assumption.142 He thus 
makes Christ the proper instance o f this sanctification leading to Sonship, the 
paradigmatic case o f all grace.
5. Conclusion
As we conclude this chapter, some of the contours o f Coffey’s proposal have 
already come into focus. This chapter has looked at certain dimensions o f what I 
have called Coffey’s Thesis A. We looked at it as an instance o f a Spirit Christo-
is able to go beyond the reluctance that these thinkers show to concluding from the baptism of Jesus 
texts that Father anoints Jesus with the Holy Spirit, bringing him into human existence. Ibid., 91- 
119. On the distinction between the in fieri and the in facto esse dimensions o f the Incarnation see 
below at p. 99f. On the “bestowal model” is found in Chapter Five below at p. 183f.
141 A more developed statement of this key position of Coffey’s may also be quoted. This second 
statement assumes a degree of trinitarian discourse beyond what we have seen thus far, so it here 
placed in a footnote:
When the Father directs his love, which is the Holy Spirit, beyond the Trinity, this love, 
like all love bestowed in or on the world, will be creative and assimilative. But the bestow­
al of the Holy Spirit of which we speak in the Incarnation is an utterly radical one, the giv­
ing of the Spirit ‘without measure. ’ We should not be surprised, therefore, that it is radic­
ally creative and radically assimilative. Thus in one act it calls the humanity of Jesus into 
existence and assimilates it to its divine source by sanctifying it with the fullness o f sancti­
fying grace and drawing it into hypostatic union with that divine person who in the Trinity 
is the sole proper object of this love, viz. the Son. The love that rests on the Son in the 
Trinity draws into union with the Son when directed beyond the Trinity.
See Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” 326-327.
142 Coffey’s position on the priority of sanctification over hypostatic union is criticised by Thomas 
Weinandy. Weinandy insists on the chronological impossibility of Coffey’s conclusion: there is no 
humanity prior to the Incarnation, and therefore it makes no sense to speak of a sanctification of this 
humanity prior to the Incarnation. See Thomas Weinandy, “Review of ‘Christ and the Spirit’ By 
Ralph Del Colle,” The Thomist 59, (1995), 658. Coffey however has clarified that he intends a “lo­
gical” and not a “temporal” priority. See Coffey, “The Common and the Ordained Priesthood,” 219- 
220.
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logy, but stressed that it was a specifically trinitarian Spirit Christology. The key 
feature distinguishing these two contemporary forms o f Spirit Christology (post- 
trinitarian Spirit Christology and trinitarian Spirit Christology) is the attitude taken 
to the doctrine of the Trinity that emerged in the post-biblical period. The post-trin­
itarian Spirit Christologists take their understanding of the literal meaning of biblic­
al texts as criteriological, and are therefore forced to deny anything like traditional 
trinitarianism. Coffey, in contrast, accepts the validity o f the doctrinal development 
of the Trinity. Recognising the historical development of the theme, he is nonethe­
less willing to consider the adequacy of the classical form of the doctrine o f  the 
Trinity to the biblical data. He finds that the “classical” theology is too one-sidedly 
Johannine in emphasis. His theological project is conceived as an attempt to ex­
plore the possibility of synthesis between the Johannine and synoptic christologies 
o f the New Testament.
We then moved on to the matter o f the involvement o f the Son and the Spirit 
in the hypostatic union. The classical tradition, on the basis of its Logos Christo­
logy, did not hesitate to allow for an appropriation to the Holy Spirit o f the function 
o f imparting sanctifying grace to Jesus Christ. In so doing, however, it relativised 
the role o f the Holy Spirit in two ways: it restricted the sanctifying work o f the 
Holy Spirit to appropriation alone, and it made this sanctification (= anointing) sec­
ondary to the Incarnation. Coffey, we have seen, proposes that we might invert this 
classical account, and to place the sanctification by the Holy Spirit prior to the In­
carnation. The next chapter will enter further into this theme, and indicate the 
grounding that Coffey finds for it in the theological tradition, and especially in the 
work o f Karl Rahner.
By way of conclusion, it is important to make clear the focus of what follows. 
In speaking o f the anointing of the human nature o f Jesus with the Holy Spirit, a 
number o f possible foci present themselves. One could, for example, focus on the 
specifically anthropological dimensions o f this thesis. Coffey himself writes at 
length on this matter, particularly in his earlier writings that explicitly address ques­
tions o f grace. One could also look at this matter with a focus on its christological
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dimensions. Again, there would be much in Coffey’s theology to justify such a fo­
cus. For our purposes, however, it is necessary to state that the focus in these first 
three chapters remains primarily pneumatological. Thus, I speak o f Thesis A and 
Thesis B as the premises of Coffey’s pneumatological conclusion: that the Holy 
Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Only on this basis will we move, 
in the fourth chapter, to a more consistently trinitarian focus.
That said, it should also be allowed that Christian theology is structured in 
such a way that christology holds and must hold a central position. The very fact 
that we speak here of Spirit Christology makes the centrality o f christology clear. 
No pneumatology can be successful, nor any trinitarian theology plausible, if  the 
christology that founds it is not sound.143 In reality, it is impossible fully to separate 
these various aspects of the discourse in question. Coffey’s style is such that it res­
ists sweeping distinctions between these strongly interrelated matters. The same 
should be true o f any fruitful theology.
143 Some space will be reserved at the end of Chapter Two for some concerns that have been raised 
about the soundness of Coffey’s christology.
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2. The “Returning” Love of
Jesus
1. Introduction: Thesis B
Theology is mined with questions of priority and sequence. Very often theolo­
gical projects are judged negatively for having taken what their critics regard as the 
wrong starting place. Lying beneath such judgements is often the belief that theolo­
gical argumentation is determined and limited by the starting point adopted.144 
Without looking at the adequacy of particular examples of such criticism at this 
point, a general point may be made. It is vitally important in approaching any theo­
logical proposal, before moving to judge the adequacy of answers, that we first es­
tablish what questions the author has set himself or herself.145
In the case of the theology of David Coffey, issues of priority and sequence 
are particularly challenging. Depending on what precise questions are addressed, 
different “starting points” might be identified. The choice to begin, as I have, with 
what I am calling Thesis A, should not be taken to imply that that is Coffey’s only 
starting point. The same body of work could be taken up from various points of 
view, and depending on which point o f view is adopted and which questions asked 
the “starting point” will vary. In the case o f the first part o f this study, contained in
144 This line of criticism is particularly well exemplified in challenges to the Western tradition lev­
elled by authors o f both East and West on the basis that somehow the starting point is wrong. Thus, 
a whole range of authors complain that the Western tradition is inadequate in its trinitarian theology 
because it takes the unity of divine substance as a starting point. This starting point is then thought 
to determine and limit the possibility of a truly trinitarian theology. For such criticisms see authors 
as diverse as Lossky, Zizioulas, Gunton, LaCugna etc.
145 O f course, some questions may be thought of as more fruitful than others, and one can certainly 
query the overall theological project of a given author. What one should not do, however, is prema­
turely judge that an author has adopted the wrong starting point before first enquiring what questions 
the author intends to pursue.
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these first three chapters, the precise question under consideration is: why, accord­
ing to Coffey, should we understand the Holy Spirit as “mutual love”? For isolating 
this theme in this way I take responsibility. In Coffey’s own writings this theme is 
woven together with many others. As far as starting point is concerned, the conclu­
sion that Chapter Three will offer, namely that the Holy Spirit is the “mutual love” 
of the Father and the Son, then becomes the starting point for further questions and 
represents the starting point for Coffey’s trinitarian theology. Thus, in the structure 
of this study as a whole, Thesis A is not to be identified as starting point, but rather 
as the first of two premises by which the starting point is established.
The current chapter comments on what is here called Thesis B. The move 
from  Thesis A to Thesis B raises its own questions o f priority and sequence. Thesis 
B operates as a second premiss for Coffey’s pneumatological conclusion, and reads 
as follows: “the response of Jesus is a love for the Father which ultimately is a re­
turn of the same Spirit.” The subject o f this thesis again is Jesus, but this time not 
simply as the recipient of God’s love in an anointing, but as acting subject, loving 
the Father in return. If Thesis A addresses questions of how Jesus came to be the 
Christ, Thesis B relates to Jesus’ human activity.
What then is the relation of Thesis A to Thesis B? Why this sequence? Why, 
in expounding Coffey’s thought on these matters, have I started with a chapter 
about the relationship of christologies (Johannine and synoptic, Logos and Spirit 
etc.), and now move to a chapter about Jesus and the Holy Spirit in the life o f Je­
sus? For some readers, the logic of this sequence will be clear: just as cause pre­
cedes effect, so too will issues relating to the “coming into existence” of Jesus as 
the “divine Son in humanity”146 (Thesis A) come before matters related to Jesus’ 
love o f the Father (referred to in Thesis B). Other readers, however, will be con­
cerned that the choice to start with the relationship between alternative christologies 
means that this study has begun on a wrong footing. One should begin, such readers
14i' This meaning of the unusual expression “divine Son in humanity” will be discussed below at p. 
73f.
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might argue, with Jesus of Nazareth to the extent that we can know him through the 
critical and historical reading of our sources, rather than allowing the primary data 
be overshadowed by the secondary data o f theological interpretation, such as is 
found in both Spirit and Logos Christologies.
It will be well, however, to invoke the caution set out above: first establish the 
question, and only then consider the adequacy o f the answer. One must first query 
what question determines the choice to begin with christologies and then move to 
say something of the life of Jesus before judging the adequacy o f this sequence. A 
key tool to command here is the distinction between the epistemological order and 
the ontological order.147
If  one assumes an epistemological order o f presentation, questions related to 
the relation o f christologies cannot come before historical study o f Jesus: from that 
point o f view christologies can only represent conclusions and never starting points. 
Following an epistemological order o f exposition one would have to begin with the 
Jesus of history, inasmuch as he can be reached through the critical and historical 
study o f our texts and our reconstructions o f the world in which this Jesus lived and 
died. From an epistemological point o f view, one might, in reading the first chapter 
o f this study, wonder how exactly we come to be in a position to ask questions, for 
example, about whether sanctifying grace or the hypostatic union come first. It 
might be objected that even the terminology used in posing such questions is drawn 
from the theological reflections of later generations, far removed from the Jesus 
event in history. From this point of view, one should begin, rather, with the life, 
activity, death and resurrection of Jesus as experienced by his disciples and medi­
ated to us through the writings of the New Testament.
Reading the New Testament, however, is a complex activity. The New Testa­
ment mediates the Jesus event not as historical data, but primarily in terms o f the 
salvific meaning of this event. Rather than attempting to present history as such, the
147 On this distinction, see Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine o f  the Triune God, 16-26. Coffey 
sometimes refers to these with the traditional language o f ordo inventionis and or do doctrinae. See 
Coffey, “In Response to Paul Molnar,” 375.
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New Testament is itself testament to the fact that the history o f Jesus lends itself to 
interpretation, and grants no direct access to the bare history o f Jesus of Nazareth. 
New Testament interpretations of Jesus are shaped by paschal imagination, symbol­
ic representations of the relationship between Jesus and God, and invocations of 
scriptural symbols o f anointing with the Spirit and Incarnation of the Word. What 
attitude must one take to such interpretations? Are they to be considered as literary 
clothing that the historically minded scholar is today called on to peel away to re­
veal the naked facts? Or do they have some weight in themselves? Do they not 
come to be in some sense significant primary data in themselves?
I f  New Testament interpretations o f Jesus and the Spirit are accepted as in 
some sense primary data in themselves, then another system for establishing prior­
ity and sequence is opened to theology: ontological priority. Here, the life, activity 
and death of Jesus are understood in terms of identity: who Jesus is. How is this 
identity understood? In the ontological order, interpretations, whether interpreta­
tions based on the symbol of anointing or interpretations invoking the idea of the 
Incarnation of the Logos, or both, have priority o f being, in that both are intended as 
having a sort o f explanatory potential.
A simple analogy for the relationship between epistemological priority versus 
ontological priority is found in our thinking about cause and effect. Epistemologic- 
ally, thoughts about cause arise in response to effects. From this point o f view, ef­
fects are prior. Ontologically, however, causes are generally treated as prior. The 
question of whether cause or effect comes first in our thinking depends entirely on 
whether we adopt the epistemological or the ontological order.
The sequence Thesis A and then Thesis B invoked in this study is shaped by 
the ontological order of questioning. Christological questions about the identity of 
Jesus are here presented first, and matters about his life, activity and death come 
second. This does not mean, however, that epistemological considerations are not
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recognised, but merely that they are not to the forefront in the structure o f my argu­
ment. As the current chapter will illustrate, however, Coffey’s attentiveness to 
epistemological concerns in christology are o f decisive importance.
It is not necessary at this stage to specify precisely why the ontological order 
o f  presentation has been preferred in the sequencing of these two chapters, except 
to state that the narrative of the New Testament itself justifies this sequence: Jesus 
is sent by God and returns to God, God loves Jesus and Jesus’ love o f God is 
presented there as a response to this “first” love of God. Further development o f the 
importance o f this sequence will be found in Chapter Five below.
Were it not for these matters, it may perhaps have been more comfortable to 
follow the epistemological order, to begin therefore with the life, activity, death and 
resurrection of Jesus. Having thus acknowledged the epistemological priority o f the 
material in this chapter, we now turn to a brief overview of New Testament themes 
about Jesus o f particular relevance to Coffey’s pneumatological argument.148
2. Divine Son “in Humanity” and 
“Incarnation” of the Holy Spirit
As the last chapter made clear, under the influence o f a dominant Logos Chris­
tology, classical theology thought of Jesus’ reception of sanctifying love as second­
ary reality, useful pro nobis but not essential to the divine being o f Jesus. Spirit 
Christology, in contrast makes it possible to understand Jesus as recipient o f God’s 
love (= Holy Spirit). Coffey writes:
It is therefore not correct to move immediately from God’s love of His 
people to Christ’s love of them, as though Christ were merely the funnel 
through which God’s love is poured.149
148 Were the focus here on Coffey’s christology, it would be impossible to cover these matters sat­
isfactorily in the space o f one chapter. What discussion is here given to specifically christological 
matters is motivated by the conviction that pneumatology must be christologically anchored and 
christologically plausible.
149 Coffey, “The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit,” 207; Coffey, “The Claim o f Catholicism.” ; Coffey, “The
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This “funnel” approach to Jesus’ reception of the Holy Spirit is a consequence of 
Logos Christology and the resulting approach to Jesus’ reception o f the Holy Spirit 
introduced above.150 What is divine in Jesus is related, in this view, to the Logos, 
and Jesus’ reception o f the Holy Spirit is thought o f only in pro nobis terms. Little 
attention is paid to the sanctifying effects of the Holy Spirit on the human nature o f 
Jesus as such. The humanity of Jesus is not, traditionally, given a real role in the 
economy of salvation: it becomes the explanation for the ignorance, hunger, suffer­
ing etc. o f Jesus/51 while the Logos is the explanation for the salvific work of Jesus. 
The consequences of this are manifold.
Coffey thinks that the New Testament as a whole communicates a more dyn­
amic sense o f what the divine Sonship o f Jesus means for his humanity than is im­
plied in the classical approach. Coffey’s concern for the humanity of Jesus is thus 
clearly specified: he is interested not in the humanity as such, but in the humanity
Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love o f the Father and the Son,” 216; Coffey, “The Spirit o f  Christ as 
Entelechy,” 394; Coffey, “A Promising Development in Christology: An Address to the Sydney 
Heretics Club”. Compare this to reflections that Coffey offers in 1970 on Jesus as him self recipient 
o f  revelation. See David Coffey, “Towards a New Act o f  Faith,” The Australasian Catholic Record 
47,(1970), 183-185.
150 Seep. 52f.
151 The origins o f this practice are perhaps found in the practice o f prosopological exegesis. Import­
ant early texts exemplifying this practice are found in Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 27, 30. See 
Slusser, “The Exegetical Roots o f  Trinitarian Theology”. Augustine assumes this traditional exeget- 
ical practice. See Mary T. Clark, “De Trinitate,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. E. 
Stump and N. Kretzmann, (Cambridge: University Press, 2001), 93.
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as sanctified by the Holy Spirit.152 This in turn throws light on the life o f Jesus as a 
manifestation of the activity of the Holy Spirit: in his acts and deeds, Jesus gives 
human expression to the perfecting work of the Holy Spirit.
With these perspectives in mind, we move now to look at some o f the themes 
from the life o f Jesus that illustrate this approach. These themes are the obedience 
of Jesus that characterises his relationship of love to God as Father; Jesus’ love of 
neighbour by which this obedience is expressed and mediated in categorial actions; 
the transcendental love of Jesus.153 On this basis, brief mention may be made of the 
death and resurrection of Jesus, and the sending o f the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, as 
the culmination o f Jesus’ life o f loving obedience to God and love o f neighbour.
Coffey articulates his discussion of Jesus’ love towards God around the im­
portant New Testament theme of the obedience o f Jesus to God. While in the 
Johannine christology, the Sonship of Jesus is explained in terms o f the Logos, in 
the synoptic theologies -  according to Coffey -  the divine Sonship of Jesus is actu- 
alised (or brought to full expression) in his Spirit-guided perfect obedience to God’s 
special will for him.154 Jesus is presented as without sin and as acting only in ac­
152 Contemporary theology often reads the early Christological controversies in terms of crude dis­
tinctions o f  concern with the divinity o f Christ (attributed, for example, to the Alexandrian school) 
and concern with the humanity o f  Christ (attributed, for example, to the Antiochian school). Histor­
ically, such distinctions are unlikely to be sustainable. See John J. O ’Keefe, “Impassible Suffering? 
Divine Passion and Fifth Century Christology,” Theological Studies 58, (1997): 39-60; Paul 
Gavrilyuk, “Theopatheia: Nestorius’s Main Charge Against Cyril o f  Alexandria,” Scottish Journal 
o f  Theology (2003): 190-207.
Neither can the Western scholastic tradition be reliably accused o f  losing sight o f the humanity o f  
Jesus. I f  one were to follow up the issue o f how the true humanity o f  Christ was treated in the schol­
astic tradition, one could do worse than read Davies’ brief summary o f Aquinas’ Christology in 
Brian Davies, Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies, Outstanding Christian Thinkers, vol. (New York: 
Continuum, 2002), 140-149. On the frustration o f  those close to the scholastic tradition at the charge 
that the true humanity o f Jesus was obscured in that tradition see F.E. Crowe, “Christologies: How 
U p-T o-D ate is Yours?,” Theological Studies (1968), 87-101.
While there is probably some misplaced criticism o f traditional theology in relation to the matter o f 
the humanity o f  Jesus, Coffey is not taking sides in that debate. The issue for Coffey is not so much 
the integrity o f the human nature as such, as the ability o f  our theological constructions to contem­
plate the sanctifying work o f  the Holy Spirit on and through the human nature ofJesus,
153, The terms “categorial” and “transcendental” here show Coffey’s dependence on Rahner.
154 Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love o f the Father and the Son,” 202. Thus, while in 
Johannine Christology, Sonship is something that is “given” at the beginning o f  Jesus’ life, else­
where there is a sense in which Sonship is “achieved.” It is important to remember here that Coffey 
is not counter-posing Spirit Christology and Logos Christology. I f  he were, then we would certainly
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cordance with God’s will.155 Moving beyond the synoptic gospels to the New Testa­
ment as a whole, we see signs of early engagement with the theme of the obedience 
of Jesus, with texts indicating that this obedience flourishes perfectly in the way in 
which Jesus went to his death (Phil 2:8; Heb 5:8-9, 2:10).
Interpreting the life of Jesus in terms of obedience to the Father is not unusual. 
What is characteristic of Coffey’s construction is the way in which he links this 
theme to the Holy Spirit. On one level, such an interpretation is easily supported in 
the New Testament. One need only recall the various texts found in all four gospels 
which speak of the role of the Holy Spirit in guiding Jesus, driving Jesus etc.156 In 
particular this theme is associated with the Gospel of Luke, where the author sys­
tematically shows the Holy Spirit’s involvement at each stage of Jesus’ life.157 
Coffey draws the biblical themes of the obedience o f Jesus, Jesus’ love for the 
Father and the Holy Spirit together.
If the Spirit gave Jesus the power to fulfil his ministry, more importantly, as 
God’s love for him, it evoked from him the love for God which was the 
wellspring of that ministry.158
By linking together the themes of obedience, love, and Holy Spirit, Coffey is thus 
enabled to think of the Holy Spirit as the “bond” between Jesus and the Father.159
Alongside the love of Jesus for God, expressed especially in terms o f the 
theme o f his obedience, Coffey also considers it important to consider those texts
have in the idea o f  the “achieving” divine Sonship an unsatisfactory formulation. The New Testa­
ment, Coffey argues, contains both approaches, and therefore so should our christology.
155- Ibid.
156’ All four gospels that contain this theme. What distinguishes the Johannine from the synoptic ac­
counts is the degree to which the accounts o f  Jesus’ Sonship depend on the Holy Spirit. In the 
Johannine gospel, it is primarily the Logos that explains Jesus’ Sonship. This need not mean, how­
ever, that the Fourth gospel does not recognise the role o f  the Holy Spirit in guiding Jesus.
157 Ibid., 205.
158 Ibid., 206.
159 Ibid. Note that for Coffey, to speak o f the Holy Spirit as “bond” o f  Father and Son is not yet to 
have arrived at the point o f affirming that the Holy Spirit is “mutual love.” See Ibid., 218.
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that speak of Jesus’ love for human beings in general. That the New Testament con­
centrates so extensively on the matter o f Jesus’ love for human beings in general is 
appropriate to the New Testament’s pro nobis orientation.
Coffey offers both scriptural and theological arguments for an identification of 
these themes: Jesus’ love for God and Jesus’ love for human beings. There is a fun­
damental congruity, he holds, between these such that they are not indeed two sep­
arate loves, but one and the same love. Again the link is found in the theme of Je­
sus’ obedience to God. Thus, when Jesus loves his neighbour, he thereby loves 
God, since that is what God wills him to do. Beyond that, however, the New Testa­
ment comes close to thematising this identification. In Mk 12:28-31, for example, 
Jesus himself sets the commandment to love God alongside that to love one’s 
neighbour. 1 Jn 4:20-21 makes love of neighbour the visible complement and veri­
fication o f one’s love of God. Mt 22:40 and Luke 10:28 make the twin loves of God 
and neighbour respectively the fulfilment o f the law and the prophets and the key to 
life respectively. Paul agrees with this perspective (see Rom 13:8, 10 and Gal 5:14). 
Matthew presents the interrelation of these loves in dramatic terms in his account of 
the final judgement (esp. Mt 25:40).160 Beyond the New Testament, Coffey himself 
has recourse to Rahner’s theology to defend a rigorous identification of Jesus’ love 
o f neighbour and his love of God.161 For Rahner, Christ’s love of God and love of 
neighbour are the “self-same love.”162
In interpreting the meaning of the particular acts o f obedience and love re­
counted in the New Testament, Coffey evokes Rahner’s distinction of the tran­
scendental and the categorial. The love o f Jesus for the Father should be ap­
proached, according to Coffey, from both of these points o f  view. What is most
160 Coffey cites these texts in Ibid., 217.; Coffey, “The Theandric Nature o f  Christ,” 38-39.
161 Karl Rahner, “Reflections on the Unity o f the Love o f  Neighbour and the Love of God,” in 
Volume 6: Concerning Vatican Council II, Theological Investigations (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1969). Coffey speaks o f  the de facto recognition o f the unity o f  these two loves in the New 
Testament, but o f  the demonstration o f  their union on “anthropological grounds” in Rahner’s article. 
See Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” 327.
Coffey, “A  Proper Mission o f  the Holy Spirit,” 276; Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the 
Triune God, 38.
6 8
evident is what he would call, following Rahner, the categorial love of Jesus {the 
discrete acts o f love that Jesus carries out). These, however, are but reflections of 
the basic love o f Jesus, that underlies and is expressed in the categorial expressions 
o f Jesus’ love. This love is described as “basic, necessary, subjective, immediate, 
and transcendental” and is, Coffey says, the consequence o f the hypostatic union it­
self.163 Thus, from the individual acts o f obedience and love we can rise to insight 
about the basic love of Jesus that itself manifests the hypostatic union.164
It is important for Coffey that we think not just o f the categorial love of Jesus, 
but o f the transcendental love, for it is Coffey’s intention to interpret Jesus’ love as 
itself the Holy Spirit. Neither particular acts of love, nor the habit o f love itself, 
could express the Holy Spirit, for both are finite. Ultimately the infinity of the 
Holy Spirit can only be explained in terms of the transcendental love of Jesus that 
underlies particular acts.165
Coffey’s position might be summarised in terms o f two claims, the first of 
which he shares with many, the second of which is unique to him. The first is that 
the life o f Jesus is itself the expression o f his love of God and neighbour. Thus, he 
writes:
the love with which Jesus drew ever closer to the Father through the events 
of his life and which reached its perfection in his death was primarily the 
work of the Holy Spirit in him.166
This first claim is uncontroversial. That Jesus lived a life o f obedience, and obedi­
ence to the death is already well-expressed in the New Testament.
1631 Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ o f the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 476.
164 I am not suggesting, o f  course, that an impartial observer could conclude from Jesus’ actions 
directly to an understanding o f the hypostatic union. The Christian who accepts the doctrine o f  the 
hypostatic union is entitled, however, to see these individual actions o f  Jesus as manifestations o f a 
more basic love, and to connect this to the hypostatic union. Coffey is not attempting here to establ­
ish the grounds for Christian belief, but exploring the intelligibility o f  the New Testament from a 
Christian point o f  view.
165 Coffey also explores the psychological implications o f the hypostatic union. He generally fol­
lows the positions o f  Rahner here, but rejects the Nestorian implications o f Rahner’s understanding 
that Jesus has direct vision o f the Logos during his lifetime. Coffey argues instead for direct vision 
o f  the Father. See Ibid., 472-474.
I<si Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love o f the Father and the Son,” 206.
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What marks Coffey’s interpretation as unique is his position that this response 
o f love is itse lf the Holy Spirit. Coffey acknowledges that the thesis that Jesus’ love 
for the Father is the Holy Spirit is more difficult to demonstrate from scripture than 
the thesis that the Holy Spirit is God’s love for Jesus.167 In relation to Thesis A, the 
matter was more straightforward, since direct biblical support for the identification 
of God’s love for Jesus with the Holy Spirit can be sought in the use o f the Holy 
Spirit symbol in the baptism scenes, and in Luke 1:35. What New Testament evid­
ence do we have for identifying the love of Jesus with the Holy Spirit? What is the 
biblical basis for the position expressed in Thesis B?
The biblical basis for this position, Coffey argues, is found especially in two 
texts related to the death of Jesus, John 19:30 and Hebrews 9:13-14. Although we 
cannot replicate the detail of his arguments, it will be necessary to sketch the basic 
outline here.168
The first text describes the death of Jesus: “When Jesus had received the vin­
egar, he said ‘It is finished’; and he bowed his head and gave up the spirit.” 
Coffey’s interest here is in the interpretation of this reference to “the spirit.” On a 
literal level, o f course, it simply means that Jesus died. But John’s writing, Coffey 
reminds us, is often better understood at a spiritual level. Certain important modi­
fications that John makes to the Septuagint version o f the underlying Isaiah 53:12 
point to the intention to connect this death in obedience with a sending o f the Spirit 
on the church.169 On the basis o f these observations, he can claim that the culmina­
tion o f Jesus’ human life is seen by John as a giving o f the Spirit (communion with 
God) to human beings.
The second text that Coffey considers in relation to the death o f Jesus is 
Hebrews 9:13-14:
167- Ibid., 205.
Ié8 These arguments are presented in Ibid., 206-210.; Coffey, “The Theandric Nature o f  Christ,” 
39-41. The first text is cited in the same context, but not discussed on Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f  the 
Holy Spirit, 154.
169 On this see, Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love o f the Father and the Son,” 208.
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For if the sprinkling of defiled persons with the blood of goats and bulls and 
with the ashes of a heifer sanctifies for the purification of the flesh, how 
much more will the blood of Christ, who through eternal Spirit offered him­
self without blemish to God, purify your conscience from dead works to 
serve the living God.
Jesus has offered himself, obedient to God’s will, “through eternal Spirit.” Again 
the question is: how should we understand the “Spirit” here? Is it best understood as 
a reference, as some argue, to the Holy Spirit (third divine person) or, as others 
hold, to the Spirit of Christ. Coffey concludes that it is most probable that it is a ref­
erence to the Holy Spirit, though in a scriptural sense, the “Spirit of God,” the very 
same spirit who guided the action of Isaiah’s Servant already alluded to Hebrews 
9:18.
On the basis of these texts, Coffey argues that we find a biblical basis for 
identifying the death of Jesus, the supreme expression of his basic love of God and 
neighbour, with the gift of the Holy Spirit. This gift, in keeping with the “double 
orientation”170 (towards God and towards human beings) characteristic o f his life as 
a whole, is the bestowal of this love (= Holy Spirit) on God the Father and on the 
church.171
Coffey’s interpretation of the death o f Jesus as a complex one. On one level, 
he adopts the position that sees the death o f any human being as the culmination of 
their personhood, and argues that it is therefore in his death that Jesus reaches the 
culminating expression o f his divine personhood (Sonship) in humanity.172 On an­
other level, he sees it as the definitive expression o f his love o f God and neighbour. 
This love is specifically self-g iftm  Jesus gives him self entirely to God in his 
earthly existence, to the point of his obedient death on the cross.174
170 Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit, 154.
171, Coffey distinguishes between the “offer” o f  the Holy Spirit to human beings, which is ad­
equately understood in terms of the “procession model” o f  the Trinity and the “bestowal” o f the 
Holy Spirit, best understood in terms o f  the “bestowal model.” See Ibid., 113-116.
112 Ibid., 150-152.
173 Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love o f the Father and the Son,” 214.
174 Although we are not yet explicitly discussing the trinitarian dimensions o f the death o f  Jesus, it 
is clear that Coffey sees what is happening in the death o f  Jesus as both the manifestation and reflec­
tion o f  the Son’s eternal love for the Father. See, e.g. Coffey, Dens Trinitas: The Doctrine o f  the 
Triune God, 111.
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In this same act, Christ also gives himself entirely to human beings to the 
point that he confers on the church his very identity. This self-gift o f his Spirit is 
given to the church, who receive it as the Spirit o f Sonship, and by this gift they are 
enabled to be united with Christ: sons (and daughters) in the Son.175 He links the 
death o f Jesus with his resurrection, with Pentecost and the ascension as the definit­
ive expressions o f  Jesus’ divine Sonship in humanity, his gift o f self to the church 
and his return in obedient love to the Father.176
The themes of resurrection (with its primary reference to what happens to Je­
sus) and of Pentecost (with its primary reference to what happens as a consequence 
o f the resurrection to ordinary human beings) are united in the observation that the 
Holy Spirit is precisely the “Spirit of sonship.”177 One of the things thus explained, 
according to Coffey is the “Christological character o f the Holy Spirit.”178 The 
Spirit which Jesus sends on the church is the very Spirit of Sonship that animated 
his human existence. When the Spirit animates the church, it does so in a way that 
brings about the reality o f the church as Body o f Christ.
175 The expression “sons [and daughters] in the Son” is founded on texts like Gal 2:20, 3:26, 4:6, 7. 
It is found very often in the writings of David Coffey. See, for example, Coffey, “The Gift o f  the 
Holy Spirit,” 222, 223; Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 67, 91-92, 114, 142-143, 149, 
261; Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ o f  the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 475, 479; Coffey, “A Proper Mission 
o f  the Holy Spirit,” 237; Coffey, “The Claim o f Catholicism,” 49, 51; Coffey, “A Case for 
Christianity Vis-a-Vis the Other World-Religions,” 34; Coffey, “The Common and the Ordained 
Priesthood,” 221; Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine o f the Triune God, 43. The “prototype” of 
human salvation is Mary, the Mother of God, whom Coffey sees as co-mediatrix in the sense that re­
demption needs not only to be offered, but also received. Mary plays a key role, according to scrip­
ture, in receiving the event o f  salvation on the part o f  “believing Israel.” She is therefore the “sym­
bol” o f  the Church: the one in whom salvation is perfectly received. See Coffey, “Mary, Prototype 
o f  Salvation”.
176 Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 152-155. With this definitive gift o f  the Holy Spirit, 
Pentecost, the “proper mission” o f the Holy Spirit begins. Coffey distinguishes between the presence 
and activity o f  the Holy Spirit in the economy o f  salvation prior to Pentecost, prior indeed to the per­
sonal history o f Jesus as Son in humanity, and the “proper mission” o f  the Holy Spirit which is 
grace.
177 Here Coffey’s thought shares something with that o f  Thomas Weinandy. See W einandy, The 
Father's Spirit of Sonship. I will comment further on Weinandy below at p. 174f.
178 See Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 478-479.
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For further development of these themes, I must refer the reader to Coffey’s 
own writings. Here I have offered a brief account o f the general orientation that he 
adopts in his reading o f the New Testament testimony about Jesus, enough however 
to serve my overall purpose.
In concluding this section, I note some of the distinctive characteristics of 
Coffey’s interpretation as introduced above. Firstly, in relation to the biblical sym­
bol o f the Son, he points to a sense in which Sonship is not simply a static notion. 
The theological tradition tended to restrict its understanding of Sonship to the onto­
logical state brought about by the hypostatic union: Jesus simply is the Son. Coffey, 
in contrast, explores the possibility of a kind o f development in the divine Sonship: 
Sonship is here expressed in acts, in a life, in a history. The Sonship in question is 
not the eternal Sonship of the Logos, but the divine Sonship “in humanity.” Unlike 
the Sonship of the Eternal Logos, the divine Sonship in humanity to which Coffey 
refers is not fully actualised in the Incarnation at the beginning of Jesus’ life, since 
the human nature of Jesus is not at that stage fully developed. As Jesus grew phys­
ically, psychologically and spiritually, so too did his human nature become an ever 
more “apt medium for the actualization of divine sonship.”179 The death o f Jesus 
represents, in this analysis, the highest expression o f love that is possible in a 
human nature.
Hence in the death of Jesus the progressive “incarnation” of the Holy Spirit 
in his transcendental love of the Father attains the limit that is possible in 
this life.180
There is no challenge to divine immutability implied in these statements: Coffey 
explains the change as being in the humanity, and not in the divinity itself.181 It is in
179 Ibid., 476.
180 Ibid., 477.
181, Coffey devotes Chapter Five o f  Dens Trinitas to the questions raised by Process Theology, and 
emerges as a strong opponent of anything that would erode the “immutability” o f  God.
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order to make just this distinction that he makes use o f the term divine Son “in hu­
manity.”182 Clearly, this distinction between the Eternal Son and the divine Son in 
humanity is particular to Coffey.
The second conclusion relates to the Holy Spirit. For Coffey, the Holy Spirit 
is expressed humanly through the life o f Jesus. The story o f the Holy Spirit’s sanc­
tifying action through the life of Jesus is read by Coffey as a kind of “incarnation” 
of the Holy Spirit.183 With this unusual expression Coffey does not, of course, in­
tend to suggest that there is an incarnation of the Holy Spirit distinct from the In­
carnation of the Son. The word “incarnation” is used analogously,184 meaning that 
the Holy Spirit is given a human story in the ever more perfect love o f Jesus.
It may be appropriate at this point to make a brief clarifying statement related 
to the Trinity, a statement to be expanded upon in later chapters. We can see a clear 
parallel between the divine Son “in humanity” and the “incarnate” Holy Spirit: in 
both cases, there is an attempt to speak of the manifestation o f a divine person in 
the economy of salvation. In neither case, however, is Coffey speaking about that 
divine person apart, as it were, from the economy. The purpose o f this distinction is 
not to separate the Son and the Holy Spirit from the second and third divine persons 
respectively. Quite the opposite. The point is to draw attention to the perfection 
(within appropriate limits) of their self-manifestation in the economy. While it is 
true that the divine Son “in humanity” and the “incarnate” Holy Spirit, as they are 
known by limited resources of human knowledge are somehow less than the divine 
persons in se, I argue that ultimately Coffey’s emphasis lies on their ontological 
identification with the divine persons of the Eternal Trinity, rather than on the epi-
182 This is rooted in Coffey’s interpretation that “[w] ha lever the New Testament says about Christ, 
no matter how exalted it may be, is said about him as a man, as a human being. His essential human­
ity is never pushed beyond legitimate limits by anything it says o f  him, and so he is never seen as 
even a possible rival to the one God of Israel, to whom he him self prayed.” Coffey, Deus Trinitas: 
The Doctrine o f  the Triune God, 10.
183 Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 476. He also thinks that we may speak 
o f  a “progressive ‘Christification’ o f  the Spirit.” See Coffey, “The Palamite Doctrine o f  God: A 
New Perspective,” 349.
184 Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ o f the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 466.
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stemologically-motivated distinctions evident here.185 When we come to discuss the 
purpose of the “immanent” Trinity, we will see that the principal purpose of that 
level o f theological discourse is to abstract the second and third divine persons from 
the limitations o f the economy of salvation; but we will also see that this move is 
provisional: theology of the “immanent Trinity” is incomplete if  it is not oriented 
towards the “economy of salvation.”186
3. The Problem of the “Wedge”
I have mentioned more than once that the emphases emerging in Coffey’s 
reading of the biblical data differs at a number o f points from those o f “classical” 
theology. I have stated that he thinks of his Spirit Christology as somehow comple­
mentary to the Logos Christology of the classical traditions. In what remains of this 
chapter, I look at Coffey’s attempts to explain the relationship between his posi­
tions and those o f the “classical” tradition. The reason for this is clear: it is not suf­
ficient to say that two things are compatible for this to be so. One must show how 
they are compatible. How, in brief, do Coffey’s interpretations o f scripture relate to 
the traditional ones? Let us first review some of the principal differences seen thus 
far.
From the first chapter above we know that the classical theologies were built 
largely on the basis of Logos Christology, while Coffey’s theology attempts a Spirit 
Christology (though he states that this need not mean abandoning Logos Christo­
logy and the associated doctrine o f the Trinity). We also know that Coffey’s theo­
logy thinks o f the Holy Spirit’s sanctification o f the human nature of Jesus as some­
how (though not chronologically) prior to the hypostatic union with the Son, a 
position that inverts the traditional order. From the current chapter, we know that
185, Thus might be answered some o f the concerns expressed by Anthony Kelly in his thoughtful re­
view o f Deus Trinitas, where -  missing these points -  he politely says that Coffey’s methodology 
“teases theologians.”
186 These points are expanded upon in Chapters Four and Five below.
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Coffey continues to read the life, death and resurrection o f Jesus in the same way, 
placing the work of the Holy Spirit somehow prior, bringing about the Sonship “in 
humanity” o f Jesus.
Another way of characterising the difference between the broad lines of 
Coffey’s theology and those of the “classical” tradition is with reference to the rela­
tionship between what happens in Jesus and what happens in ordinary human be­
ings. In the “classical” approach, the case o f Jesus is conceived in a way discontinu­
ous with that of ordinary human beings. The need to do this, as indicated, was 
linked historically with the need to assert the unicity of Christ, against adoptionism. 
Accordingly, Jesus is the Son because he is the Logos incarnate, while ordinary 
human beings are saved by grace. What happens in the case of Jesus is no guide to 
what happens with ordinary human beings, and vice versa.
Coffey’s theology, in contrast, sets aside the traditional reluctance to explore 
the continuities, and advances the argument that just as ordinary human beings are 
sanctified by the Holy Spirit, so too is Jesus sanctified by the Holy Spirit. What 
happens in the case of Jesus is, for Coffey, the best guide to what happens with or­
dinary human beings, because the case of Jesus is paradigmatic. As a result of what 
happens in Jesus, there is even a sense in which we might urge a “vice versa”: as 
long as it is clear that the anointing of Jesus is primary, we can look at the sanctify­
ing work o f the Holy Spirit in ordinary human beings (grace) in order to gain some 
insight into the work of the Holy Spirit in relation to the human nature of Christ.
Yet another way of characterising the difference with Coffey’s theology is in 
relation to the notion of the “Son.” Classical theology thinks o f the Son as the pre­
existent Logos, the one who assumes a human nature in Jesus, the principle o f unity 
in Christ. Classical theology has no notion o f the Son “in humanity,” one who is 
progressively brought into being by the Holy Spirit through the life o f Jesus.
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Why, from the point of view of traditional theology, would it be difficult to 
accept Coffey’s positions as sketched above? We have already seen that the basic 
answer is the dominance in the tradition of Logos Christology and the comparative 
neglect o f Spirit Christology. It is time now to look at the broad impact of this on 
the history o f christological thought, time to set out Coffey’s diagnosis o f what he 
calls the problem of the “wedge.”
According to Coffey, the rise of Logos Christology in its ontological interpret­
ation brought with it what he regards as an unscriptural division between the human 
and the divine natures o f Christ. No such distinction is found in the bible itself. To 
claim to find a distinction between the human and divine natures o f Christ in the 
bible would be anachronistically to import the thought-culture of the Hellenistic 
world into the Semitic world of the biblical authors. I have already sketched some­
thing o f the rise in the post-biblical period of what Coffey reads as an ontological 
interpretation o f the New Testament Logos Christology.187 A typical fruit of this on­
tological approach is manifest in the terms of the fourth century “Arian” contro­
versy: either the Son is divine or the Son is a creature. When, in the fifth century, 
this framework is brought to christology itself, the ontological chasm dividing Cre­
ator from creatures is brought to bear on the heart o f  the hypostatic union itself. The 
result o f this, for Coffey, is that the human nature o f Jesus lies on one side o f this 
chasm on the divine nature on the other. The question of how these two natures are 
related, Coffey thinks, was left unanswered by the Chalcedonian framework, which 
insists that both natures are perfect, but also that they are unmixed and unconfused. 
In its bid to ensure the unicity of Christ, classical Logos Christology comes to rely 
on an opposition between these two natures. This reliance on an ontological chasm 
to ensure the unicity of Christ came at the price o f relegating the effects o f the hy­
postatic union on the human nature o f Christ to second place. The principal func-
(a) Diagnosing the Problem
187 See above at p. 32f.
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tion of the human nature of Christ in christology comes to be the explanation o f  the 
limits and weaknesses in Jesus testified to in scripture.188 Christ is one with God in 
his omnipotence, and one with human beings in his weakness.
Coffey, o f course, cannot and does not disagree with Chalcedon on these 
points. In Coffey’s view, however, for all its positive points, for all its authority in 
the Christian tradition, the doctrine of Chalcedon brought with it a significant diffi­
culty: the difficulty of expressing how the two natures in Christ are related. This he 
refers to as the problem of the “wedge.”189 As a result, although the doctrine of 
Chalcedon remains the classical statement of christological orthodoxy, it suffers 
from an imbalance inasmuch as it fails to deal with this “wedge” between the divine 
and human natures o f Christ.190 This is unfortunate on both anthropological and 
pneumatological levels.
(b) Addressing the Problem
In Coffey’s view, there are hints o f  a solution to the problem of the “wedge” 
in Karl Rahner’s transcendental christology. He also argues, though less convin­
cingly in my view, that we might find elements of a solution in patristic theology,
l8S' See above at p. 65f.
189 Coffey makes reference to the image o f  a “wedge” in Ibid., 468. Coffey states that the
Chalcedonian dogma was the classical expression o f  the problem o f the wedge.
I would suggest that it is more correctly seen as a refinement o f  Cyril and the Council o f  Ephesus’ 
response to the problem o f the “wedge.” Chalcedon does make a number o f  statements about the re­
lationship o f one nature to the next, but does so on the firm basis o f  the conviction that it is the Son, 
the Word who is incarnated, and not simply the divine nature, and that it is the hypostatic union that 
gives us the ontological basis for our discussion o f the relation o f  the two natures in Christ.
A similar use o f the word “wedge” is found in Ivor Davidson, “Theologizing the Human Jesus: An 
Ancient (and M odem) Approach to Christology Reassessed,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology (2001), 135. The views set out by Davidson in that article converge with those o f  Coffey 
on a number o f  points. I f  Davidson’s debt to Coffey is direct, he does not make this clear in his 
article.
190 Although it is not our direct concern here, it is important to state that the impact o f  this “wedge” 
includes the need to distinguish the “grace o f  Christ” (the Incarnation) sharply from the “grace o f 
human beings” (grace in general). What makes Christ holy needs in this system to be different to 
what makes ordinary people holy. The theology o f grace thereby loses its christological mooring. 
This precise problem is the setting and theme o f  Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit.
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in the notions of the enhypostasia, the communicatio idiomatum  and the notion of 
the theandric activity of Christ. Since I fmd his use o f Rahner’s transcendental 
christology more convincing I will begin with that.
The classical accounts and Rahner’s theology do not differ on the existence 
o f an ontological chasm dividing the realms of Creator and created. In Rainier’s 
transcendental theology, however, God’s definitive action in Christ redefines this 
relationship by means o f God’s self-communication, a self-communication that 
finds its definitive expression in the hypostatic union.
As a result of the self-communication of God, especially in the hypostatic uni­
on, the world may no longer be adequately grasped as simply non-being, since a 
created being has become the humanity o f the Eternal Son. In Rahner’s thought, the 
hypostatic union is not, however, an unexpected subversion o f the Creator-created 
dialectic. As a result of the hypostatic union, it is possible to re-read the history of 
the world prior to the birth of Jesus as the history o f Spirit in the world. Prior to the 
hypostatic union, Spirit is already in the world, animating it, moving it in self-tran­
scendence beyond itself. This activity of Spirit in the world moves created reality 
towards the highest point of its self-transcendence in the Incarnation. This activity 
o f the Spirit moving created reality towards fulfilling its obediential potency191 in 
human nature for hypostatic union with the Word is, according to Coffey, the Holy 
Spirit as “entelechy.”192 Against this background, Rahner understands human nature
191 By speaking o f “obediential potency” Rahner (and Coffey) intend to rule out any ungraced self- 
transcendence o f  humanity that would reach the point o f hypostatic union. The position suggested is 
neither pantheist nor is it a kind o f “super-Pelagianism” that would allow humanity o f itself to 
achieve hypostatic union. See Coffey, “The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit,” 218; Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ 
o f  the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 467; Coffey, “The Theandric Nature o f  Christ,” 412.
192 Coffey develops Rahner’s idea o f the Spirit as “entelechy.” See especially Coffey, “The Spirit 
o f  Christ as Entelechy”. Above I stated that for Coffey, the “proper mission” o f  the Holy Spirit be­
gins at Pentecost. See above at note 177 on p.72. This does not mean that this was the first entry of 
the Spirit into the world. By speaking of the Holy Spirit as “entelechy” Coffey not only opens space 
for Spirit Christology, but also makes space for interesting investigations into the theology o f  reli­
gions. See Ibid. and Coffey, “Questiones Disputatae: A Trinitarian Response to Issues Raised By 
Peter Phan” .
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in terms of self-transcendence, and sees this transcendence as fulfilled paradigmat- 
ically in Jesus o f Nazareth. The culminating point o f its obediential potency is unity 
of person with the Eternal Son.
The idea o f self-communication o f God is not, however, explained exclusively 
with reference to the Son. Coffey writes that transcendental theology:
sees the incarnation and grace as determinations, by God, of man in his 
openness to him, the incarnation being the uniquely highest such determina­
tion. If in each case it is the Holy Spirit as Spirit of sonship who is commu­
nicated by God (the Father), it is clear that the uniquely highest form of this 
determination will be that in which the humanity becomes one in person 
with the divine Son, while lesser determinations will not be such as to rule 
out independent human personhood, and so will remain unions of human 
persons with the Holy Spirit, sons in the Son.193
Coffey develops the possibility that just as “Incarnation” is proper to the Son, so 
too “grace” is proper to the Holy Spirit. Thus Incarnation and grace are two modal­
ities o f the self-communication o f God.194 If  this is accepted, Coffey can advance 
the thesis that the flourishing of human transcendence is the work o f grace which is 
the sanctifying work o f the Holy Spirit, rather than the fruition o f human nature as 
such.195
Returning to Rahner, the next point is that rather than thinking of human 
nature as that which has not yet been graced, Rahner’s theology leads to an under­
standing of human nature that is always already oriented to God, that the obedien­
tial potency towards hypostatic union pertains to the very definition of humanity. 
Coffey draws our attention to two quotations196 from Rahner’s “On the Theology of 
the Incarnation,” worth reproducing here:
193 Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit, 92.
194 Exploration o f  how Coffey modifies and refines Rahner’s position on the self-communication 
o f  God in Incarnation and grace is found especially in Coffey, “The Gift o f the Holy Spirit”; Coffey, 
Grace: The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit, 54—71.
195 Remember that for Rahner, human nature is reduced to a Restbegriff. Thus, while it is possible 
to consider human nature without the activity o f  the Holy Spirit, in concrete reality the Holy Spirit is 
always active with the offer o f grace: this offer being the “supernatural existential.” Coffey develops 
some stimulating distinctions between the “offer o f  grace” and “grace” in Coffey, “The Whole 
Rahner on the Supernatural Existential”.
196 These quotations and Coffey’s comments are found in Coffey, “The Theandric Nature o f  
Christ,” 4 1 1 -414 .
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The indefinable nature [human nature], whose limits — ‘definition’ — are 
the unlimited reference to the infinite fullness of the mystery, has, when as­
sumed by God as his reality, simply arrived at the point to which it strives 
by virtue of its essence.197
The second quotation:
The Incarnation of God is therefore the uniquely highest of the perfection of 
the human reality, which consists in the fact that man is insofar as he gives 
himself up. He who understands with theological correctness what potentia 
obedientialis for hypostatic union means — the assumability of human 
nature by the person of the Word of God — knows that this potential cannot 
be just another ability alongside other possibilities of the human condition, 
but is objectively identical with the essence of man.198
In Christ, human nature shows itself capable o f reaching a divine way of being. 
Coffey reads Rahner’s transcendental christology as the recovery and strongest pos­
sible formulation of the ancient description of human beings as capax Dei. Coffey’s 
modification o f Rahner’s position allows him to identify this work of self-tran­
scendence, this dynamic impulse towards the Incarnation, with the Holy Spirit. We 
have seen that Coffey places the sanctifying work o f the Holy Spirit prior to the as­
sumption o f the human nature of Jesus.199 Now we see the Rahnerian setting from 
which Coffey develops this position.
Coffey’s appropriation of these insights from Rahner has a further dimension: 
that o f theological epistemology. This too needs to be addressed here. Some readers 
are alert to questions such as whether and how we can truly know Jesus as divine 
Son. Is not divine Sonship something essentially beyond the range of human 
knowing?
Coffey observes that while we cannot directly know the divinity o f  the Eternal 
Son, nothing in principle prevents us from knowing the sanctified nature o f Christ.
197 See Karl Rahner, “On the Theology of the Incarnation,” in Volume 4: More Recent Writings, 
Theological Investigations (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 109. The bracketed gloss 
specifying that the indefinable nature is human nature is Coffey’s. The italics are present in the 
translation and Rahner’s original.
198 This translation is Coffey’s. The standard English translation is found in Ibid., 110. It is interest­
ing that the quotations from Rahner reflect Rahner’s descending rather than his ascending theology. 
On the relation of the two basic types of Christology in Rahner see Karl Rahner, “The Two Basic 
Types of Christology,” in Volume 13: Theology, Anthropology, Christology, Theological 
Investigations (New York: Seabury, 1975); John McDermott, “The Christologies of Karl Rahner,” 
Gregorianum 27, (1986): 87-123; 297-327.
199 See above at p. 56f.
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Christ’s sanctified human nature is human nature at the peak o f its possibility, but is 
nevertheless still human nature, and is therefore knowable. Coffey argues that what 
we can know o f the divine Son is what is revealed o f the divine Son through his 
human activity, his love etc. In Jesus these are not simply ordinary human activity, 
human love; in this human activity and love we experience human nature brought 
to the highest point o f perfection by the Spirit.
By concentrating on divine nature as we can know it (i.e. divine nature as it is 
communicated to and through human nature), Coffey sharpens the paradoxical con­
tent of Rahner’s suggestion, and writes:
[...] the divinity of Christ is not something different from his humanity; it is 
the humanity, i.e., human nature at the peak of its possibility, which is the 
achievement of God’s grace, to which the human efforts of Jesus are 
subordinated.200
200 Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 467.
This position is not monophysist, since Coffey is not talking of the human nature becoming one 
with the divine nature, or being swamped by the divine nature. He is talking of the perfection, within 
its own limits, of the properly human nature. Speaking of grounds in the doctrine of the Incarnation 
for Christian mysticism, Coffey writes:
The limit of union with God is given concretely in the Incarnation, which is a union that 
can rightly be called unity, and it can be shared by others who place their faith in Christ, 
bringing about in their case, simple union with God. This unity broadening out into union 
constitutes the basis for Christian mysticism. Jesus was uniquely one with God, not just in 
unity of will and function (the teaching o f the New Testament) but also ontologically (the 
teaching of the early church councils). This statement becomes intelligible in the light of 
the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus, Jesus was, by the prevenient grace of God, ontologically 
one with God, i.e. according to his divine nature, in which he was the pre-existent divine 
Son, second person of the Trinity. But even in the case o f Jesus there was not the absolute 
unity with God which is taught by Advaita Vedantism. For according to the Council of 
Chalcedon Jesus, though one with God in his divine nature, differed from him by his 
human nature, which was a creature. Only in monophysitism, rejected by the Council as 
heretical, does the human nature of Jesus melt into the divine, becoming one with it and 
making him indistinguishable from God in every respect. The teaching of the Council was 
reinforced and developed by the enhypostasia of Leontius o f Byzantium, according to 
which the Incarnation was to be understood in terms of the ontological relationship 
between the two natures of Christ, or, more exactly, between the human nature and the di­
vine person.
See Coffey, “A Case for Christianity Vis-a-Vis the Other World-Religions/’ 32-33.
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This extraordinary statement, that the divinity o f Christ is the humanity, should be 
interpreted in the light of this epistemological focus: the divinity we know is the 
sanctified humanity of Jesus. While we cannot directly know the divinity o f the 
Eternal Son, we can know the sanctified humanity o f Jesus.201
It is in this complex sense that Coffey intends the term the divine Son “in hu­
manity.” He takes from Rahner the transcendental framework for understanding all 
humanity in terms o f the Incarnation. He spells out the implicit pneumatological 
moment in this Rahnerian construction. Focussing then on the humanity of Jesus he 
thinks that this humanity brought to the highest point of human self-transcendence 
is the proper object of theological investigation.
The transformed human nature o f Jesus, Coffey argues, is the starting point 
for a christology that “transfers the focus o f his unity from the divinity to the hu­
manity.”202 It is a christology that, although it assumes the Incarnation, can never­
theless be considered a christology “from below” in much the same sense as 
Rahner’s later christology is “from below.” It takes the humanity of Jesus (although 
it is humanity in a form that has obedientially reached the culmination of its po­
tency) as its starting point.
The question could be raised: is it acceptable to construct a notion of a divin­
ity that is somehow on the side of created reality? Coffey believes not only that this 
is possible, but that this was already admitted by St. Thomas. Coffey finds support 
for speaking o f the outcome of the hypostatic union as a created reality in Summa 
theologiae III q. 2 a. 7.203 Here in the “On the contrary” Thomas writes,
201 I would argue that what is known in Jesus is not only the sanctified human nature, but more im­
portantly the activity of the second divine person Incarnate. In general one must ask whether 
Coffey’s language places too heavy a burden on the category o f nature, and not enough on the cat­
egory of person.
202 Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ,” 405. This idea o f transferring the focus of unity from 
divinity to humanity is badly expressed, I believe. In traditional theology, the focus of unity was not 
the divinity, but the divine person of the Son. As mentioned in the previous footnote, Coffey’s theo­
logy continually manifests a diminished appreciation of the theological function of the idea o f “per­
son.” That said, the idea of transferring the focus of unity to the sanctified human nature is a new 
idea, arguably justified by the epistemological focus that Coffey has adopted here.
203' Coffey makes this “discovery” after 1999 and refers to it in Coffey, “In Response to Paul
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Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this union was not from 
eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is created.
And in the responsio of that article Thomas writes,
The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider 
between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together 
in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above, every relation 
which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, 
by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really 
in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any 
change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are 
speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the 
human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is 
something created.204
The effect of the hypostatic union is therefore a created reality, and this reality is 
the reality o f divine Sonship in the human nature of Jesus.
(c) Patristic Precedents?
The Rahnerian basis for Coffey’s thought here is clear. Coffey wishes, how­
ever, to find a patristic precedent for Rahner’s solution. Such precedent, he thinks 
he finds in three places: in the doctrine of the enhypostasia, in the idea o f the 
“theandric” activity of Christ and in the communicatio idiomatum. In my view, 
however, the claim that these represent patristic precedents for Coffey’s positions 
remains in some doubt.
To recall: Coffey thought that the doctrine of the Council o f Chalcedon con­
cealed a theological weakness, a weakness that he understands to be the ontological 
chasm between the human and the divine natures in Christ, the “problem of the
Molnar,” 376.
204 Coffey also appeals here to Maurice de la Taille who in his article “Created Actuation by Un­
created Act” writes,
This substantial actuation is precisely the grace of union; created grace, like sanctifying 
grace; not, however, like the latter, purely habitual, that is, a simple accidental disposition, 
but a truly substantial adaptation and conformation to the Word. [...] [This reality occurs] 
not in the manner of an adoptive sonship or its eventual flowering, but as a true and sub­
stantial communication of natural sonship: so that in His very humanity Christ is Son, the 
only Son of God.
See Ibid. The italics are from Coffey.
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wedge.”205 The classical resolution of this issue, for Coffey, comes with the enhypo- 
stasia. This term was traditionally associated with the theology of Leontius of Byz­
antium, though its authorship is now disputed.206 Coffey’s enthusiasm for the doc­
trine (or theologoumenon) of the enhypostasia is such that he does not hesitate to 
claim it is “the only orthodox Christology to result from the Council o f 
Chalcedon.”207 According to Coffey the achievement of the enhypostasia is to set 
the two natures o f Christ in relation to one another.208
In attributing this function to the enhypostasia, Coffey diverges sharply from 
the use o f the term made by other commentators. The ordinary assessment o f the 
function o f this term is that it relates not to the question o f the relation o f “natures” 
but to the issue o f where to locate the one person  in Christ. That person is identified 
not with the humanity of Jesus, nor for that matter with the divine nature, but with 
the pre-existing divine Son. This does not mean, however, that the human nature o f 
Jesus is deficient in personhood: the humanity of Jesus, while not itself a person, is 
hypostatic in the person of the Eternal Son.
Coffey’s view that the purpose o f the enhypostasia is to bring the two natures 
o f Christ into communion with one another marginalises the question of the “per­
205 As stated, I do not think that this is a helpful way of stating the outcome of the Council of 
Chalcedon, The structure implied by that Council indicates that rather than thinking of the relation­
ship between natures, we think of relationship of divine “person” and human “nature.” Much of the 
weakness that I find in this aspect of Coffey’s presentation relates to this initial misdiagnosis.
206 The term exerted an important structuring influence in the theology of Karl Barth, and the no­
tion itself and doubts about its authorship and patristic pedigree remains a focus of interest in theo­
logy influenced by Barth. See LeRon Shults, F., “A Dubious Christological Formula: From Leontius 
o f Byzantium to Karl Barth,” Theological Investigations 57, (1996): 431-446; U.M. Lang, 
“Anhypostasis -  Enhypostasis: Church Fathers, Protestantism and Karl Barth,” Journal of  
Theological Studies 49, (1998): 630-657; Davidson, “Theologizing the Human Jesus: An Ancient 
(and Modem) Approach to Christology Reassessed”; Oliver Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The 
Incarnation Reconsidered, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72-89. For my pur­
poses, the issue of the exact origin of the notion, whether it is Leontius of Byzantium, or another an­
cient author is unimportant. The principal issue here is the function that the notion plays in sub­
sequent theology.
207 Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ,” 415.
208 See Coffey, “The Incarnation: Fact Not Myth.”; Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in 
Christ,” 468; Coffey, “A Case for Christianity Vis-a-Vis the Other World-Religions,” 33. Other ref­
erences to the “enhypostasia” in Coffey’s writings include Ibid., 18-19.; Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as 
the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 226; Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ,” 414- 
418; Coffey, “The ‘Unities’ of the Episcopal Office,” 3.
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son” o f the Eternal Son. It thereby excludes the precise issue that the enhypostasia 
was designed to answer: the question o f the principle of unity in Christ, De-em­
phasising the issue of the personhood in Christ in this way means that Coffey can 
go as far as speaking of a certain invertibility o f the enhypostasia,209 Thus, Coffey 
claims that just as we say that the human nature o f Christ is hypostatic in the divine 
person, we can also invert this statement and claim that the divine nature is hypo­
static in the human nature.210
The idea that the enhypostasia might be invertible appears to me to confuse 
matters. The term was originally used to show how the human nature was not a-per- 
sonal. In Coffey’s suggestion that it may be inverted, the question of the “person” is 
lost from sight. The patient reader should, however, having noted this problem, 
seek to understand what function this manoeuvre has in Coffey’s own theology. We 
have already seen the work that this modified enhypostasia is to be put to: the di­
vinity that human beings can know is the divinity that is the humanity of Christ at 
the highest limit o f  its self-transcendence. This “divinity in humanity” o f the divine 
Son in humanity can be thought of as representing another focus o f unity in christo- 
logy. Thus, while ontologically, the focus o f unity must be the Eternal Son, the 
second person o f the Trinity, epistemologically, the focus of unity can -  arguably at 
least — be the divinised human nature o f  Jesus. Underlying the matter o f epistemo- 
logy, however, is the more important issue: by shifting the focus o f unity from the 
divine person to the divinised human nature, Coffey wishes to open space for con­
sideration o f the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit.211
Coffey’s second attempt to find a patristic background to his christology falls 
into similar difficulty. This attempt is built on the possibilities he sees in the term
2V)~ Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ,” 417.
210■ Piet Schoonenberg also writes of an inversion of the enhypostasia, but in a different sense. For a 
brief account o f shifts in Schoonenberg’s theology on the matter of the invertibility of the enhypo­
stasia see Del Colie, Christ and Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian Perspective, n. 58 on p. 188.
2"' Contrast this new focus on the humanity o f Jesus with the statement of Pannenberg, more typic­
al of the general opinion, that the enhypostasia in fact moves attention away the humanity of Jesus: 
“the doctrine o f enhypostasis, the tenacious inclination of the Logos-sarx Christology to miss Jesus’ 
true humanjty, continued.” See Pannenberg, Jesus -  God and Man, 339.
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“theandric,” a term that he uses to describe the human nature of Christ thus sancti­
fied and transformed by the work of the Holy Spirit.212 One way o f expressing the 
idea that the human nature of Christ becomes “divinity” (not the divinity itself, but 
the kind o f divinity available to human knowing, i.e. humanity at the limits of its 
self-transcendence) is to say that through the action of the Holy Spirit this nature 
has become theandric. In itself the term means “divine-human,”213 but in terms of 
Coffey’s meaning it could be translated “divine in a human way, as a result o f the 
sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit.”
The term “theandric” itself is ascribed to Pseudo-Dionysius, who in the fifth 
century wrote o f the co-operation of the human and the divine in Jesus in terms o f a 
theandric activity. Though it was sometimes used in what turned out to be an un­
orthodox way, Coffey points us to an orthodox (dyoenergist214) usage of the term by 
John Damascene. Damascene writes:
Thus, the theandric operation shows this: when God became man, that is to
say, was incarnate, his human operation was divine, that is to say deified.
[.... When] we speak of one theandric operation of Christ, we understand
212 Especially in Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ” . Coffey had already made appeal to the 
idea of the “theandric nature” of Christ in Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 157.
213 For Coffey, there would be something to be said for using the term “theanthropic,” because of 
its gender inclusivity, but he opts rather for “theandric” specifically for its greater antiquity.
214 The background to the idea of the theandric action o f Christ lies in controversy over monothelit- 
ism and monoergism. The latter doctrines represented attempts to bridge the gap between Chalcedo- 
nian “orthodoxy” and those who continued to sustain forms of monophysitism after Chalcedon.
Pope Honorius’ (d. 638) apparent endorsement of the latter doctrines represents something of an 
embarassment to the See o f Rome’s record of unswaying orthodoxy. It appears that Honorius in his 
own statements is in fact orthodox, and uses the term “one will” only to indicate that there was no 
conflict between the two energies/wills in Christ. He had failed to understand what lay behind the 
position expressed to him by Sergius of Constantinople. Had he understood the Eastern controversy 
fully he would more likely have found himself siding with Sophronius rather than Sergius. The de­
fence of the pope’s orthodoxy is, simply put, that he appears to have missed the point of the whole 
debate. That said, his apparent support was of great benefit to the monothelite cause, and was instru­
mental in fanning the flames of what otherwise may have remained a regional problem. Coffey 
makes passing allusion to this matter in Coffey, “The Claim of Catholicism,” 54.
Monothelism and monoergism were condemned at the Third Council of Constantinople (681), con­
demnations confirmed by Honorius’ successor in Rome, Leo II (682). The council itself drew 
strongly on the formulations of Pope Leo I’s Tome to Flavian (449), and taught that in Jesus there 
are two wills that are distinct and related in much the same way as the two natures in Christ (“undi­
vided,” ’ “unchanged,” “inseparable,” “unmixed”). But it also clearly taught the concord of the activ­
ities of the two natures. This concord of activities was sometimes explained with reference to a 
theandric activity of Christ.
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the two operations of his two natures: the divine operation of the divinity 
and the human operation of the humanity.215
Coffey’s interest here is in the fact that the human operation is said to be deified.
He quotes from John’s De duabus in Christo voluntatibus to underline this theme:
Being made man, he manifested a new, strange, and theandric operation: di­
vine but working through the human, human but serving the divine and ex­
hibiting the tokens of his conjoined divinity.216
Coffey’s real interest, however, lies not so much in the theandric action o f Jesus, 
but in what he takes to be the basis o f this action: the theandric nature o f Jesus 
Christ. He overcomes the difficulty that neither Pseudo-Dionysius nor John of 
Damascene makes mention of a theandric nature as such, but only a theandric oper­
ation, as follows: “Though Pseudo-Dionysius does not say so, the implication is 
that producing this activity is a single nature o f Christ which should also be termed 
theandric.”217 Coffey claims that the theandric activity reveals the theandric nature.
In the same article, “The Theandric Nature o f Christ,” Coffey claims that 
Rahner’s position is also foreshadowed in the communicatio idiomatum ,218 Coffey’s 
interest in the communicatio idiomatum lies in the ontological justification for this 
practice. He states that the practice o f communicatio idiomatum  must be based on 
an “ontological communication between the natures.” He does refer to the “hypo­
static union” as the basis for this communication o f attributes.219 He prefers to deal, 
however, with this matter as though it were a question o f  an ontological communic­
ation from one nature to another.
215 De fide orthodoxa 3, 19. Quoted in Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ,” 407-408.
216 Quoted in Ibid., 408.
217 Ibid., 407.
218 It is interesting, given Coffey’s relative silence about Cyril o f Alexandria and the Council of 
Ephesus, to see how he treats of the communication of idioms since this was central to the Nestorian 
controversy that provoked that council. The question of the attribution o f characteristics of one of 
the natures of Christ to the other nature, a traditional practice of the piety of the people, was being 
put to the test over the issue of the theotokos. Ultimately, the Council defended this practice, on the 
basis that the union of natures was not merely according to the prosopon (not, that is, according to 
appearances only), but was hypostatic (according to the substantial reality of the divine person).
219 Here too we see Coffey’s unusual reluctance to deal with the idea of person, or hypostatic 
union.
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[A]lready in antiquity there was some appreciation of the fact that commun­
ication as predication would be meaningless unless it were based on com­
munication as event.220
From the communion of attributes, Coffey deduces a real communication from the 
divine nature to the human nature.221
It would be a distraction from our main purpose to go into further detail here 
on these matters. The principal reservation I express is that Coffey does not engage 
sufficiently with the important theological matter o f the divine person. Ordinarily, 
the category o f “person” is used as the divine subject who assumes a human nature. 
Coffey is mistaken in suggesting that the classical theological tradition takes the di­
vine nature o f Christ as the focus of unity.222 It is rather the divine person of the Son 
who is the focus of unity in classical christology. By not engaging with this point, 
Coffey approaches the enhypostasia, the communicatio idiomatum and the 
theandric activity of Christ only in terms of the impact that the divine nature has on 
the human nature. This framing of the christological issues in terms of the relation 
o f natures risks falling into Nestorianism inasmuch as it does not give adequate ac­
count o f the unity of Christ.
I do not believe, however, that ultimately Coffey’s theology is Nestorian. I 
hold rather that it represents a new set o f christological questions, one guided firstly 
by his project to build a trinitarian Spirit Christology, and secondarily by the epi-
220 Ibid., 419.
221 Coffey regards the doctrines of the enhypostasia and the communicatio idiomatum as belonging 
together as key elements in any balanced Christology. He states this position clearly as follows:
[M]y claim is that, theologically, these expressions represent heuristic concepts that as such 
belong together — with the enhypostasia primary and the communicatio secondary —  in 
constituting a template for all orthodox Christology. The enhypostasia sets the two natures 
in their correct ontological relationship, which the communication of idioms then trans­
poses into a dynamic communication from the divine to the human. Ibid., 423.
He doesn’t draw our attention to the fact that the communicatio idiomatum is the older and 
more theologically weighty of these two doctrines, inasmuch as the communicatio idiomatum is 
based on the lex orandi rather than on the speculative work of seventh century theologians. In 
my view, then, one would probably do better to see the communicatio as primary, and the enhy­
postasia as secondary.
222 I have already quoted the following: “my study transfers the focus of his unity from the divinity 
to the humanity.” See Ibid., 405.
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stemological focus mentioned above. It would have been more helpful, in my view, 
had Coffey been more explicit in recognising that the questions that he poses are 
not ones addressed in the patristic period, and devoted as much space to justifying 
the significant modifications o f patristic notions as he does to his modifications of 
Rahner’s theology. As it stands, his attempted use of these patristic precedents 
tends to be misleading. Weakness at this point in Coffey’s argument has led some 
o f his critics to raise rather serious, understandable, but ultimately unjustified 
doubts about the christological orthodoxy of his writings. While it is not necessary 
to engage with these opinions at any great length here, since they represent the fruit 
o f inadequate readings of Coffey, they should at least be mentioned briefly.
4. Concerns about Coffey’s Christology
Coffey’s Spirit Christology, if  it is to be plausible, has to be plausible as chris­
tology. Because it is unusual in various respects, Coffey’s christology has not gone 
without criticism. A full consideration o f Coffey’s christology would engage at 
much greater length these matters. For our purposes, I can be more brief.
Paul Molnar is concerned that David Coffey’s christology might be adoption- 
istic.223 He writes:
Despite Coffey’s explicit rejection of it, there is the persistent appearance of 
adoptionism throughout his work. Thus, he writes: [1] “In the synoptic 
theology the unique divine Sonship of Jesus is brought about by the bestow­
al of the Holy Spirit on him by the Father”, and [2] “Jesus is brought into 
human existence as his [the Father’s] beloved Son”; also [3] “... the Father’s 
radical bestowal of the Holy Spirit on Jesus at the moment of his conception 
brings about his divine Sonship ...” and finally, there is [4] “a progressive 
realisation of divine Sonship in Jesus...”224
223' Paul Molnar, “Deus Trinitas: Some Dogmatic Implications o f David Coffey’s Biblical 
Approach to the Trinity,” Irish Theological Quarterly 67, (2002), 36-39; Molnar, “Review o f Deus 
Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God By David Coffey,” 245.
224 I have added the bracketed numbers for convenience. Molnar, “Deus Trinitas: Some Dogmatic 
Implications o f David Coffey’s Biblical Approach to the Trinity,” 36.
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It is interesting to look at the quotations offered by Molnar in support o f his charge. 
The first relates to Coffey’s reading of synoptic christology. If it is inaccurate to say 
that in the synoptic gospels the unique divine Sonship o f Jesus is brought about by 
the bestowal o f the Holy Spirit, then Molnar should explain precisely why this is so. 
He should also explain why the expression of such a judgement on the synoptic 
gospels (whether accurate or not) might make the author o f such a judgement adop- 
tionistic. Coffey’s attention to the issue o f adoptionism is manifest even in his use 
o f the word “unique,” a point on which one might expect Molnar at least to com­
ment. He does note that Coffey explicitly rejects the idea that his christology is ad- 
optionistic,225 but does not engage with these reasons, leaving the impression that 
Coffey merely protests his innocence without argument.
It is unclear what precisely in the second quotation demonstrates that Coffey 
expresses an adoptionistic christology. In relation to the third quotation advanced 
by Molnar, the only way to interpret this as adoptionistic is if  one has already de­
cided in advance that any explanation o f Christ’s Sonship in terms of the Holy 
Spirit is adoptionistic. Similarly, there is little reason to think that because Coffey 
explores a sense in which we can think o f a progressive realisation of Sonship in Je­
sus, his is thereby an “adoptionist” christology. Surely “adoptionism” has nothing 
to do with “progressive realisation”: God presumably does not “adopt” progress­
ively, but all at once. Reading Molnar’s criticisms leaves one with the impression 
that Molnar has not engaged with Coffey’s thought adequately. There is certainly 
much to think about in Coffey’s presentation, but Molnar has not helped much by 
suggesting that Coffey’s thought is adoptionistic. The term “adoptionism” is too 
blunt an instrument to deal with Coffey’s effectively unprecedented theological 
proposals.
According to Molnar, the error that leads Coffey towards this alleged adop­
tionism is his “historicist exegesis.”226 This, he believes, leads the Australian theo­
225 Coffey distinguishes his position from adoptionism also at Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy 
Spirit, 58f; Ibid., 120.; Ibid., 123f. and Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine o f the Triune God, 62; 
Coffey, “In Response to Paul Molnar,” 378.
226 Molnar, “Deus Trinitas: Some Dogmatic Implications of David Coffey’s Biblical Approach to 
the Trinity,” 37.
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logian to separate the humanity and the divinity o f Christ in his reading of New 
Testament texts. It is clear from what we have seen above that Coffey does not be­
lieve that, historically read, the New Testament allows for any such separation, 
simply because in his view abstract ideas o f divinity and humanity had not entered 
Christian discourse at that stage. Not recognising this, Molnar attributes the alleged 
confusion to another (though related) factor, namely Coffey’s insistence on the ex­
clusively functional nature of biblical expression. Clearly Molnar assumes that fun­
ctional discourse can only speak of Christ’s humanity, while ontological discourse 
is required for speech of Christ’s divinity, although on what grounds this assump­
tion is held we are left unclear.227 Certainly, if  by “historicist exegesis” Molnar 
means “historically sensitive exegesis” Coffey would gladly be found guilty.228
As the final quotation listed above shows, for Molnar the alleged adoptionistic 
christology of Coffey is also the fruit o f Coffey’s view that there can be a “pro­
gressive realisation of divine Sonship in Jesus.” This, he thinks, is fruit of Coffey’s 
adhesion to Rahner’s “degree Christology.” The difficulty here, according to Mol­
nar is this whole project rests on a failure to distinguish between Christ’s humanity 
and Christ’s divinity.2291 concede that certain quotations from Coffey taken out o f 
context will certainly give that impression, especially Coffey’s claim that the divin­
ity of Christ is the humanity. As I have tried to show, however, the context for this 
and similar statements is clearly set in Coffey’s Spirit Christology and in the epi- 
stemological framework he sets. Thus, the intention is to say that the divinity that 
we can know, the divinity that is available to theologians and to human beings in 
general is not the divinity of the Eternal Son in the immanent Trinity, but the divin­
221 - For Coffey, christological claims made in the functional mode of expression of the New Testa­
ment are not necessarily signs of a “lower” christology than those that came to be expressed in the
ontological language of Greek culture. Indeed, if the later ontologically-expressed christology were
to be expressed to a first century Jewish Christian, such christology would probably be seen as lack­
ing inasmuch as the mode of expression adopted would not communicate the dynamic sense of in­
volvement in human history so powerfully expressed in Jewish religious thought. See Coffey, Deus
Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 9-10.
228 Molnar’s allegiances in this matter are with Karl Barth. See above at note 96 on p. 39.
229 Molnar, “Deus Trinitas: Some Dogmatic Implications o f David Coffey’s Biblical Approach to 
the Trinity,” 35.
9 2
ity manifest in the sanctified humanity, or theandric nature of Jesus. Whether all 
can accept this use of the word “divinity” is open to question. Also open to ques­
tion, however, is the fairness of the accusation that there is here a “confusion” of 
the two natures.
Emerging from Coffey’s account are two uses o f the word “divinity”: the “di­
vinity” in God and the “divinity in humanity.” Molnar leads his reader to suspect 
that Coffey has simply collapsed the first meaning into the second. This is not so. If 
anything, as a result of this distinction, the “divinity in God” is even more protected 
from collapse into the human than is ordinarily the case, since the divinity (in the 
ordinary sense) o f the Eternal Son remains hidden, while only the “divinity in hu­
manity” is manifest.
A  further point should be made in relation to the charge o f adoptionism on the 
basis of “degree Christology.” Rahner’s christology is a recent theology. In reject­
ing adoptionism, the ancient church cannot be thought to be thereby rejecting “de­
gree Christology.”230 There is, in fact, no specific dogmatic injunction against “de­
gree Christology.” Instead what the church clearly rejects is any christology that 
fails to respect the unicity and divinity o f Christ. The issue o f progressive realisa­
tion of Sonship is not covered by the church’s rejection o f adoptionism, unless it 
fails to respect the unicity and divinity o f Christ. In the sense in which Coffey in­
tends it, it is the divine Son in humanity that is thus realised. This language serves 
his purpose o f developing the implications o f Spirit Christology. It is not intended, 
as we will see presently, to replace Logos Christology. The two forms of christo­
logy are compatible, because they answer two different sets of questions, as will be 
clarified in the conclusion of this chapter.
Molnar’s reservations appear to suggest that one could never attempt to elab­
orate a “thoroughgoing” Spirit Christology, since anything less than a traditional
2,0 Note: I am using the term “degree Christology” here aware of the polemical tone with which 
Colin Gunton uses the phrase. Molnar cites Gunton at Ibid.
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Logos theology will fall necessarily into adoptionism.231 Gary Badcock, however, is 
correct when he argues that one should not be discouraged from attempting a Spirit
Christology for fear of the charge of adoptionism:
The link with adoptionism past and present, however, is actually a distrac­
tion for Spirit Christology. First of all, no adoptionist theology will ever be 
embraced by the church; since theology is either a servant of the church’s 
faith or nothing, there is really no point in developing such an approach, for 
it is ruled out as something useless in advance. But more important than this 
is the fact that adoptionist christology is strictly unnecessary, for Spirit 
Christology and Logos Christology are surely no more incompatible than 
Spirit and Logos themselves. According to strict trinitarian orthodoxy, after 
all, the two are one as much as they are distinct.232
From the point o f view o f mainstream Christian thought, there has always been a 
concern to deny any theological move that would understand what happens with Je­
sus on an analogy with what happens with ordinary human beings. It is important 
however to understand the “direction” of the analogy between what happens with 
ordinary human beings and what happens with Christ. What Coffey does is reverse 
the ordinary direction of the analogy, making Christ the primary analogue. This is 
the move that prevents him from falling into adoptionism. Rather than seeing what 
happens with Jesus as an exalted case o f what happens in grace, Coffey sees grace 
on the analogy with what happens in Jesus. Much confusion about what Coffey in­
tends in his Spirit Christology can be set aside once one fully grasps this point.
The deepest criticism that Molnar makes o f Coffey’s theology in general is 
that it represents an instance of thinking from “a centre in oneself’ whereas for 
Molnar (following Barth) theology must be a thinking from “a centre in God.”233 
This is the fundamental criticism that Barth made of Pannenberg, and a criticism 
that Molnar does not hesitate to invoke against Coffey. The following observation 
might be made: once one accepts the possibility o f a transcendental theology, the 
binary logic o f “centre in oneself’ or “centre in God” tends to break down, just as
23 '• Coffey recognises the challenge of adoptionism: “I accept that any Spirit Christology is vulner­
able to the charge of adoptionism, and that his places on the theologian an onus to show that he or 
she is not at fault in this regard. See Coffey, “In Response to Paul Molnar,” 378. Demonstrating the 
difference between his position and any form o f adoptionism is a recurring concern in Coffey’s 
theology.
232 Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire ofLove: A Theology of the Holy Spirit, 161.
233' Molnar, “Review of Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God By David Coffey,” 41.
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simple dichotomies of Creator and creature fail in the case o f the hypostatic union. 
If  indeed the Spirit guides created reality towards a transcendent reality, then talk of 
static “centres” is ruled out. Transcendental theology does not deal in simple dualit­
ies. If  the hypostatic union is thought o f as the ultimate potential o f human nature, 
the terms of the God-world relation are reformulated. Thus, one might think in 
terms o f starting from a “centre in oneself’ or “centre in Christ.” O f these two, one 
would certainly have to prefer a “centre in Christ” as the locus o f theology. But 
Christ has his “centre” in God.234 The issue, hence, is not whether one starts with 
the human or the divine, but whether and to what extent the human is sanctified by 
the Spirit and converted to and united to Christ. What Molnar has in mind in mak­
ing this criticism is that theology “from below” is basically Pelagian. Since, how­
ever, Coffey accepts the Rahnerian idea o f the “supernatural existential” as always 
already the offer of grace (the Holy Spirit), the idea that theology “from below” 
should be thought of as Pelagian does not stand.235
Moving beyond Molnar, now, a much more interesting challenge to Coffey’s 
christology is the possibility, already mentioned, that it confuses “person” and 
“nature.” This concern is articulated by Neil Ormerod, who attributes it to the influ­
ence o f Karl Rahner. Ormerod writes:
Take for example the statement, “though also divine, Christ’s human nature 
remains basically and integrally human.” To what does the word “divine” 
refer -  person or nature? If nature, then it seems to assert that Christ’s 
human nature is divine by sharing somehow in the divine nature. This 
verges on the Monophysite. On the other hand, if it refers to the divine per­
son, then there is a blurring of the distinction between (the divine) person 
and (the human) nature. One could ask the same questions about the asser­
tion, “if this nature is also in a sense divine, it remains a nature and does not 
itself become the person of the Word.” Chalcedon does not assert that the 
human nature of Jesus is divine in any sense, but that the human being Jesus 
Christ is a divine person.”236
234 It is interesting to think of 1 Corinthians 15:28 in this light.
235 See Coffey, “In Response to Paul Molnar,” 376. For Coffey’s subtle reading of Rahner’s theo­
logy o f the “supernatural existential” see Coffey, “The Whole Rahner on the Supernatural 
Existential”.
236' Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 129-130. The quotations from Coffey 
are from Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ,” 412.
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Either Coffey’s christology is Monophysite, claims Ormerod, or it blurs the distinc­
tions between “person” and “nature.” For some reason, he does not develop the 
possibility that Coffey’s theology might, if  the latter possibility is accepted, fall into 
Nestorianism.237 In Ormerod’s view, this possible confusion of “person” and 
“nature” sets off any number of imbalances in his theology.238
In my view, although Ormerod does not offer either a sympathetic or a reli­
able reading of Coffey’s theology,239 there is something in this criticism. Coffey 
gives less attention than he might to demonstrating why precisely his position is not 
Nestorian. Rahner referred once to a preference for “orthodox Nestorianism” over 
“orthodox Monophysitism.”240 Does Coffey follow the German Jesuit in this 
direction?
As stated above, there may indeed be a weakness in Coffey’s managing o f the 
distinction between “person” and “nature.” Without a fully developed use o f the 
term “person,” christology may be left without a principle o f unity in Christ. If  the 
“natures” are treated as though they were distinct subjects, and then the Chalcedo- 
nian doctrine of the natures being “unmixed” and “unconfused” is applied, then ef­
fectively there are “two” in Christ, and no “one and the same.” Without a principle 
o f unity between the natures, it is not surprising that Coffey has recourse to his ver­
sion of the enhypostasia to re-establish the relation between the natures, even if  this
237 Neil Ormerod claims that the adoptionism that Molnar alleges implies “Nestorian overtones.” 
This claim is not however found in Molnar, so the intimation that this is the case should be attrib­
uted to Ormerod himself. See Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 128.
238 Ormerod both in his book on the Trinity and in a number of articles returns to Coffey’s theology 
often. He usually takes Coffey’s theology as an exemplification of the peril of distancing oneself 
from the classical tradition. Apart from the book cited above see Ormerod, “Wrestling With Rahner 
on the Trinity”; Ormerod, “Questio Disputata: Two Points Or Four? -  Rahner and Lonergan on 
Trinity, Incarnation, Grace, and Beatific Vision”; Ormerod, “The Goal of Systematic Theology”.
239 For instance, in an extraordinary piece of misquotation, Ormerod claims that Coffey has admit­
ted that his position might be called a form of “monophysitism from below.” See Ormerod, The 
Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 128. It is instructive to compare Ormerod’s quotation with 
the passage from Coffey on which he is commenting. It is difficult to know how to interpret Or­
merod’s egregious mishandling of the literal meaning of a text here. Coffey responds to Ormerod’s 
criticisms in Coffey, “Questio Disputata: Response to Neil Ormerod and Beyond” , and specifically 
to this one on p. 907.
240 See Karl Rahner, Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews 1965 -  1982, ed.
Hubert Biallowons and Paul Imhof, (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 127.
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means altering the original and traditional sense of that term. Ultimately, however, 
in my judgement, Coffey’s christology is not Nestorian because, as stated above, 
the set o f theological issues he engages with is not one dealt with in the patristic 
period. It is nevertheless confusing therefore when he introduces these patristic ele­
ments in response to questions not directly raised in the patristic period.241
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, it is of great importance first to es­
tablish what questions are being asked before judging the adequacy o f answers. 
Coffey’s focus is on finding a space for the action of the Holy Spirit, and he thinks 
he finds this in the sanctifying o f the human nature of Jesus. His focus on this issue 
inevitably shifts attention away the category o f “person,” since the “person” in 
question is the Logos. When Coffey speaks o f the “incarnation” o f the Holy Spirit, 
he is speaking o f the development of the divine Son “in humanity.” He writes that: 
“the ‘theandric’ Sonship is not a substitute for the Incarnation o f the divine Word, 
but rather its concrete effect on the sacred humanity.”242 It is to be supposed that 
Coffey’s christology is not Nestorian because the discourse it engages in about the 
sanctification of the humanity of Jesus is not separate from discourse about the act­
ion o f  the person of the Son. Although, as noted, Coffey does not always say 
enough about the eternal person of the Son, the sanctification o f the humanity is 
understood by Coffey in terms of its becoming an ever more adequate “instru­
ment”243 of the “person” of the Son. It is united ontologically with the Son at the In­
carnation and becomes ever more perfectly united historically throughout the life of 
Jesus. Although sometimes Coffey’s expressions may appear to suggest otherwise, 
the humanity o f Jesus is not an autonomous subject such as would make the charge 
o f Nestorianism more compelling. In Coffey’s theology, we can think of the divine
241 In his 1979 book, Coffey engages at significant length on patristic readings of the theme of the 
anointing of Jesus. He explores the Cappadocians, but especially Cyril o f Alexandria and Augustine, 
and finds that in places their trinitarian reading o f the biblical theme of the anointing is close to his. 
This material would have been a better place to look for a patristic background to support this partic­
ular line of enquiry.
M2' Coffey, “In Response to Paul Molnar,” 376.
243, In Summa theologiae ID, q. 7, a. 1 ad 3 Thomas writes that “The humanity of Christ is the in­
strument of the Godhead -  not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is merely 
acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act.”
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Sonship in itself, and the divine Sonship in humanity. There is no question of 
Coffey speaking of two distinct sons here. The distinction is not ontological but is 
epistemological: although there is one divine Son, it is only within the bounds o f 
human nature that we can know this Sonship.244
5. Conclusion: Different Questions, 
Different Answers
In this chapter, we have continued our discussion of Coffey’s Theses A and B. 
These are the premises to what I am calling Coffey’s pneumatological conclusion, 
to which we come in the next chapter. Together these represent for Coffey a New 
Testament basis for an interpretation o f the anointing o f Jesus as the love, firstly, of 
God for Jesus and, secondly, the life o f Jesus as his responding love for God. 
Coffey identifies these “loves” with the Holy Spirit. In the next chapter, I focus 
more directly on what I have called the pneumatological conclusion drawn from 
these two premises: namely that the Holy Spirit be understood as the mutual love of 
Father and Son. This same idea is not unfamiliar in the tradition, but as we will see 
it was not traditionally based on the biblical themes that we have seen interpreted 
by Coffey in these first two chapters. Coffey’s innovation in this sense is methodo­
logical: to ground the mutual love approach to the Holy Spirit in the economy o f 
salvation. How precisely he argues from what we have seen thus far to his pneuma­
tological conclusion will form the matter of the next chapter.245
244 Coffey writes: “First on an ontological level: Jesus is ontologically son. His sonship does not 
depend on his human existence, but it is expressed in his human existence. It is realised in humanity. 
Thus, his faith flows from his divine sonship, but this divine Sonship “was realized in him only 
through the exercise of faith by him.” Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f the Holy Spirit, 74.
245' Ted Peters writes:
Coffey finds he can argue in the following way: “If  Jesus can return the Spirit as his own 
and as his love, on his fellow human beings, then this shows that Jesus, like the Father, is 
divine.” Now I do not fault his conclusion. But I do question his assumption regarding the 
nature o f the Spirit. He treats the Spirit as if it were a thing that can be possessed and then 
distributed around. He assumes that the Spirit is a kind o f divine football that can be carried 
or passed. Could it be that Coffey is still working with substantialist assumptions that have
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In conclusion, it will be worth briefly stating how Coffey approaches the mat­
ter o f reconciling these two christological approaches.
According to the classical account of the relationship between the Incarnation 
and the work of the Holy Spirit there is a sequence to be respected. Congar sum­
marises this sequence faithfully, quoting Thomas:
The hypostatic union is a metaphysical fact by means of which a human 
nature subsists through the Person of the Son of God. It clearly requires the 
man who is thus called into existence to be holy. In Scholastic theology, 
this is the work of the Holy Spirit, who follows the presence of the Word, 
and of sanctifying grace, which follows the grace of the union as its con­
sequence (see ST III, q. 7 a. 13).246
Where the classical approach thinks of the union first and the sanctification second, 
Coffey thinks of the sanctification first and the union second.247 Coffey sees the lo­
gic o f Thomas’ order as descending and that of his own proposal as ascending. His 
is ascending to the extent that the metaphors suggested by sanctification and then 
assumption can be seen as raising the human nature beyond its natural limits in two 
steps.
In typical fashion, Coffey does not simply jettison the classical sequence. He 
finds a theoretical framework for the accommodation of both sequences by establ­
ishing that, in addition to the fact that the two sequences reflect two sets of biblical 
data, the two sequences also respond to two distinct types o f  question. To do this 
he advances a distinction between the in fieri and in facto  esse dimensions in chris-
“over-thingified” the divine hypostases?
Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life, 69.
Note that Peters here shows little recognition of the carefulness with which Coffey has constructed 
his position. What Peters ultimately calls into question here is the idea that the Holy Spirit is gift. It 
is unnecessary to move from the image of gift to the image of “thing to be possessed and then dis­
tributed around” and from there to “divine football.” In what sense does Peters not fault Coffey’s 
conclusion if he is still in a position to imagine Coffey’s presentation of the Holy Spirit in such 
terms? Further, is the charge that Coffey is working with “substantialist assumptions” grounded in 
some reasoned suspicion, or is this a merely gratuitous criticism? Peters does not tell us.
246 Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 3, (New York: Crossroad, 1997), 166.
247 Coffey recognises the difference between his position here and that of Thomas in Coffey, “The 
‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 469. I have simplified the issue here by mentioning only 
sanctification and hypostatic union. In fact, there are three things to be set in sequence. The omitted 
term is creation, i.e. the creation of the humanity of Jesus.
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tology.248 If christology is interested in the coming to be o f Jesus as Son of God, it 
will appeal to the in fieri sequence (sanctification by the Holy Spirit followed by 
union). If, instead, christology is interested in Jesus Christ as constituted (in facto  
esse) it will appeal, rather to the classical sequence (union, followed by the sancti­
fication by the Spirit).249 Since the fully developed fruit o f the Christ event is the In­
carnation o f the Logos as Jesus, the emphasis will lie there: Logos Christology is 
suited to expressing the perfection of the Christ event. Spirit Christology, in con­
trast, addresses the “becoming” of Jesus as the Son incarnate. This distinction mir­
rors, for Coffey, the distinction between descending christology (attending to Christ 
as constituted), and ascending Christology (attending to the formation of Christ).250 
The epistemological order of presentation (via inventionis) will be more attentive to 
the in fieri, while the ontological order (via doctrinae) will attend to the in facto  
esse. Coffey is able to accommodate the apparently contradictory results o f Logos 
Christology and Spirit Christology, because he is attentive to the fact that theology 
does not always ask the same questions. Coffey’s questions are not those that mot­
ivate the classical Logos Christology, nor are those that motivate Spirit Christology 
adequately answered by the classical Logos Christology.
248 This distinction is found, for example, in Thomas’ Summa theologiae in, q. 2 a. 8. Thomas’ 
main focus in that passage is on the distinction between speech about the assumption (by the Logos 
of the human nature) and speech about the union (of the divine nature and the human nature in the 
person of Jesus Christ). Talk about the assumption is talk about the hypostatic union in fieri (about 
the ‘becoming’ o f the hypostatic union), whereas talk about union is talk about the hypostatic union 
in facto esse (about the ‘having become’ of the hypostatic union, the union as constituted).
249 A similar manoeuvre is found in Emile Mersch, although he puts it to a different purpose. He 
too invokes Thomas’ distinction, but he translates the terms as “action” (corresponding to in fieri) 
and as “result” (corresponding to in facto esse). He writes:
Regarded as an action, the Incarnation is common to the three divine persons. It is a work
ad extra, and every such work is common to the Three But the Incarnation regarded in
its term and result, the union of a human nature with a divine person, belongs strictly to the 
Son. The three divine persons have incarnated; the Second alone is incarnate. This result, 
however, is not an activity but a way of existing, the way o f existing that is realised in the 
assumed humanity and that causes the humanity to subsist in the Word and accordingly ad­
apts it to such subsistence.
See Emile Mersch, The Theology of the Mystical Body, (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co, 1962), 357.
250 See Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 91. Elsewhere, as we will have oc­
casion to see, he applies a similar distinction to the Trinity itself. See below at p. 19If.
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An important dimension that has been omitted in this discussion, but that was 
introduced in Chapter One, is how all o f this relates to the Trinity. We have not yet 
arrived at the point of addressing these questions, but it might be worth recalling 
that one o f the reasons advanced in the scholastic tradition of the West for the tradi­
tional priority o f hypostatic union over sanctification was that o f the classical trinit­
arian taxis. The traditional theology o f the West concluded, as we saw, from the 
belief that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son to the position that the 
Son must therefore be prior to the Spirit. In Coffey’s construction, as seen above, 
there is an attempt to see the Spirit as somehow also prior to the Son. These issues 
will be taken up in Chapter Five. First, we turn to the matter o f arguing from what 
we have seen thus far to the position that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of Fath­
er and Son.
101
3. Towards an Ascending Mutual 
Love Pneumatology
1. Introduction
Chapters One and Two above presented Theses A and B as premises251 for a 
“pneumatological conclusion.” That conclusion is “[that] in the immanent Trinity, 
the Holy Spirit exists as the mutual love o f the Father and the Son.” This conclusion 
is sometimes cited as the typical Western approach to the Holy Spirit. Bertrand De 
Margerie, for example, goes so far as to say that this position is a “common good
251 In a discussion of pneumatology, Walter Kasper writes: “It is the task of theology to develop 
[the] data o f scripture and tradition into a theology of the Holy Spirit. This does not mean drawing 
conclusions from the data of scripture and tradition as though these were premises [....]” See Kasper, 
The God of Jesus Christ, 224.
While the language of premise and conclusion attributed to Coffey might appear to fall foul of 
Kasper’s admonition, the true force Kasper’s statement is to rule out rationalism and private specu­
lation, rather than talk of premises and conclusions. Kasper specifies that in t a lk in g  about drawing 
conclusions from premises he is warning against:
thus passing from the realm of binding faith into the realm of non-binding private specula­
tion. The point is, [he says] rather, to penetrate more deeply into the inner spirit and mean­
ing of what is believed (intellectus fidei). This is done by seeking to grasp the internal con­
nection between the various experiences and interpretations of faith (nexus mysteriorum), 
as well as their mutual correspondences (analogia fidei), and thus come to understand the 
one mystery that is manifested in the various mysteries of faith. The point, therefore, is not 
to do away with mystery by rationalizing it but to gain a deeper understanding of the mys­
tery as mystery.
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peacefully possessed by the whole Church and one whose value is recognized even 
outside its visible limits.”252 In recent times it has received prominence in the papal 
magisteria o f Leo XIII253 and John Paul II.254
Despite this pedigree and despite this presumption in its favour, it is arguable 
that the “mutual love” approach to pneumatology sits rather uncomfortably within 
the Western tradition. This is due in no small part to what Frederick Crowe refers to 
as a “persistent confusion” in relation to this idea.255 Among the reasons for this 
confusion is a certain unclarity in the vocabulary. Take, for instance, the following 
terms: “love,” “gift,” “common love,” “love proceeding,” “communion,” “source of 
communion,” “bond of love,” “bond of communion,” “mutual love.” All o f these 
are characteristically used o f the Holy Spirit. Should we think o f these terms as syn­
onymous, or should they be somehow distinguished? If, as Crowe claims, there is a 
“persistent confusion” then this is due in part to the fact that theological comment­
ators often move from image to image without clearly stating the meaning or at 
least function o f their terms.
252 See Bertrand De Margerie, The Christian Trinity in History, Studies in Historical Theology, vol. 
I, (Still River, Massachusetts: St. Bede’s Publications, 1982 (original 1975)), 110-121. With the 
words “outside the visible limits” De Margerie intends to suggest that it is not just a peaceful posses­
sion o f the Catholic tradition, but has also exerted an influence on Protestant and Orthodox thinking. 
He cites Barth and Bulgakov in support of these claims.
Coffey notes some sympathy for this approach in Palamas and Bobrinskoy. See Coffey, “Spirit 
Christology and the Trinity,” 326.
253 Divinum Illud Munns (1897), §§ 4 and 9.
254 John Paul IPs encyclical Dominum et Vivificantem (1986) sets out this doctrine in the following 
terms:
In bis intimate life, ‘God is love,’ the essential love shared by the three divine persons: per­
sonal love is the Holy Spirit of the Father and of the Son. Therefore he ‘searches even the 
depths of God,’ as uncreated Love-Gift. It can be said that in the Holy Spirit the intimate 
life of the Triune God becomes totally gift, an exchange o f mutual love between the divine 
persons, and that through the Holy Spirit God exists in the mode of gift. It is the Holy 
Spirit who is the personal expression of this self-giving, of this being-love. He is Person- 
Love. He is Person-Gift. Here we have an inexhaustible treasure of the reality and an inex­
pressible deepening of the concept of person in God, which only divine revelation makes 
known to us. [§10]
255 See F.E. Crowe, The Doctrine o f the Most Holy Trinity, (Unpublished Manuscript: Milltown 
Park Lonergan Centre, 1970), 94. Crowe believes that this confusion “weakens its position in 
dogma.”
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One might object that it is impossible to expect the precision of, for example, 
scientific discourse in such matters, and that there is room for the multiplication of 
images for the Holy Spirit or indeed need for such multiplication. No one image 
can be expected perfectly to describe the Holy Spirit. This is true, o f course. The is­
sue here is that discussions of the Holy Spirit as “love” can often lack the necessary 
intellectual asceticism and focus, they can risk saying more than is warranted by the 
data and can risk poeticising theological discourse.
The principal points to be argued in this chapter are: (1) that despite the ap­
pearance of talk o f a “mutual love” pneumatology, the Western tradition has been 
dominated by a “common love” approach to the Holy Spirit; (2) that where we fmd 
evidence of a more sustained effort at developing a “mutual love” pneumatology, 
this was on grounds that will no longer convince historically-minded contemporary 
theologians; (3) that Coffey recognises these two points and intends to remedy the 
situation by arguing for a historically-rooted “mutual love” pneumatology; (4) that 
Coffey regards the “mutual love” approach to the Holy Spirit as responding to the 
question of “ascending” rather than “descending” theology; and (5) that Coffey 
finds evidence o f a dynamic thrust towards an “ascending” “mutual love” pneuma­
tology in the Western filioque, even though that doctrine does not itself yet express 
such a pneumatology.256
256 An issue that often arises in relation to the “mutual love” approach to the Holy Spirit is whether 
“mutual love” can be a person in any proper sense, whether this theory implies a kind of subordina­
tion of the Holy Spirit. This issue is succinctly put by Moltmann who writes: “Ever since Augustine, 
whenever the Spirit is merely termed vinculum amoris between the Father and the Son, it is enough 
to assume a ‘duality’ in God.” See Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom o f  God: The 
Doctrine o f  God, (London: SCM Press, 1981), 142-143. For some reflections of Coffey on this, I 
point the reader to Coffey, D id You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: Some Basic 
Questions fo r  Pneumatology, 52-55.
Although I do not engage with this question, 1 register two concerns about the question itself: (1) the 
concern about how easily anthropomorphic expectations creep into the very posing of this question; 
(2) the concern about the assumption that the Holy Spirit must be “person” in a way similar to the 
way in which the “Son” is.
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2. The Emergence of a “Common Love”
Emphasis
David Coffey distinguishes between what he refers to as the “common love” 
and what he calls the “mutual love” approaches to the Holy Spirit as “love.”257 This 
distinction is important and needs to be introduced.
The “common love” approach, for Coffey, thinks o f the Holy Spirit as the 
love of God as such. God is “love” (1 John 4:8), the Holy Spirit is God, so the Holy 
Spirit is “love.” This “love” is the same “love” that is shared by Father and Son. It 
is the gift o f God for the world, and is so even prior to being given. The “mutual 
love” approach, in contrast, is the love that the Father has for the Son and the Son 
has for the Father.25® In Coffey’s thought, the term “mutual” love emphasises the re­
ciprocity o f the love of Father for Son and of Son for Father. It is not simply the 
“love” that God is, but in a certain sense assumes a distinction o f persons upon 
which reciprocity depends. If, in brief, the “common love” approach takes unity in 
divine essence as its starting point, a “mutual love” approach takes its starting point 
in plurality (the distinction of the Father and Son), and moves towards unity.
257 Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 6; Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of 
the Father and the Son,” 198.
258 The “contrast” here is one of contrasting theological emphases. When speaking of the Holy 
Spirit do we intend first the “love” that the Father and Son have in common, or the “love” that they 
have for each other? On this see Coffey, “A Proper Mission o f the Holy Spirit,” 235.
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Coffey argues that despite the presumption in favour o f the “mutual love” ap­
proach mentioned at the outset of this chapter, it is the “common love” approach to 
the Holy Spirit that dominates.259 It is our task now to sketch something of a back­
ground for this position o f Coffey’s in the history o f pneumatology.
The first step in the historical development o f  the theme o f the Holy Spirit as 
“common” love was the beginning o f an identification o f the Holy Spirit with 
“love.”260 Historically, the emergence of this identification is best explained in the 
context o f the development of pneumatology as a whole. We have already com­
mented on one aspect of the early development o f pneumatology: the rise and fall 
of Spirit Christology.261 The emergence o f the theme o f the Holy Spirit as “love,” 
however, had no direct connection with the development o f early Spirit Christo­
logy. The mainstream of earliest pneumatological discourse focused not so much on 
the issue of the Holy Spirit in relation to Christ, nor even on the Holy Spirit as trin­
itarian person; but rather on the sanctifying work and effects o f the Holy Spirit in 
the church, through the scriptures, through the sacraments and so on.262 We have 
already seen that the process of understanding the Holy Spirit not simply as God 
active in the economy (as was arguably the biblical view), but as the third divine 
person took time, only being complete at the time o f the Second Ecumenical Coun­
cil.263 The emergence of an explicit sense o f the hypostatic distinctness of the Holy 
Spirit gave rise to the question o f how to express this distinctness. Searching the
259 One might look, for example, at the quotation from Dominum et vivificantem given above. Here 
the pope begins with the “essential love” shared between the three divine persons. This love 
“becomes” “mutual love,” but this “mutual love” is said to be “between the divine persons”: pre­
sumably between the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit. It is not clear that he intends the Holy Spirit as 
the “mutual love” of the Father and the Son. See above at note 255 on 103.
260 Augustine admits that scripture does not state that the Holy Spirit is love in D e trinitate 15.27. 
Thomas is less concerned with the scriptural basis for the equation: the authority he cites is Gregory. 
See Summa theologiae I q, 37 a. 1.
261 See above p. 30 f.
262' On this see Robert Louis Wilken, “Spiritus Sanctus Secundum Scriptures Sanctas,” Augustinian 
Studies 31,(2000): 1-18.
263 There is therefore a shift in focus from the work and activity of the Holy Spirit in earlier tradi­
tion to a later focus on the Holy Spirit as such. This shift mirrors the move from a functional to an 
ontological christology, though of course these two lines of theological enquiry follow relatively in­
dependent trajectories.
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scriptures264 for language to describe the ecclesial impact o f the post-Pentecost mis­
sion of the Spirit led certain patristic writers towards reflection on “gift” and “love” 
as ways o f describing what was distinctive about the Holy Spirit.
In the early, pre-Augustinian phase of pneumatological development, explora­
tion of these terms was conducted in a pro nobis sense: the Holy Spirit was ap­
proached as “gift” to the church, as God’s “love” for the world. A new stage in this 
development is reached in the West in the thought o f Augustine himself. He inherits 
the emerging Western tradition of reflecting on the Holy Spirit as “gift” and “love,” 
but develops it by asking an important new question: “Was [the Holy Spirit] 
already gift before there was anyone to give him to?"265 With this question, Au­
gustine signals a move beyond thinking primarily about the work and activity of the 
Holy Spirit pro nobis to thinking about the Holy Spirit in se. Augustine’s answer is 
affirmative: the Holy Spirit is “gift” eternally, because a “gift” is such even before 
it is given. Analogously, the Holy Spirit is “love” not just for the church and in the 
economy of salvation, but also eternally.
Given the historical context, it is not surprising, however, that Augustine 
should think of this “gift” and “love” in ways that emphasise the “common” rather 
than the “mutual love” dimension.266 That context, recall, was one marked by the 
struggle with various forms of subordinationism. Against subordinationism, the 
Council o f Nicaea (325) had offered a framework for understanding the unity of the 
Father and the Son primarily in terms o f a oneness in ousia,267 and by the time of
264 Early pneumatology (in contrast to early Christology which had found points of support in pa­
gan, especially in Stoic and Platonist thought), found itself without non-Christian supports when it 
came to expressing this distinctness. The only resources available for interpreting the presence and 
activity of the Holy Spirit in the church were scriptural. See Ibid.
265 Augustine puts this question in De trinitate 5. 17. On the evolution of the question asked by 
Augustine see Ibid. Note that donum and not amor is Augustine’s most used word for the Holy 
Spirit. See Michael O’Carroll, Veni Creator Spiritus: A Theological Encyclopedia o f  the Holy Spirit, 
(Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1990), 22.
266 A quick survey of the passages on the Holy Spirit as “love” is found in Ibid., 22-23. It is clear 
from these, for example, that it is the “love” that Father and Son have in common rather than their 
“mutual” love that is central in Augustine’s thoughts.
267' Although Augustine appears not to have been aware of the teaching o f the Council of Con­
stantinople, and although that council had not appealed to the idea o f the homoousios, it was clear 
that if the Holy Spirit was true God, then the Spirit too was of one ousia with the Father and the Son.
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Augustine the Nicene solution had come to be accepted by a broad-range of theolo­
gical traditions. The homoousios offered a new way of conceiving the oneness of 
God, one that was, however, more closely adapted to the work of defending the 
Christian understanding of God against subordinationism than it was in reflecting 
the dynamics o f  the economy of salvation. This context confirmed a preference for 
a “common love” (as against a “mutual love”) approach. Thus, while in the eco­
nomy of salvation one may easily speak o f the duality o f subjects (Jesus and God) 
and the mutual love between them, in a theology o f the “immanent Trinity” that 
takes the homoousios as its “starting point” it is more difficult to accommodate 
such an idea. It is easier on the basis o f the homoousios to argue that the Holy Spirit 
in se is “love” because God is love, than to argue the more specific claim that the 
Holy Spirit is the “mutual love” of the Father and the Son.268
This does not mean, of course, that Augustine was not interested in the dis­
tinction between Father and Son. Once oneness in divine ousia comes to be the 
dominant heuristic for reflecting the oneness o f God, the question of the plurality of 
divine persons is expressed as the question of distinction (between trinitarian “per­
sons”). For Coffey this passage from an assumed oneness towards distinction is 
precisely what defines “descending” theology.
Athanasius makes the unity in the divine ousia explicit in his “Letter to Serapion” 1.27. The author­
ity o f the Council o f Constantinople may not have been accepted in the West until the early seventh 
century, though reluctance on this point is related the contested issue of the status of the See o f Con­
stantinople and not to the pneumatological teaching. See Coffey, “The Teaching of the 
Constantinopolitan Creed on the Holy Spirit,” 66.
268 As Coffey correctly states, the implication in the idea o f “mutual love” is that it is “by definition 
the love of two persons in distinction.” See Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” 326.
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3. Ascending and Descending Theologies
The metaphors of “ascent” and “descent” are widely used in theology, and es­
pecially in christology. Coffey’s usage, however, is distinctive and should be ap­
proached with attention. I will begin by clarifying what the terminology o f ascent 
and descent does not connote in Coffey’s theology, before moving to a positive 
statement o f what it does connote.
Coffey’s usage of the terms “descending” and “ascending” in theology is not 
determined by attitudes towards the dogmas o f the early church councils and their 
place within theological method.269 I have already introduced the broad lines of 
Coffey’s approach to the sources of trinitarian theology, showing how he attempts 
to combine the historically-sensitive reading of biblical texts with an acceptance of 
doctrinal development and recognition o f the criteriological value o f magisterial 
statements.270 His acceptance, in this context, of council teachings as criteriological 
does not make his a “descending” theology, at least not according to his own under­
standing of the term.271 For Coffey, it is perfectly possible to accept the truth of 
christological and trinitarian dogmas and  adopt an “ascending” method. In fact, he
269 Such a connotation is not uncommon especially in christology, where the christological dogmas 
are regarded as either starting point (descending) or proposed point of arrival (ascending). On this 
usage see, for example, Pannenberg, Jesus -  G od and Man, 33-35; Dermot A Lane, The Reality o f  
Jesus: An Essay in Christology, (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1975), 13-18; Thomas P. Rausch, 
Who is Jesus?: An Introduction to Christology, (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2003), 5. Such 
usage may be appropriate in christology, but is more difficult to apply in the same form to trinitarian 
theology.
270 See p. 48f above.
271 The best way of thinking of the distinction between “ascending” theology and “descending” 
theology is to view the distinction as primarily methodological in nature. All theology, if it is theo­
logy, assumes “faith.” What distinguishes these two approaches is not the matter of faith, but rather 
the question of explicit starting point. Ascending theology takes the economy of salvation, rather 
than the church’s doctrinal statements, as its explicit starting point: from a point o f view of faith, one 
might explicitly take the literal meaning of biblical texts as starting point, and tries to show the his­
torical process by which these were interpreted, and the process by which the church’s belief 
emerged. Speaking of Christology “from below” (analogous here to ascending theological method), 
Schillebeeckx writes that it is “faith in search of historical understanding.” See Edward 
Schillebeeckx, Interim Report on the Books "Jesus" and "Christ", (New York: Crossroad, 1980), 29. 
Schillebeeckx also formulates this in Latin in an article entitled “Fides quaerens intellectum historic- 
um.” See fir. 9 on p. 144 at Ibid.
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argues, the church arrived at its dogmatic positions by means o f a method that was, 
broadly speaking, an ascending one. The issue of the status o f dogmatic definitions 
is, in brief, not pertinent to Coffey’s usage o f the terminology o f “ascending” and 
“descending.”
Coffey writes:
‘Descending theology’ has as its point of departure the sphere of God and as 
its term the world of human beings, while ‘ascending theology’ begins from 
the world of human experience and rises to the sphere of God. These two 
complementary ways of doing theology, each with its foundation in the 
New Testament, have had very different histories. The descending method, 
awarded a commanding position by the form given to the christological 
doctrines of the early church councils, has held sway until modem times, 
when it has begun to be replaced, or at least balanced, by the ascending 
method.272
The position expressed in this paragraph may appear to be in direct tension with 
that expressed in the previous paragraph. That it is not may be realised once any 
supposed equivalence between biblical data and “the world o f human beings,” on 
the one hand, and between the council teachings and “the sphere o f God,” on the 
other, is queried. No such equivalence should be assumed. In point o f fact, all theo­
logies, whether biblical or conciliar are necessarily “ascending” at first: all neces­
sarily have a rooting in the world of human experience and all rise thence to the 
“sphere o f God.”273
“Descending” theology comes after this initial “ascent.” It takes the results of 
the “ascent” as a basis for another kind of discourse about God. What are the condi­
tions for the possibility o f such an experience of salvation: how must God be in or­
272 Coffey, “Priestly Representation and Women’s Ordination,” 81. Though he does not make it 
explicit in this quotation, it is clear that the New Testament bases for “descending” and “ascending” 
theologies are Johannine and synoptic christology respectively.
273- Accordingly, in the quotation given in this paragraph, both “descending” and “ascending” theo­
logy are said to have their point of departure in the New Testament.
Coffey’s willingness to root both “ascending” and “descending” forms of theology in the New Test­
ament means that he is in a position to avoid certain ambiguities such as that found in Pannenberg, 
Jesus -  God and Man, 33 and 34. On p. 33 of that book, Pannenberg speaks of New Testament pas­
sages (Phil 2:5ff; Rom 8:3; Gal 4:4) pointing “in the direction” o f “descending” theology, but on p. 
34 speaks of “Christology from above” presupposing the Doctrine o f the Trinity. Since Pannenberg 
does not assume that there is a Doctrine of the Trinity in the New Testament, one is forced to ima­
gine that he regards these New Testament texts as anomalous or at least uncharacteristic in the New 
Testament.
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der to explain what happens in the world? It is not, in brief, the fact o f the appropri­
ation and development by church councils o f part of the biblical data that signals 
for Coffey the difference between “descending” and “ascending” theology.
The issue is rather the “descending” form  in which these dogmas came to be 
expressed.274 A new dimension is opened up once one approaches the biblical data 
with trinitarian assumptions. From a trinitarian point of view, the key issue distin­
guishing “descending” and “ascending” theology is the question o f the direction of 
theological thought with regard to questions o f oneness and threeness in God. Once 
the doctrine o f the Trinity is assumed, the question o f whether one thinks from  the 
unity o f God towards the distinctness o f persons, or vice versa arises. To ask how 
one God can be three persons is to be engaged in “descending theology.” To ask, in 
contrast, on the assumption of a distinction o f persons, how the three divine persons 
are one is, for Coffey, to be engaged in “ascending theology.”275
How, one might ask, does this relate to metaphors o f “ascent” and “descent”? 
To understand this, let us take firstly the example of “descending” theology. Theo­
274 See above at p. 29 for an example of the “descending” form of classical christological 
statements.
275 There is no intention here of invoking the questionable but commonplace assumption o f a dis­
tinction between Eastern and Western theological traditions that holds that Western theology begins 
with unity and proceeds towards distinction, while Eastern theology does the opposite. As we will 
see below, in this matter both traditions eventually come to follow a “descending” path in their 
pneumatology, so that this question does not map onto any distinction between Eastern and Western 
theology.
Important challenges to the notion that one might distinguish Eastern and Western theological tradi­
tions on these grounds are found in Barnes, “De Regnon Reconsidered”; Barnes, “Augustine in 
Contemporary Trinitarian Theology”; Sarah Coakley, ‘“Persons’ in the ‘Social’ Doctrine o f the 
Trinity: A Critique of Current Analytic Discussion,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium 
on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 131; 
Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology.
It should also be noted that talk of “beginning with” divine “unity” is highly ambiguous, with both 
terms calling for careful argument and justification. On the Augustinian understanding o f divine 
“unity” see Ayres, “ ‘Remember That You Are Catholic’ (Serm. 52.2): Augustine on the Unity of the 
Triune God”. Failure clearly to specify the meaning of terms like divine “unity” often allows theolo­
gians to elide important distinctions on the basis of minimal textual evidence. One of Ayres’ re­
peated admonitions to systematicians is that they need to attend much more closely to their historical 
sources if they are not to fall into unhelpful and misleading generalisations. Such generalisations 
tend to be ideologically charged. In my discussion, I attempt to avoid the implication of any particu­
lar reading of what divine “unity” might mean. The important point in my discussion relates not to 
the terms “unity” and “diversity” in themselves, but the direction of argument: from unity to divers­
ity or from diversity towards unity.
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logy that takes the unity of God as “starting point” and enquires after the distinction 
o f persons customarily thinks about this distinction in terms of “missions” by which 
the Son and the Spirit are thought to have come forth  from God, “down” into the 
world. These missions may, in turn, be thought to reveal eternal processions, but it 
is the missions that anchor the metaphor of “descent.” The Father sends the Son 
into the world, the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit. If, in contrast, theolo­
gical enquiry moves in the opposite direction, from plurality towards unity, then for 
Coffey it is “ascending” in direction. It is “ascending” because it begins with the 
plurality found in the distinctness of Jesus from God given in the economy of salva­
tion. One can use the metaphor o f “ascent” to explain the move from the plurality 
given in the economy of salvation, i.e. the distinction o f Jesus and the Holy Spirit 
from God, towards the assertion of unity of the Trinity.276
This way of approaching the distinction of “ascending” and “descending” 
theology is congruent with, but not identical to, epistemological concerns about 
what human beings can know of God and how. “Ascending” theology, as stated 
above, begins with the world of human experience, but specifically with the eco­
nomy of salvation. What is given in the economy of salvation is plurality: Jesus is 
experienced initially as distinct from God, though powerfully related to God. Theo­
logical interpretation rises from this plurality to an interpretation of how God is 
one. One ascends, so to speak, from the plurality manifest in history to claims about
276 In other places, Coffey uses a set of metaphors related to inside and outside, drawn from the 
classical distinction of works of God ad extra and relationships ad intra. He further develops the dy­
namic possibilities o f this metaphor with talk o f centrifugal and centripetal. These metaphors will be 
invoked below at p. 183f.
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oneness in being.277 Theology needs to be both “descending” and “ascending.”278 
The plausibility and limits of such an ascent is one of the key issues upon which 
Coffey’s theology may be judged, an issue that the next chapter addresses.279
277 This point calls for further nuance, since there is also a sense in which thought about the Holy 
Spirit historically moved from unity towards distinction. What is first perceived in the economy of 
salvation is a certain unity of the Spirit with God, and an emerging sense in earliest Christian reflec­
tion of a certain unity of the Spirit with Christ. The direction of theological development then moves 
towards an understanding of the distinctness of the Spirit from both “God” and “Christ.” See Coffey, 
D evs Trinitas: The Doctrine o f  the Triune God, 11-12. This does not take, however, from the gen­
eral point that “ascending” theology moves from plurality towards unity, whether that plurality be 
diadic or a triadic.
278 Gregory of Nazianzen writes: “No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am illumined by the 
Splendour of the Three; no sooner do I distinguish Them than I am carried back to the One. When I 
think o f any One of the Three I think of Him as the Whole, and my eyes are filled, and the greater 
part of what I am thinking of escapes me. I cannot grasp the greatness of That One so as to attribute 
a greater greatness to the Rest. When I contemplate the Three together, I see but one torch, and can­
not divide or measure out the Undivided Light.” Oration 40/41
279 I limit myself here to stating the objection of Neil Ormerod to the plausibility of such an ascent. 
He sees it as an attempt to introduce:
a certain kind of interpersonal categories into the Trinitarian relationships. This may seem 
an odd objection to make. Given the large-scale adoption o f such categories in modem 
Trinitarian theology, an interpersonal consideration of the Trinitarian life is being hailed as 
a major advance in theological thought.
He links the problem to Rahner’s identification of the immanent and economic Logos and writes:
Now there are many things that we can say about the economic Logos, the incarnate Word, 
Jesus Christ in terms of his relationship to the Father. He is obedient to the will o f the Fath­
er, he loves the Father, he prays to the Father. We may rightly deploy a whole series of in­
terpersonal categories to describe this relationship. Nonetheless, in classical terms the 
validity of these interpersonal statements depends on their application to the incarnate 
human being, Jesus of Nazareth. For example we may speak of the love of Jesus for the 
Father in terms of an act of the human will of Jesus, and similarly with respect to obedi­
ence. However, it is less clear that these same categories can be used of the immanent rela­
tionship between the Father and Son in the Trinity. In what sense, if any, is the immanent 
Logos obedient to the Father? [...] Within the divinity, the homoousios implies a single di­
vine will, equally that of the Father, Son and Spirit. Unless one were to fall into a 
Monotbelite Christology, the divine will o f the immanent Logos is distinct from the human 
will of the economic incarnate Logos. In this case one cannot read back from the economic 
Trinity truths about the immanent Trinity. In this sense at least the immanent Logos is not 
strictly the same as the economic Logos. There is no clear reason why interpersonal realit­
ies grounded in the human will of Jesus can or should be read back into statements about 
the immanent Logos. More summarily Lonergan observes, “The person of the Word can 
speak and actually does speak in accordance with his human nature. But in his divine 
nature the person of the Word neither can nor does speak but is only spoken.”
See Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 130. Although Ormerod refers 
specifically to Rahner, he takes Coffey’s theology as an exemplification of the consequences of tak­
ing Rahner’s proposal to its logical consequences.
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4. Descending Theology and the “Common
Love” Approach
We are now in a position to return to Coffey’s characterisation o f Augustine’s 
approach as a “descending” approach, and to show how the “common” love ap­
proach to the Holy Spirit coheres with this. On the basis o f the Nicene framing o f 
the issue o f God’s oneness in terms of the homoousios it is not surprising that the 
“common” love might prevail over the “mutual” love approach. The specific issue 
addressed by Nicaea and the pro-Nicene theology280 was subordinationism, and this 
coloured the preference for the “common” love approach. In this polemical con­
text,281 any tendency that suggested that the Eternal Son might be in relationship o f 
love with the Father, analogous with the relationship between Jesus and God would 
have been seen as threatening the pro-Nicene defence against subordinationism, a 
defence built on the oneness of being o f Father and Son. The preference for a “com­
mon” love approach, further, was congruent with the preference for Johannine 
christology developed in the previous chapters, since the Johannine christology em­
phasises not Jesus’ reception of the Spirit, but rather his sending o f the Spirit. 
Johannine christology suggests and supports a “descending” view of the Holy 
Spirit. The Holy Spirit is understood here primarily as one sent into the world.282
It was almost inevitable that pro-Nicene “descending” theology would tend to 
think of the Holy Spirit primarily as the “common love” of the Father and the Son,
280 The term “pro-Nicene” is associated with Ayres and Bames. By it is designated a broad con­
sensus among theologians faithful to the Nicene settlement of both East and West, The reading of 
the history of Fourth Century trinitarian thought that this term connotes aims at overturning the hy­
pothesis that East and West occupy different ends o f the theological spectrum as regards starting 
point in trinitarian theology, the East beginning with plurality and the West with unity (the so-called 
De Regnon hypothesis).
281 it had been thought that Augustine wrote his treatise on the Trinity without particular polemical 
intent. This older view is now being contested. An influential statement by a patristics scholar on 
this is Bames, “Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology”.
282 A recent article has shown how the deeply the Fourth Gospel shapes the logic of the Augustini- 
an approach to the Trinity. See Evan F. Kuehn, “The Johannine Logic of Augustine’s Trinity: A 
Dogmatic Sketch,” Irish Theological Quarterly 68, no. 3 (2007): 572-594.
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as eternal “gift” given in time in the economy of salvation, rather than as the “mutu­
al love” o f the Father and the Son. If not balanced by the synoptic portrait of Jesus 
as recipient of the Spirit or by the scriptural narrative suggesting that the life of Je­
sus might be read as a return of the Spirit, it is unsurprising that the classical ap­
proach to the Holy Spirit as “love” should emphasise the “common” rather than the 
“mutual” love dimension.283
Having thus looked at the emergence o f a preference for the “common love” 
approach, and stated that this emphasis was understandable in the context o f pro- 
Nicene polemics, the question of whether we can attribute a “mutual” love ap­
proach to the Holy Spirit to Augustine arises. In several places, Coffey asserts that 
we can,284 a view that is not unusual. He is glad to find in Augustine a patristic au­
thority by which to show a traditional precedent for the “mutual love” pneumato- 
logy that he himself wants to develop. In making this claim, however, Coffey 
brings to it a clearer distinction between the “common love” and the “mutual love” 
approach than is usually the case. The question thus becomes not whether Au­
gustine speaks o f  the Holy Spirit as “mutual love,” but whether he does so intend­
ing to distinguish this term from what Coffey calls the “common love” approach.
I find that although Augustine does make mention o f the Holy Spirit as “mu­
tual” love it is not at all clear that, as Coffey implies, Augustine intends to distin­
guish this approach from the “common love” approach. Augustine does not, for ex­
281 As a point o f nuance I note that in fact theme of the mutual love o f Father and Son emerges
with even greater clarity in the Johannine gospel. What Coffey notes is the absence in the Fourth 
Gospel of a basis for connecting this mutual love with the Holy Spirit. While the theme of the mutu­
al love o f Father and Son may be less explicit in the synoptic gospels, it is nevertheless present at the 
level of the narrative as a whole, and may be more easily connected with the Holy Spirit, as attemp­
ted in Chapters One and Two above.
Ultimately, as we will see in the final chapter, the distinction offered by Johannine vs synoptic chris- 
tology needs to be set alongside another distinction that Coffey finds in the New Testament: the dis­
tinction between the “mission” and the “return” schemas of the Trinity. On this see below at p. 180f.
284 In various places, Coffey refers to Augustine as originator and “formulator” of the “mutual” 
love model. See, for example, Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit, Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ 
of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” 471; Coffey, “A Proper Mission o f the Holy Spirit,” 232; Coffey, “The 
Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 193; Coffey, Dens Trinitas: The 
Doctrine o f  the Triune God, 4-5; Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” 326; Coffey, D id You 
Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: Some Basic Questions fo r  Pneumatology, 47.
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ample, attempt to explain how one model is related to the other.285 Coffey does not 
show that Augustine intends this distinction, and his brief acknowledgment that Au­
gustine sometimes confuses the vocabulary of “common” and “mutual” does little 
to strengthen his case.286
That said, the distinction between a “common love” and a “mutual love” ap­
proach is sustainable. What is important in Coffey’s reading of Augustine on this 
matter is that he points to Augustine’s failure to offer a plausible scriptural basis for 
the “mutual love” approach, since this is exactly what Coffey’s own theology at­
tempts to do. Augustine’s only real attempt to root the “mutual love” approach in 
scripture, Coffey points out, is found in De fide  et symbolo (9, 19), where the 
African Father appeals to the work of “others” in finding a scriptural basis for this 
idea, but does not specify exactly who these “others” are, or what proofs they offer. 
Augustine preached that:
This Godhead, then, which they wish to be understood likewise as their [i.e. 
of the Father and the Son] mutual love and charity, they say is called the 
Holy Spirit. And this opinion they support by many proofs from the Scrip­
285 The clearest Augustinian reference to a “mutual” love approach to the Holy Spirit in the sense 
intended by Coffey is probably in 15.37. There we read: “if  the charity by which the Father loves the 
Son and the Son loves the Father inexpressibly shows forth the communion of them both, what [is] 
more suitable than [that] he who is the common Spirit of them both should distinctively be called 
charity?” It would be interesting to see how Augustine would himself explain the relation between 
the mutual love o f Father and Son and the communion in divine substantia. All he says is that the 
former “ineffabilitar demostrat” the latter. Is the mutual love “inexpressible” because it appears to 
depend a kind of plurality in God that Augustine is not in a position to explore, given his pro-Nicene 
commitments?
286 Coffey writes:
It is important to note that Augustine held [...] that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the 
Father and the Son: ‘According to the holy scriptures this Holy Spirit is not of the Father 
alone or of the Son alone but of both, and therefore he conveys to us the common love by 
which the Father and the Son love each other.’ As such he is the ‘bond’ that unites them. 
From this mutual love must be distinguished the ‘common’ love of the Father and the Son, 
by which the two together love some object, be it a divine person or persons or the divine 
essence. It is unfortunate that in this context Augustine uses the word ‘common’ in the 
sense in which we have above defined ‘mutual’ precisely in order to distinguish it from the 
proper sense of ‘common.’ That Augustine held the Holy Spirit to be in fact the mutual, 
rather than the common, love of the Father and the Son is remarkable [....]
See Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 6.
Coffey explains away Augustine’s use o f the term “common love” where Coffey would prefer to see 
“mutual love” as a kind of lapse on Augustine’s part. I think had Augustine thought it important to 
distinguish these the two approaches he would not have committed such a lapse.
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tures, for example, ‘For the love of God is shed in our hearts by the Holy 
Spirit who has been given to us,’ and many other such testimonies.287
Coffey takes this to be Augustine’s only attempt to demonstrate a scriptural basis 
for the idea o f the Holy Spirit as mutual love, and correctly points out that as such, 
it is far from satisfactory. Firstly, the cited Pauline text does not speak of the love of 
the Father and the Son, but rather of the love of God. Secondly, it does not speak of 
the love o f God between divine persons, but rather of that love directed towards us, 
i.e. human persons. In practice, then, Coffey believes, Augustine has not offered a 
satisfactory scriptural basis for this doctrine.288
I would further take this as evidence that Augustine is not himself quite clear 
on the distinction that Coffey is bringing to the material.289 No matter how we re­
solve the question of whether Augustine indeed proposes a model o f the Holy Spirit 
as “mutual” (as against “common”) love, the basic issue that Coffey raises remains: 
the question o f the scriptural basis for claiming that the Holy Spirit is “mutual 
love.”
287 Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 195-196. Augustine 
does not say who “they” are, but it is commonly thought that this is a tentative way of offering his 
own opinion on the matter. See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century 
Trinitarian Theology, 370-372.
288 He discusses this matter in Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the 
Son,” 201.
289 Coffey has perhaps himself grown cautious o f attributing the “mutual love” theory to Au­
gustine. In 2007, he wrote that he was led to the idea from the theme o f the anointing, and not from 
Augustine. See Coffey, “Vive La Difference: A Response to Donald Gelpi,” 120. In 2008 he makes 
no mention o f Augustine when he writes that it has its “theological precedents in Scripture and tradi­
tion, not to mention Aquinas.” See Coffey, “Questiones Disputatae: A Trinitarian Response to Issues 
Raised By Peter Phan,” 862.1 fully accept that the origins of Coffey’s idea of the “mutual love” ap­
proach is the data o f the economy of salvation, and have here merely argued that his earlier enthusi­
asm for an Augustinian resonance for the idea was probably misguided.
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5. Descending Theology Addresses the 
Distinction of Persons
I have stated that the emphasis that emerges in Augustine is on the Holy Spirit 
as “common” love. This is not to say, however, that Augustine was not interested in 
the matter o f the real distinction of divine persons. In point o f fact, once the unity of 
God is explained in terms of the homoousios, that is the unity in divine substantia, 
the question of the distinction of persons comes to be the principal task facing trin­
itarian theology.
In order to express the distinction o f divine persons, as is well-known, Au­
gustine adopts the category o f relation.m  He does this because it appeared to offer 
a way o f expressing the distinctness of the Son and the Father without falling into 
either modalism or subordinationism. These relations, he argues, are neither sub­
stances nor accidents.291 The category o f relation allows both unity and real distinc­
tion to be preserved.
The adoption o f the category of “relation” by Augustine offers an interesting 
challenge to readers in our time. In modem culture, talk o f “relation” evokes im­
ages that are interpersonal in character. This would not have been the case in Au­
gustine’s time, where a more metaphysical meaning would have prevailed.
In view of the pro-Nicene context in which the idea o f “relation” as a fruitful 
approach to the distinction of divine persons flourished, it is clear that one should 
be cautious about assuming any attempt in Augustine to evoke interpersonal rela­
290 The use of the term relation (oyeou;) to speak of the distinction between Father and Son goes 
back at least as far as Gregory of Laodicea. See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to 
Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, 201. Augustine may have found this idea in Gregory of Nan- 
zianzen, Oration 29.16 or Didymus the Blind, D e frinitale 1.16. Augustine’s own discussion o f this 
point is in De frinitale 5.5, 7. 1-2. See also Enarrationes in Psalmos 68.
291 This argument of Augustine is found in De frinitale 5.3—8.
1 1 8
tionships as a way of understanding the distinction o f persons.292 The basic form of 
his theology is “descending” (in Coffey’s sense) and any attempt at introducing in­
terpersonal analogies would have to be taken as a reversal o f his basic pro-Nicene 
strategy, the abandonment of the “descending” theology agenda and the adoption of 
an “ascending” mode of theology.
The contemporary reader should not assume, without evidence, that Augustine 
intended to draw an analogy between the trinitarian “relations” and human interper­
sonal relations, or even to imagine that the New Testament narrative of the relation­
ship between Jesus and God in the economy o f salvation might be taken as a start­
ing point in understanding the relations between the divine persons. If  Augustine 
speaks of the Holy Spirit as “mutual love,” similarly, we should not assume that he 
does this on the basis o f biblical evidence of the “mutual love” of Father and Son 
such as this is manifest in the economy of salvation. When Augustine writes that 
Holy Spirit is “a certain inexpressible communion or fellowship between the Father 
and the Son,”293 he is probably thinking of their sharing in the divine substantia and 
not directly to any pre-existing eternal relationship between two distinct persons.294
The preference for a “common” love approach and the methodological demo­
tion o f the biblical witness to the economy of salvation as a source for trinitarian
292 Benner writes: “Augustine more often protects against views of the Trinity that tend toward 
tritheism and subordinationism than he protects against views of the Trinity that tend toward 
modalism.” Drayton C Benner, “Augustine and Karl Rahner on the Relationship Between the 
Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity,” International Journal o f  Systematic Theology 9, 
(2007), 28.
293 De trinitate 5. 11.
294 It would be worth further investigating the influence of Neo-Platonist epistemology on Au­
gustine’s failure to clearly indicate the relation of the “immanent Trinity” with the economy of sal­
vation. The influence of Neo-Platonism inculcates a reluctance to imagine that the “visible” realm, 
in this case the economy of salvation, might lead us to real knowledge of the invisible God. The path 
to knowledge of the supreme being in neo-Platonism was not through the senses, but through 
contemplation.
Accordingly, rather than appealing consistently to the economy of salvation as a basis for under­
standing the relations by which the one God was distinguished as three persons, Augustine has re­
course to a “more inner way” (interiore modo). This search for a more “inner way” leads Augustine 
to the development of the psychological analogy for the Trinity.
For further information on the contentious issue of the visibility of Jesus in Augustine, see Michel 
René Barnes, “The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity. Mt. 5:8 in Augustine’s Trinitarian 
Theology of 400,” Modem Theology 19, (2003): 329-355.
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theology in Augustine’s thought is further reinforced by the development of his 
psychological analogies for the Trinity.295 Augustine carries out the task of under­
standing the church’s trinitarian faith primarily through his development of trinit­
arian analogies.296 The type of analogy Augustine is looking for in the latter part of 
De trinitate is quite clearly defined. He needs an analogy to show how one God can 
exist as three persons without partitioning the substantia. In book 10 of De trinitate, 
Augustine explores, for example, the potential of the triad of memory (memoria 
sui), understanding or knowledge (intelligentia sui) and will (voluntas sui).297 The 
analogy of memory, understanding and will was not to prove the most influential of 
Augustine’s experimental formulations. It was rather the analogy of the mind, its 
self-knowledge and its self-love298 that fed much more significantly into the West­
ern tradition as a result of the use made o f it by Thomas.
The principal point to note for current purposes is that in the above analogy, 
the love invoked is not the love of Father and Son, but the self-love of the individu­
al: it is m/rasubjective. The line of enquiry that Coffey will propose, in contrast, is 
/«te/'subjective: the very term “mutual love” indicates a reciprocity of relationship 
that cannot be adequately represented with intrasubjective analogies.299
295 Already in The Confessions Augustine explores the triad o f being, knowing and willing. See 
Confessions 13. 11, no. 12. Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding, The Works 
o f Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, vol. 1/1, (New York: New City Press, 1997). 
Further comment on the place of the psychological analogy in the structure o f Western theological 
thought is found below at p. 146f.
196' It is not true, as some allege, that Augustine in developing the psychological analogy for the 
Trinity is proposing an alternative source for knowledge of God other than the bible. To understand 
the place of these analogies, one must first understand the difference for Augustine between “faith” 
and “understanding.” For Augustine, faith in the Trinity is a given: he thinks it is found directly in 
the bible and is taught by the church. In his De trinitate Augustine spends much o f the first part of 
the book engaging with the belief of the church, and defending it against wrong beliefs. In the 
second half of the treatise, Augustine shifts to an emphasis on understanding. What dominates is the 
attempt to comprehend the intelligibility of the church’s trinitarian faith. The analogy is neither an 
alternative source, nor is it a proof. The preferred English translation o f this work is Augustine of 
Hippo, The Trinity, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill, Works of Saint Augustine: A 
Translation for the 21st Century, vol. 1/5, (New York: New City Press, 2002).
297 Onnerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 80-81.
298 De trinitate 9 ,3 -5 .
299 It is acknowledged that alongside the psychological analogy, Augustine also experimented with 
analogies that appealed to interpersonal love. One of the better known analogies presented in De 
trinitate is that with the lover, the one loved and love. Such attempts are found, for example, in De
120
6. The Holy Spirit as Love After Augustine
In the centuries after Augustine, the Western tradition bifurcates on the matter 
of the Holy Spirit as “love.” The dominant tradition takes up the “common love” 
approach, and after Augustine it is found in Anselm and Thomas and others. There 
is, however, also a second, but also influential, account, which develops the “mutu­
al love” approach, developing the very incomplete elements o f such a theology 
found in Augustine.300 This second tradition fmds its classic formulation in Richard 
o f St Victor (+ 1 173).301
A brief word regarding this second tradition. It develops what can indeed be 
thought o f as the “mutual love” pneumatology, perhaps hinted at but not developed 
in Augustine’s writings. What marks Richard’s approach as a “mutual love” ap­
proach is his willingness to explore the analogy o f interpersonal love. This does not
trinitate 8.14, 9.2 and 15.10.
Augustine himself, however, was wary of these analogies, and the implicit risk of undermining 
God’s oneness. Perhaps this fear lies behind the mysterious statement in 15.10 when Augustine 
looks back at his work and recalls how he did not develop such interpersonal analogies: “However, 
no trinity was yet aparent to us in this, because we could not hold the gaze of our mind fixed on 
looking for one in that dazzling brilliance; all we were able to perceive was that there is no mass 
there in which we would have to believe that the size of two or three is something more than that of 
one.”
300' Michael Schmaus recognises the existence o f these two major theologies o f the Trinity in the 
medieval West, but does not place Augustine at the head of both in the way that Coffey does. The 
first tradition is that of Augustine, Anselm, Peter Lombard and Thomas, and the second that of 
Richard o f St Victor, Bonaventure. Yves Congar does place Augustine at the head of two traditions, 
in the following terms: “In the theology of the Trinity, [Augustine] opened two great ways, each of 
which was followed further in mediaeval thinking. The first of these took up the analysis of the 
activities o f the activities of the spirit, understanding and love, and was followed above all by An­
selm and Thomas Aquinas. The second way followed the theme o f God-charity and the Spirit as the 
mutual love between the Father and the Son. This was the way which attracted, with individual dif­
ferences, Achard and Richard of Saint-Victor, Bonaventure and the Franciscan School.” See Congar, 
I  Believe in the Holy Spirit, 96. See also John Cowbum, Love and the Person, (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1967), 257; François Bourassa, Questions De Théologie Trinitaìre, (Rome: Università 
Gregoriana Editrice, 1970), 59-124; Hill, Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery o f  
Salvation, 226 text and footnote 25.
301 The key text is Book Three of Richard’s treatise on the Trinity. It is published in English in 
Richard of Saint Victor, The Book o f  the Patriarchs, the Mystical Ark, Book Three o f  the Trinity, ed. 
Grover A. Zinn, Classics of Western Spirituality, vol. (London: Paulist Press, 1979), 373-379.
For general notes on Richard, see Edmund J. Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study o f  the 
Doctrine o f  the Trinity, Theological Resources, vol. (London: Hutchinson, 1972), 191-194.
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mean that Richard has abandoned the project of giving guarantee to divine oneness 
in theology; in his theology there is indeed a strong emphasis on divine unity. He 
understands, however, that oneness in a way that in itself implies plurality. The 
oneness particular to God, for Richard, is not monadic arithmetical oneness, but it is 
the Summum Bonum. This oneness and goodness o f God should, he argues, be 
understood in the light of the “God is love” statement o f 1 John 4:8. Since, for 
Richard, “love” is understood as a type o f self-transcendent tending towards the 
other, the divine unity implies some form of plurality at its heart. Richard connects 
this with the philosophically elaborated idea of the Good as self-diffusive.302
If God is the Summum Bonum then there must be in God an Other, and this 
accounts for the procession of the Son.303 But if  this love is to be truly altruistic, as 
love itself demands, Richard argues, then it calls for a “third,” in which love finds 
its perfection. “The lover seeks a third to share the regard in which he beholds the 
beloved and to be regarded by the beloved as the beloved is regarded by him.”304 He 
writes:
Sharing o f  love cannot exist among any less than three persons. Now, as has 
been said, nothing is more glorious, nothing m ore m agnificent, than to 
share in com m on w hatever you have that is useful and pleasant.
But this cannot be hidden from supreme wisdom , nor can it fail to be p leas­
ing to suprem e benevolence. And as the happiness o f  the supremely pow er­
ful O ne and the pow er o f  the supremely happy One cannot be lacking in 
what pleases Him, so in Divinity it is im possible for tw o persons not to be 
united to a third.305
302 Theological exploration of God in the light of the philosophy o f the Good as self-diffusive is 
common in much medieval theology.
303 Peter Abelard (1079-1142) had attempted a similar line of thought in relation to love, but had 
tried unsuccessfully to reconcile this with the Western emphasis on divine unity as evidenced in An­
selm’s thought. Accordingly he made the creation of other beings by God necessary in order that 
God might express charity. This suggestion was, o f course, unacceptable. See Cowbuxn, Love and  
the Person, 258.
304' See Hill, Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery o f  Salvation, 79.
305 Richard o f Saint Victor, De trinitate 3.14, translation quoted by Hunt, Trinity: Nexus o f  the
Mysteries o f  Christian Faith, 25.
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Richard argues that the process of multiplication does not, however, continue bey­
ond three, since already with three it is perfect and any more would be superfluous. 
On the basis of this analogy, we also find grounds for distinguishing between the 
three persons. Ilia Delio explains Richard’s position thus:
there must be three divine persons: one who is totally gratuitous in love [the 
Father], one who is totally receptive in love [the Spirit], and one who is 
both gratuitous and receptive in love [the Son]. Where there are three divine 
persons in mutual love, there is perfection.306
Let this suffice as a comment on the “mutual love” approach o f Richard of St. 
Victor.
While Richard’s is indeed a “mutual” rather than a “common” love pneumato- 
logy, it raises various questions. It fell to other medieval thinkers, especially within 
the Franciscan tradition such as Alexander of Hales and St Bonaventure (1221— 
1274) to bring to “full intelligibility” Richard’s vision.307 Various issues remain: 
Richard’s argument is highly speculative and possibly rationalistic. It may be guilty 
o f  “crude anthropomorphism.”308 The concern that occupies us here is that it ap­
pears to be insufficiently rooted in scripture. While Coffey appreciates the preced­
ent offered by the Victorine tradition, he is unhappy with Richard’s methodology. 
In his own theology he attempts to argue towards a similar conclusion, drawing 
however not on metaphysical speculation about the “inner life” of God, but on the 
resources set out in Chapters One and Two above, the economy of salvation as me­
diated in the biblical texts interpreted by the church.
With the exception of the Victorine tradition, the mainstream of Western 
thought developed the “common” love perspective. This too, however, underwent 
development. One of the most important developments was the promotion after the
306, Ilia Delio, Simply Bonaventure: An Introduction to His Life, Thought, and Writings, (New 
York: New City Press, 2001), 42—43.
307. Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery o f Salvation, 78. See also Hunt, Trinity: 
Nexus o f the Mysteries of Christian Faith, 26-28. The treatment of John Cowbum of this develop­
ment through the figures of William of Auxerre (+ 1249), Alexander o f Hales (+ 1245), St Bonaven­
ture (1221-1274) and Henry of Ghent (+ 1293), though brief is well focused and helpful. See 
Cowbum, Love and the Person, 259-263.
308 This criticism is made by Von Balthasar, despite sympathy with Richard’s project. See Hunt, 
“Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in Trinitarian Theology,” 200.
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time o f Augustine of the psychological analogies almost to the level o f dogma. In 
that context, it is not surprising that the “mutual love” approach failed to develop 
convincingly: one simply cannot reconcile the interpersonal presuppositions of 
“mutual love” talk with the interpersonal parameters of the psychological analogy.
The eventual affirmation of the mainstream perspective is particularly associ­
ated with St Anselm (1033-1109), in whose writings it is often thought that the 
Western tendency to emphasise the unity o f divine essence reaches its highest point. 
Although Augustine inaugurated the tradition of exploring psychological analogies 
for the Trinity, he himself did not push this attempt as far as did Anselm, who -  in 
Coffey’s words -  “carried the analogy through to its logical conclusion, which 
makes the essential acts of knowledge and love the formal reasons o f the proces­
sions.”309 In the Anselmian form the psychological analogy emerges as a strictly 
mterpersonal one. For Anselm the form al reason o f the second procession is the es­
sential love o f God, that is the self-love of the divine essence.
What o f the position of Thomas in this regard? Coffey devotes the second 
chapter o f his Grace: The Gift o f  the Holy Spirit to a lengthy discussion o f where to 
position Thomas on the matter of the Holy Spirit as “love” in the “ immanent 
Trinity.”310 Although the details o f his intricate argument cannot detain us here, it is 
worth noting the importance that Coffey gives to this discussion. This is not surpris­
ing, given the central position that Thomas of Aquinas occupies in the Western 
theological landscape. Coffey’s observation is that the position normally attributed 
to Thomas, namely that the latter favours the Anselmian tradition and the “essen­
m  See Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 20. Coffey’s reference is to Anselm’s de divin- 
itas essentia monologium 49-51. In speaking here of the “essential” acts o f knowledge and love, 
Anselm is referring to God’s self-knowledge and self-love.
Coffey discusses the use of the terms “essential” and “notional” in Ibid., 16-17. In Thomas’ lan­
guage, the “essential” love is understood as the love that God is: God’s essence. Accordingly, to say 
that the Holy Spirit is “essential love” is to say that the Holy Spirit is the very “love” that God is. 
There is no specific reference here to the “mutual” “love” by which the Father and the Son love each 
other. The term “notional” comes from the technical term “notion,” which is used o f the “proper 
idea by which we know a divine person” (ST I, q. 32 a. 3). “Essential love” pertains to God in God’s 
essence, while “notional love” pertains to our knowledge of the persons. See also Coffey, Deus 
Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 54-55.
310 Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 11-32.
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tial” love approach over the “notional” love approach associated with Richard of St 
Victor is only partly conect It is true, he acknowledges, that in the Summa theolo- 
giae Thomas clearly thinks of the Holy Spirit proceeding by the “essential” rather 
than the “notional” love o f God. Coffey argues, however, that the position o f the 
later Thomas o f the Summa differs from that found in his earlier writings, where the 
Victorine influence is more widely felt. This shift is linked to the increasing dis­
tance that Thomas takes from Richard’s position, and a move towards Anselm’s 
version o f the Augustinian position. One should not invoke Thomas in support of 
the Anselmian tradition without noting this shift in Thomas’ own position.
Recall, at this stage, the statement o f De Margerie, quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter, to the effect that the “mutual love” theology of the Holy Spirit is 
peacefully held by the whole church. Thus far in this chapter I have argued that the 
Western tradition does not hold its “mutual love” pneumatology with anything like 
the tranquillity that De Margerie suggests. I have indicated two barriers to the de­
velopment of a properly “mutual love” approach to the Holy Spirit. The first was 
methodological: attempts to elaborate an account o f  the Holy Spirit as “mutual 
love” have been largely expressed in speculative terms, terms that no longer hold 
the power to convince that they once did, given the demise o f  the “classical” culture 
that supported them.311 The second barrier is more systematic in nature: the need to 
guarantee the oneness of God.312
5il On the passage from a “classicist” to a “modem” culture see Bernard Lonergan, “Belief: 
Today’s Issue,” in A Second Collection: Papers By Bernard Lonergan, S.J, ed. William F J .  Ryan 
and Bernard J. Tyrell, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974). The metaphysical framework as­
sumed by thinkers such as Richard can no longer be assumed by contemporary readers for whom, as 
Lonergan argues, empirical and historical criteria are primary.
312 Rahner objects that “mutual love” implies two acts, and as such undermines divine unity. See 
Rahner, The Trinity, 48. Coffey believes that part o f the response to this objection lies in some ver­
sion of Lonergan’s position that the one divine consciousness exists in a triple mode, and that each 
of the three subjects thus implied must in some way be self-conscious, so that the one divine con­
sciousness exists as three self-conscious subjects. On this see Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, 289. 
Coffey offers the terminology of three “relative” subjects. On this matter, see his Coffey, Deus 
Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 58-60; Coffey, Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You 
Believed?: Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology, 48—49.
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With respect to this second barrier there is, according to Coffey, a certain dyn­
amism within the Western tradition towards what the elaboration o f a properly 
“mutual” love theology o f the Holy Spirit. In turning to this matter we comment 
now, in conclusion, on the first word of this chapter’s title: the “towards.”
7. The Filioque between “Essentialism” and
“Personalism”
The history outlined above, dominated as it is by a “common love” approach 
to the Holy Spirit but with hints of a “mutual love” approach is not, for Coffey, the 
story o f an irresolvable tension. There is already a dynamism in this history towards 
the resolution of this tension. He fmds evidence o f this dynamism, curiously, in the 
filioque  theology of the West. This dynamic thrust towards a “mutual love” ap­
proach to the Holy Spirit is tending in our time towards an important step forward. 
Coffey’s pneumatology attempts to identify this dynamic thrust and show where it 
leads.
Coffey imagines the range of ways in which the theological tradition has inter­
preted the Holy Spirit as love as being arrayed along a scale that moves from “es- 
sentialist” to “personalist.” The "common love” approach discussed above corres­
ponds to an “essentialist” view. This means that the “love” in question is the 
essential love o f God. The “mutual love” approach, at the other end o f this scale, 
may be called “personalist.” It proceeds from the distinct persons o f Father and 
Son, rather than from the divine essence as such.313 The dynamic is from  “essential-
313 There is no direct reference here to the philosophical school of “personalism.” It might be 
noted, however, that Coffey does engage with the strengths and weaknesses of “personalism” in the 
ordinary sense elsewhere. The stimulus for this was the mid-twentieth century debate about whether 
“personalism” in a more general sense might offer theology resources that could replace those 
formerly offered by scholasticism. On this distinct question, Coffey wishes to embrace the new pos­
sibilities offered by personalism, without jettisoning the advantages of clarity and rigour offered by 
the scholastic heritage. See Coffey, “The Gift o f the Holy Spirit,” 204—205; Coffey, Grace: The Gift 
of the Holy Spirit, 49-53. This topic is not of direct interest to this study, but it does offer a further 
illustration of Coffey’s catholic instincts.
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ism” to “personalism,” or, to express it in other terms, from  “descending” theology 
towards “ascending” theology. Coffey sees the filioque  as occupying a middle posi­
tion between these “essentialist” and “personalist” approaches.
In order to situate Coffey’s thought on this matter a few comments on the 
Eastern and Western approaches to the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit will be 
helpful.314 Coffey points out that beneath the important differences between the 
Eastern and the Western approaches to the eternal procession lies a common set of 
theological preoccupations that he portrays as the classical project o f “descending” 
theology. The master question that characterises this classical project, in both its 
Eastern and Western forms, is the question o f how one God can be three persons. 
Thus, in both the Eastern and the Western traditions the common questions in rela­
tion to the Holy Spirit are (1) how does the Holy Spirit proceed? and (2) how are 
we to account for the distinctness between the Son and the Holy Spirit? The distinc­
tion between Eastern and Western traditions lies not in the questions but in the re­
sponses to those questions. The resolution that Coffey seeks, as Chapter Five below 
will illustrate, lies in a redefinition of the questions: of itself “descending” theology 
cannot be expected to resolve these matters.
In the meantime, the East and the West answer the questions o f “descending” 
theology differently. As we have seen above, the Western approach develops the 
idea of the Holy Spirit proceeding as “love,” with specific interest in the “love” that 
is common to the Father and the Son, an eternal “gift” given in the economy of sal­
vation. Both Father and Son share this “love,” that tradition speaks of the Holy
314 What is dealt with in this chapter is not so much the filioque issue in itself, but the relation to 
this to the Holy Spirit as love theme. The final chapter will return more specifically to the debated 
question o f the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit.
Coffey’s reading of the history of the debates between East and West over the procession o f the 
Holy Spirit as a history of dynamic development along more or less fruitful paths is evident in an 
early form in Ibid., 7-8.
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Spirit as proceeding from the Father and  the Son. The filioque tradition attempts to 
answer both questions of classical “descending” theology mentioned above by ar­
guing that the Holy Spirit proceeds as love from the Father and the Son.
The Eastern tradition adopted a different approach to answering the questions 
defined above as the questions of “descending” theology. The Eastern approach has 
been shaped by two cornerstones: (1) the belief that the Holy Spirit was sent from 
the Father through the Son and (2) Photian monopatrism.
The first o f these is known to the Latin tradition as the per filium, and de­
veloped independently of the line of development that led to the Western filioque. 
In responding to the question of the eternal origin o f the Holy Spirit and that of the 
distinction between the origin of the Holy Spirit and that o f the Son, the Eastern tra­
dition developed the position that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through 
the Son. Following up on hints in Origen,315 the Cappadocians and the Eastern tra­
dition in general make some tentative steps that culminate in John Damascene’s 
idea o f the procession of the Spirit through the Son.316 John o f Damascus writes in 
D eF ide Orthodoxa 1.12:
But the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father but the Spirit of the Father as 
proceeding from the Father. For there is no impulse without Spirit. And we 
speak also of the Spirit of the Son, not as through proceeding from Him, but 
as proceeding through Him from the Father. For the Father alone is cause.
The phrase “through the Son” was used by Patriarch Tarasius at the Council of 
Nicaea (787).317
315 Ibid., 6.
316 Coffey believes that the Cappadocians appropriate Origen’s idea without accepting its implicit 
subordinationism.
317 Methodologically, Coffey believes that there is a problem with the way in which the issue is 
framed in Eastern theology. The problem, as he sees it, is that Eastern thought fails to update its un­
derstanding of the principle of unity in God after Nicaea. Unlike the Western tradition, for which the 
unity of God is more directly guided by the Nicene homoousios, the Eastern tradition continues to 
identify principle o f unity with the Father, as was the scriptural usage. For Coffey, this tendency of 
the Eastern theological tradition represents something of a confusion. Thus he writes,
Methodologically, the distinction of persons is its end point, not its starting point. It follows 
from this that in the economic Trinity it is not the Father who is to be equated with Yahweh 
of the Old Testament. Rather it is God who is to be thus equated, God who differentiates 
out into Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and this despite the fact that in the New Testament
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An important difference between this position and that enunciated in the West 
is that in the Eastern tradition the per filium  describes what happens in the economy 
o f salvation only. It is not held to reflect the eternal “procession” of the Holy Spirit. 
The reason for this reluctance to correlate the mission of the Spirit from the Father 
per filium  with the eternal procession of the Spirit and the Son is probably found in 
the ongoing Eastern struggles against a subordination not just o f the Son to the 
Father, but also o f the Holy Spirit to the Son.318 Sensitivity to this danger led East­
ern theology consciously to limit the correspondence between the economic co­
sending of the Spirit by the Father and the Son and the eternal procession of the 
Spirit, lest this lead to a subordination o f the Spirit to the Son. The per filium  is, for 
this reason, limited to the economy of salvation.319
the word “God” nearly always refers to the Father.
See Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 47—48.
On the question of how the Holy Spirit was to be distinguished from the Son, the Eastern tradition 
pointed to the fact that while the Son is generated, the Holy Spirit proceeds. Both Son and Holy 
Spirit proceed (to use the generic Western sense of “proceed”) immediately from the Father.
Here we see Coffey adopting an approach analogous to the one that he took in relation to the term 
“Holy Spirit” in the bible. The literal meaning o f the biblical text is not the only meaning. Theolo­
gical development within the church clarifies the meaning o f these texts even when it goes beyond 
their literal meaning. The biblical text remains criteriological inasmuch as it is the basis upon which 
theological development takes place, and such development must show itself to be rooted in the bib­
lical texts. Coffey, however, rejects any fundamentalist or archaist approaches to the biblical texts. 
On this see also Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 8. See also Coffey, “Mary, Prototype of 
Salvation,” 95.
3I8' The Pneumatomachian tendency is not found in the West.
319 See Coffey, “The Roman ‘Clarification’ o f the Doctrine of the Filioque,” 11-12. For this reas­
on, the per filium could not be expected to ascend from statements about the economy to statement 
about the eternal Trinity.
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Attempts to show some degree o f equivalence between this position and the 
Western filioque are usually overstated.320 Coffey recognises this and does not fol­
low those Western thinkers who see in it a basis for arguing for a proto -filioque 
theology in the East.
The second cornerstone o f Eastern thought about the eternal origin of the Holy 
Spirit is Photian monopatrism.321 This is the doctrine that the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from the Father alone. Photius, the 9th century patriarch of Constantinople took is­
sue with the filioque especially in 867. The word “alone,” is not found in the teach­
ing o f the Council of Constantinople, which also fails to mention any relation 
between the eternal procession of the Spirit and the Son. The Photian approach, 
despite its claims to represent the Eastern tradition as a whole, may be taken as a 
development within that tradition. By stating that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the 
Father alone, the Photian version of the Eastern tradition goes beyond the literal 
meaning o f the Council of Constantinople. Setting aside the unjustified attempt to 
root monopatrism in the Second Ecumenical Council, we should acknowledge the 
validity o f this doctrine’s basic concerns: the need for an account o f the origin of 
the Holy Spirit that respects the primacy o f the Father, one in other words that does
320 Much has been made of the significance of the existence o f a per filium in the Eastern tradition, 
and it formed an important part of the basis for the attempted but doomed attempt at reconciliation at 
the Council of Florence. There are two principal reasons for this failure. Firstly, this phrase from the 
Damascene is not as typical of the Eastern tradition as has sometimes been supposed. See W.F1. 
Principe, “Filioque,” in Encyclopedia of Early Christianity, ed. E. Ferguson, (New York and 
London: Garland, 1997), 348. Secondly, the per filium describes the sending of the Holy Spirit. It is 
thought not to apply to the matter of the eternal procession o f the Holy Spirit.
Attempts such as that at the Council of Florence to make it equivalent to the filioque were never 
likely to command assent. Notwithstanding the above, contemporary Western attempts to work out 
an accommodation o f the filioque with the Eastern tradition continue to hinge on the per filium. The 
1995 Vatican “Clarification” goes so far as to suggest that the per filium “must serve for the continu­
ation o f the current theological dialogue between Catholic and Orthodox.”
In my view, the insistence of some Western theologians on this formula as a path towards reconcili­
ation is extremely unhelpful. It assumes that the per filium is doctrine, which it is not. It assumes that 
the per filium is an incipient filioque, despite the protests of Eastern theologians who fail to recogn­
ise it as such. A helpful step in dialogue, one would think, is to recognise where difficulties lie, 
rather than simply to insist that they do not exist.
321 See Markos A Orphanos, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit According to Certain Later Greek 
Fathers,” in Spirit o f God, Spirit of Christ: Ecumenical Reflections on the Filioque Controversy, 
Faith and Order Papers No. 103 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981).
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not confuse the Father and Son. If  the filioque  indeed damages this principle then it 
will never be accepted, even as an instance o f “reconciled diversity”322 by the East­
ern tradition.323
For current purposes, the important observation is that both the Western 
filioque, and  the Eastern per filium  represent fruits o f what Coffey calls “descend­
ing” theology: both work from divine unity towards the distinction o f trinitarian 
persons. For Coffey, the fact that both Eastern and Western traditions approach this 
matter from the point of view of descending theology means that both are likely to 
fail. Neither can reach the comprehensive point o f view that is available when one 
brings the descending theology into dialogue with the ascending theology.324 How 
Coffey proposes to do this is considered in Chapter Five. In the meantime, there is 
something to be learned from the filioque about the dynamic tendency towards the 
personalist approach to the Holy Spirit as love referred to above.
Given the limitation, as Coffey sees it, o f operating within the framework of a 
“descending” theology, he nevertheless believes that the Western tradition moves a 
step beyond what is found in the Eastern tradition, a step in the right direction. Un­
like the Eastern tradition that identified the Father as the principle by which we un­
derstand divine unity, the Western tradition shows greater clarity in its acceptance 
o f the homoousios as the basis of such unity.
Following the argument that the Father and Son are one in all, except that the 
Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father, Coffey believes that the Western 
tradition is correct in concluding that the Father and the Son must be one in the di­
vine operation o f breathing forth the Holy Spirit.325 The filioque  is not, however,
322 The term “reconciled diversity” was introduced into ecumenical conversation by Harding Mey­
er and Lukas Vischer during the WCC Faith and Order convention o f 1974.
323- In 1982, Coffey accepted Garrigues’ view that the filioque might be considered a theologou- 
menon in the West, as might “monopatrism” in the East. See Coffey, “The Teaching of the 
Constantinopolitan Creed on the Holy Spirit,” 72-73. In later writings, Coffey accepts the dogmatic 
force o f the Councils of Lyons and Florence, at least for the West.
324 Coffey’s position has developed on this important point. In his earlier theology he stated, con­
trary to the above that the Western position is comprehensive and includes the per filium logically. 
See Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 7.
325 Coffey subscribes to the doctrines of the Councils of Lyons (1274) and Florence (1439), while
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simply a deduction from the homoousios. It does not imply that the Holy Spirit pro­
ceeds from the divine ousia. If  it did, then the Holy Spirit, who shares the divine 
nature, would also be involved in originating himself. That this was the implication 
o f the filioque  was argued by the filioque’s greatest Eastern opponent, the Patriarch 
Photius. Orphanos summarises the objection:
According to Photius, the Son cannot be considered as a common cause of 
the Holy Spirit’s procession with the Father, because this would imply that 
the procession is a common property of the Father and the Son. Since all 
things common to the Father and the Son are in any case common to the 
Spirit, the Holy Spirit must thus proceed from himself. Even he will be the 
principle of himself and at the same time both cause and caused. Neverthe­
less, Photius says, not without irony, even the myths of the Greeks never 
fabricated such an idea. (De Spiritus Mystagogia, 44, PG 102, 321C).326
The mistake in Photius’ reasoning is that he posits only two possibilities: either the 
Holy Spirit proceeds from the person of the Father, or the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from the homoousios. As Congar expresses it, there is an unjustified dualism in 
Photius’ thinking: either “persons” or “nature.”327 Coffey does not accept the terms 
of this dualism and points out a middle possibility: that the Holy Spirit is originated 
from something shared by the Father and the Son: the vis spiritiva (the power to 
breathe forth the Holy Spirit).328
Coffey adopts the notion of a vis spiritiva from the Western tradition in order 
to show evidence of a dynamic tendency to move from  an “essentialist” towards a 
“personalisf ’ approach to the origin of the Holy Spirit. Offering a heuristic under­
standing o f the term, Coffey situates it as the power to breathe forth the Holy Spirit, 
a power shared by both Father and Son, but something not shared by the Spirit. It is 
not therefore, as one might be prompted to object, a divine person. Coffey, follow­
recognising the limits of their basically “descending” theology. He will argue, however, that the lim­
its implicit in the classical filioque need to be addressed by an “ascending” “mutual love” approach.
326 Orphanos, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit According to Certain Later Greek Fathers,” 23. 
See also Brian Gaybba, The Spirit of Love, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1987), 73-74.
327' Congar, IBelieve in the Holy Spirit, 58.
328 Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 48. Edmund Hill appears to suggest that 
Augustine’s theology leaves us with the Photian impasse, but Thomas’ theology offers one path bey­
ond it by distinguishing the virtus spiritiva from the supposita of the breathing forth. In the former 
Father and Son are one, while in the latter they are “several.” See Hill, Mystery of the Trinity, 114— 
115. The text cited from Thomas is Summa theologiae I, q. 36, a. 4 ad 1. Coffey’s view is that the 
virtus spiritiva is shared by the Father and Son, but not the Spirit. Coffey also refers to this as the 
virtus spirandi. See Coffey, “The Roman ‘Clarification’ of the Doctrine of the Filioque”.
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ing the classical definition of person, is careful to point out that while this vis spirit- 
iva is subsistent (since otherwise the Spirit proceeding would not be subsistent), it 
is not a hypostasis, since it is neither distinct nor incommunicable.329 In point of 
fact, it is communicable, since it is communicated from the Father to the Son. This 
last point is important, since it is precisely in engaging with this fact that Coffey be­
lieves the issue o f the primacy o f the Father can be answered.330
Beyond these points, we need not say much about this vis spiritiva, other than 
to acknowledge its function as a theoretical construct that aims at naming some­
thing communicated from the Father to the Son, but not possessed by the Holy 
Spirit. As such, the idea o f the vis spiritiva, implicit in the filioque is something 
shared not by all three divine persons, in which case it would be essential, but 
something shared by Father and Son.331 Thus, Coffey believes that we can see the 
filioque  as a middle point between the essentialist view introduced above and the 
“personalist” view that Coffey himself will advocate.
8. Conclusion: Mutual Love Pneumatology 
Rooted in the Economy
I have suggested that Coffey imagines the range o f approaches to the Holy 
Spirit as “love” as if  along a scale moving from “essentialist” to “personalist.” The 
filioque  stands as a midway point between these two extremes. In the filioque the 
possibilities o f “descending” theology meet their limit. A properly “mutual love”
329 Coffey, Dens Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 55.
330 This point is taken up in Chapter Five below.
331 Coffey thinks that the attempt to root the filioque in reflections drawn from the psychological 
analogy easily fall into a confusion between the “essential” and the “notional” planes of discourse. 
See Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 26. Although in his 1979 book Coffey attempts to re­
formulate the psychological analogy to accommodate the “notional” level o f discourse, this attempt 
is abandoned in later writings.
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account o f the Holy Spirit must, in Coffey’s theology, rather than beginning with 
the oneness in divine ousia, highlight the “persons” o f the Father and the Son lov­
ing one another. It must be an “ascending theology.”
The grounding that Coffey himself proposes for such an “ascending” “mutual 
love” approach is that set out above in Chapters One and Two, namely the scriptur­
al witness to God’s love of Jesus and Jesus’ love of God (whom he called Father), 
and the scriptural identification o f both o f these loves with the Holy Spirit. Al­
though the biblical texts do not in their literal meaning contain a doctrine o f the 
Trinity, there is a basis here -  in Coffey’s view -  for an inference o f an inner-trinit- 
arian reality, namely that the Holy Spirit is the “mutual love” o f the Father and the 
Son eternally.332 Whether such an inference is possible is addressed in the next 
chapter. In this chapter, we have seen how Western reflection on the Holy Spirit as 
“love” does not usually invoke a properly “mutual” love account, and when it has it 
has failed to offer the kind o f methodological support that would recommend it to 
theology today. I conclude this chapter with a number o f summary observations; 
they will be expanded on in what remains o f this study.
1. Firstly, it will be obvious that in developing this theme, Coffey is taking 
forward the agenda set out in the first two chapters o f this study. In the Fourth Gos­
pel, we saw, the Spirit plays an important role in the life o f Jesus, but one that is fo­
cused on the manifestation of God’s glory in Jesus to ordinary human beings. The 
Spirit is not in that gospel the ointment by which Jesus is the Son and the Christ; Je­
sus is the Son and Christ because he is the Logos Incarnate. In the synoptic gospels,
332 I am not suggesting here that Coffey is unique among recent theologians in trying to draw infer­
ences about the Trinity from the economy of salvation. One statement of the readiness with which 
contemporary theology does this is the following, from McDade:
I f  we ask, ‘what is the relationship between Jesus and the Father?’ then we must answer 
that it is the relationship between the Son and the Father within the Triune life; and corres­
pondingly, if we ask, ‘what is the relationship between the Son and the Father?’ then we 
must answer that it is precisely the relationship between Jesus and the Father. [That...] 
which occurs between Jesus and the Father, through the mediation of the Spirit, [is] the 
proper locus for the articulation of the Trinitarian mystery.
See McDade, “The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery,” 184. Coffey’s work offers a framework for 
systematising the relationship between the “classic” and the “newer” approaches.
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by contrast, Jesus receives the Holy Spirit in an anointing by which he is the Christ, 
and even the beloved Son. We saw that in the post-biblical period, although there 
was some early development of the seeds o f Spirit Christology implied in the syn­
optic gospels, doctrinal concerns led to a preference for Logos Christology, a pref­
erence reinforced by the early church councils.
2. For Coffey the integrity of reception o f the biblical witness is a primary 
concern. In developing the “mutual love” approach to the Holy Spirit one of his 
principal motivations is the attempt to restore the “synoptic” dimension that had 
been obscured in the above process. We have already seen that he wishes to do this 
without excluding the positive benefits associated With. Logos Christology.
3. A third observation is that Coffey holds that the Johannine tendency in the 
classical theological tradition has led to a one-sided interest in “descending” rather 
than “ascending” theology.333 In both Eastern and Western forms of the classical 
theological tradition the question of the Holy Spirit was raised within a firmly “des­
cending” logic, for which the basic question relates to how the distinct persons 
come forth from the divine unity. To this end, the Johannine christology proved to 
be a rich resource. Coffey’s concern is to explore the resources o f the synoptic gos­
pels for the construction of an “ascending” approach to the Trinity.
4. Coffey’s principal argument, as I have presented it, takes the form z/Thesis 
A and  Thesis B then the Holy Spirit is the mutual love o f the Father and the Son in 
the economy of salvation. This depends on the view that the “economic Trinity” re­
veals the “immanent Trinity.” On this view the Holy Spirit should be understood as 
mutual love not just in the economy o f salvation, but also in the immanent Trinity. 
The “mutual” love theory depends not just on the plausibility of Theses A and B,
333 While in contemporary Christology it is sometimes observed that the synoptic gospels present 
us with a more “human” Jesus and the Fourth Gospel presents us with a more “divine” Jesus, in 
Coffey’s theology this is not the primary emphasis.
It is possible, in fact, that such a distinction between a more “human” and a more “divine” Jesus is 
only comprehensible in the light of the church’s classical christological doctrines, such that such a 
distinction cannot be applied directly to the New Testament writings themselves.
1 3 5
but also on the plausibility of an “ascent” from observations about the “economy o f 
salvation” to observations about the “immanent Trinity.” Looking more closely at 
this “ascent” is the business o f the next chapter, to which we now turn.
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4. From Spirit Christology to 
Trinitarian Theology
1. Introduction
In his contribution to a symposium on pneumatology held at Marquette Uni­
versity in April 1998, David Coffey stated that: “Spirit Christology provides our 
best mode o f access to the theology of the Trinity.”334 Two claims are made here. 
The first, to be explored in this chapter, is that Spirit Christology provides a mode 
o f access to the theology of the Trinity. The second, to be explored in the next 
chapter, is that Spirit Christology provides the best mode of access.
The first task of this chapter is to introduce some features of what I am calling 
“classical”335 trinitarian theology.336 From the point o f view of this “classical” trinit­
arian theology, the claim that Spirit Christology might provide a mode of access to 
theology o f the Trinity, never mind the claim that it might provide the best mode of 
access, is open to serious doubt. The purpose of introducing certain features o f the 
“classical” trinitarian tradition is to illustrate how Coffey’s approach respects these,
334 This talk is published as Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” 315.
333 In my usage “classical” does not represent a judgement of value, whether positive or negative. I 
place the word “classical” in inverted commas to indicate caution not about the existence of a clas­
sical tradition, but rather to indicate that the precise theological value of this tradition needs to be 
continually explored and explained. For some authors, the “classical” tradition is itself a criterion of 
right thought, or even orthodoxy, such that any approach that differs in emphasis from the “classic­
al” approach is therefore suspect. Coffey himself prefers to emphasise that alongside significant 
points of contrast, there is a basic dialectical coherence between the classical approach and his own 
that mirrors, among other things, the range of christological positions expressed in the New 
Testament.
336 Although I concentrate on the Western form of this “classical tradition,” many o f the features 
find some degree of correspondence in the Eastern tradition. Philip Cary, for example, would argue 
that the basic structures of the Eastern and Western traditions are identical on the matters discussed 
in this chapter. See Cary, “On Behalf of Classical Trinitarianism: A Critique of Rahner on the 
Trinity”.
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while suggesting ways of addressing some of the important limits that the “classic­
al” tradition would impose on attempts such as his to find a new point of departure 
for trinitarian theology in Spirit Christology.
2. Some Features of the “Classical” 
Approach
We have seen that trinitarian theology emerged in dependence on an increas­
ingly influential Logos Christology.337 This brought both benefits and challenges. 
We saw that in relation to pneumatology it provided the framework for a recogni­
tion o f a distinct personhood o f the Holy Spirit, analogous to that o f the Eternal 
Logos, but also that it manifested a certain weakness inasmuch as it tended to obs­
cure the “ascending” “synoptic” data about the involvement o f the Holy Spirit in 
the coming into existence of Christ.338 Coffey proposes, in contrast, that the biblical 
data suggesting Spirit Christology might serve as an alternative starting point. In a 
sense, then, his is an attempt to return to the bible itself for additional data pertinent 
to trinitarian theology, data that had not attracted particular attention in “classical” 
trinitarian theology.
Direct appeal to the biblical data, such as we find in Coffey’s proposal, runs 
contrary to an interesting feature of the “classical” tradition: that o f limiting direct 
appeal to the bible as source. The background to this lies, perhaps, in the church’s 
struggle against the flourishing of gnostic and other interpretations of Jesus in the 
second and third centuries. Among the strategies employed by the church were two 
kinds o f limitation of access to data about the events o f the economy o f salvation. 
First, there was a suppression of apocryphal accounts o f the story of salvation and 
the teachings o f Jesus and the apostles by means o f the establishment of a canon of 
scripture. Second, more subtly, there was the promotion o f a kind of universal and
337, See above at p, 34f.
338 See above at p.  4 If.
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shared interpretation of the canonical scripture passed down in prayer, sermon, 
creeds and symbols of faith. This traditional interpretation proved consistent 
enough to be invoked by a single name: the régula fide i.339 When the Fathers went 
to the scripture, they went to it not as do historically-minded theologians today; 
they were guided in their readings by a sense that the scripture was to be read with­
in a very particular tradition of interpretation.340 This tendency was fortified when 
the régula fidei interpretations found precise formulations in the official creeds pro­
mulgated by church councils. Contemporary theology, by contrast, as exemplified 
by Coffey’s work, attempts a more complex manoeuvre, one that is not always suc­
cessful. It attempts to begin with the data of historically read scripture and, often 
struggling in the attempt, seeks points o f harmony with the régula fidei f i 1
Neil Ormerod has positioned himself as a defender of the “classical tradition.” 
He draws attention to the distinction between the “classical” theological tradition 
and what he sees as “new” and misplaced theological projects such as that found in 
Coffey. Central to his criticism is the belief that much of contemporary theology 
has fallen into what he regards as the Kantian error o f seeing major statements of 
belief, statements such as those enshrined in the creeds, but also those expressed in 
the major representatives of the Western theological tradition (especially Thomas) 
merely as interpretations. The “Kantian” error is thinking that truth remains inac­
cessible and all that we can work with is the multiple (phenomenal) interpretations
339 See M.E. Williams. "Rule of Faith," in New Catholic Encyclopedia: Volume 12: Ref -  Sep. 
Ed.Berard Marthaler. Detroit: Thompson Gale, 2003
340 On the use of the regula fidei and its relationship with scripture in Irenaeus and Tertullian see 
Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 36-41. Coffey makes an interesting reference to the judgement of 
Congar “in the primitive Church Scripture was not used for first conversion but only to strengthen 
and deepen faith,” and that of Newman that “The sacred text was never intended to teach doctrine, 
but only to prove it, and if we would leam doctrine, we must have recourse to formularies o f the 
Church.” See Coffey, “Congar’s Tradition and Traditions: Thirty Years on,” 58.
341 This increases the likelihood that theologians will arrive at positions difficult to reconcile with 
the regula fidei. Among those whose theology leads them to positions at variance with the regula 
fidei I would include, for example, the “post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists” discussed above. 
Among those who arrive at positions different from, not necessarily at variance with, the regula 
fidei, I would include theologians like Coffey who allow for the possibility that “new” data might be 
retrieved from “new” readings of the scriptures. Such independence in interpretation was not charac­
teristic of the Fathers of the Church, or -  even -  fourth and fifth century “heretics” (most of whom 
devoted considerable effort to showing that theirs was the traditional interpretation of scripture).
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of truth. This “error” is potentiated, Ormerod holds, in an intellectual climate enam­
oured by the promises of historical research. The multiplication of historical studies 
o f ancient texts tends to train the attention of theologians away from the important 
task of finding the truth of doctrinal and theological assertions towards the distrac­
tion of ever better interpretations of historical data. Ormerod urges a return by sys­
tematic theology to its principal task: the understanding o f theological truth.3,42
In the above, Ormerod suggests a very close relation between systematic theo­
logy and the “classical theology.” The concern of systematic theology, in this ac­
count, is the exploration of the intelligibility of the church’s trinitarian faith as ex­
pressed in the regula fidei, in the creeds and in the major representatives of the 
theological tradition. If this is so, it will not be surprising to find that systematic 
theology is called to devote itself to the issues o f “descending” theology, since 
these were the issues of the “classical” tradition. It will not want to explore the im­
pact o f Spirit Christology or of the “ascending” biblical data, precisely because 
these are new.
Coffey’s theology, in contrast, without denying the validity or fruitfulness of 
the “classical” theological tradition, argues that the New Testament when read in its 
entirety calls for another set of questions alongside this first set o f questions: the 
questions o f what he calls “ascending” theology. Before looking at how he devel­
ops his position on this matter, it is best to devote more attention to particular 
cornerstones o f the “classical” trinitarian approach: the principle o f “common act­
ion,” the strategy o f “appropriations,” and the place o f the “psychological analogy.”
In the Western form of the “classical” tradition, the solution to the question of 
the distinction of the divine persons that gained ground in the theological tradition 
of West was, as stated, built on the Augustinian idea that the persons were to be dis­
342 For Ormerod, the true task of “systematic theology,” namely the understanding of theological 
truth, has been best expressed in recent times by Bernard Lonergan and, in dependence on the latter, 
by Robert Doran. See especially Chapter One o f Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western 
Tradition. See also Ormerod, “What is the Task of Systematic Theology?”; Ormerod, “Questio 
Disputata: Two Points Or Four? -  Rahner and Lonergan on Trinity, Incarnation, Grace, and Beatific 
Vision”; Ormerod, “The Goal of Systematic Theology”.
1 4 0
tinguished by their relations.343 These relations, however, as the previous chapter ar­
gued, were understood not by any direct appeal to the data o f the economy of salva­
tion, but rather in the more rarified terms offered by the theology o f the immanent 
Trinity. “Paternity,” “generation,” “passive” and “active” spiration, the terms with 
which these relations are named do, o f course, have scriptural basis. That basis is 
sought especially, however, in the names “Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit,” and 
not so much in the narrative elements contained in the New Testament. It was, ac­
cordingly, by appeal to an idea of mutually opposed relations inferred from the 
names, rather than from the story of Jesus as such, that the divine persons were 
understood to be distinct.
A standard statement of this Western approach to the distinction o f divine per­
sons points us to the way in which the distinction o f divine persons was understood 
without reference to the economy of salvation. This statement is in Deo omnia sunt 
unum ubi non obviat relationis o p p o sitio n  According to this axiom, the only 
grounds for distinguishing the divine persons was the opposition of relationships. 
As this axiom makes clear, this opposition o f relationship was not, however, the op-
343 See above at p. 118.
344, This is the formulation of the Council of Florence’s Decree for the Copts (1442). See DS 1330, 
ND 326. The principle itself is often attributed to St. Anselm. See Deprocessione Spiritus Sancti, 1. 
Anselm’s own formulation is more balanced. Anselm wrote:
Thus, the oneness never loses its own consequence in a case where no opposition of rela­
tion stands against it; and the relation does not lose what belongs to it except in the case 
where the inseparable oneness stands against it.
An English translation is available in Anselm of Canterbury, Complete Philosophical and 
Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, brans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, 
(Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000).
It was the Council o f Florence’s version, however, that prevailed. Edmund Fortman says that it 
“seems to be o f defined faith.” Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the 
Trinity, 229. On a hermeneutical point, of interest to trinitarian theology, Coffey points out that the 
desire o f the Council of Florence to discourage tritheism lay behind the one-sided emphasis in this 
formulation. In his judgement, it would be “unwarranted to generalize from this by saying that in all 
circumstances this emphasis has to be maintained.” Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 9.
Karl Rahner, and Coffey following him, cannot simply ignore this axiom, but they would like to of­
fer an important nuance to its application. See Rahner, The Trinity, 25. According to Cary, what 
Rahner does is “call into question the use that the Latin tradition has made of the rule and the im­
plications that have been drawn from it.” See Cary, “On Behalf o f Classical Trinitarianism: A 
Critique of Rahner on the Trinity”. This is a fair way of stating the issue in relation not just to 
Rahner but also to Coffey.
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position of relationship manifest in the story of salvation. Father and Son were dis­
tinguished by “paternity” and “generation” rather than by what is learned o f the re­
lationship of God and Son from the story of Jesus in the scriptures.345 The life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus did not offer the grounds for distinguishing the per­
sons: the grounds for such distinctions were understood to be “strictly inner-trinit­
arian,”346 by which we can understand “not economic.”
The tendency towards developing trinitarian theology without direct reference 
to the data o f the economy of salvation was historically fortified by the need to en­
sure that Christian theology maintained a clearly monotheistic form. If the three di­
vine persons are of the same being (homoousios), then, the “classical” tradition de­
duced, that they must be one in their work. This conviction was given standard 
formulation in the axiom, omnia opera Trinitatis sunt indivisa: the works of God ad  
extra are undivided or inseparable. This position represents a laudable extension of 
the thinking manifest in the previous axiom. The joint impact of these two axioms 
on the method o f trinitarian theology was that they confirmed the tendency already 
found in Augustine to develop trinitarian theology without direct appeal to the eco­
nomy o f salvation.347 God does not, in brief, in the “classical view” communicate 
the grounds o f personal distinction with the world.348
That said, Christians do in fact attribute certain works more spontaneously to 
one or other particular divine person. The name “Creator” is often given the Father, 
“Redeemer” to the Son and “Sanctifier” to the Holy Spirit. This tendency is even
345 See note 280 on p. 113 above for Ormerod’s explicit denial of the value of the relationship of Je­
sus to God in arriving at an understanding of the Son-Father relationship.
346 Coffey, “A Proper Mission of the Holy Spirit,” 229. An important point to note here is that 
Coffey accepts the truth of this position of the “classical” tradition, but offers a framework for tran­
scending its apparent limitations. This framework is more fully presented in the next chapter.
347 See p. 119 above.
348 Coffey, again, accepts these positions, but points to important limits in their application. He 
agrees that the works of God ad extra should be thought of as undivided, and he agrees that the 
grounds for distinguishing the divine persons should be thought of as “strictly inner-trinitarian.” His 
argument, in brief, is that the “classical” tradition of trinitarian thought in its Western form mis­
takenly applies these axioms in the case of the “Incarnation” and the case o f “grace.” These are not, 
he argues, simply works of God ad extra. They are instead the two modalities of the self-communic- 
ation of God, proper activities o f the second and third divine persons in the world.
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found, for example, in the creeds. In the Nicene creed, we find the formulation “we 
believe in One God, the Father, the Almighty, maker o f heaven and earth, of all that 
is, seen and unseen.”349 Strictly speaking, however, according to the “classical” trin­
itarian tradition, we should not speak o f one particular person as Creator if by this 
we mean to exclude the other divine persons.350 The “classical” tradition negotiated 
this impasse by explaining that while strictly speaking all three persons are equally 
Creator, there is a certain appropriateness in speaking o f the Father as Creator.351 
The basis for this “appropriateness” is sought in a deduction from an inner-trinitari­
an argument: in the Trinity, the Father is understood as source (am a) of the other 
divine persons, the generator of the Son and spirator o f the Holy Spirit.352 ft is 
therefore “appropriate” to think of the Father as Creator since in discourse about the 
immanent Trinity it is from the Father that the other persons are said to come forth. 
On this basis, according to the classical Western tradition, we may appropriate cre­
ative activity to the Father, as long as we do so in ways that at the same time affirm 
the equal involvement of the other persons. By the same procedure, the Western 
tradition appropriated certain characteristics to the Son and the Spirit.353
349 Interestingly, of course, the naming of the Father is preceded with the term “One God,”
350 Indeed scripture speaks not just of creation by God (in the biblical sense) but also of the in­
volvement of Son-Wisdom and Spirit in creation (though admittedly not in the context of a de­
veloped Trinitarian understanding). The involvement of Son and Spirit in creation is also found in 
the Creed: of the Son it says “by whom all things were made,” and of the Spirit it says “Giver of 
Life.”
351 A general introduction to the idea o f “appropriation” can be had from J.B. Endres, 
“Appropriation,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia: Volume 1: A -A zt, ed. Berard Marthalar, (Detroit: 
Thompson Gale, 2003). Classic texts explaining the operation o f appropriation are found in Thomas’ 
De veritate 7.3 (see note below) and Summa theologiae I q. 39 a. 7.
332 Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 8-9.
3S3 In Thomas’ De veritate 7.3 we read:
To appropriate means nothing else than to contract something common, making it some­
thing proper. Now, what is common to the entire Trinity cannot be appropriated to a single 
Person on the grounds that this belongs more to this Person than it does to another. Such an 
action would deny the equality of the Persons. However, appropriation may be made on the 
grounds that what is common nevertheless has a greater resemblance to what is proper to 
one person than it has to what is proper to another. For example, goodness resembles what 
is proper to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, because goodness is the object of love,
and so is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Again, power is appropriated to the Father be­
cause power as such is a principle, and being the principle o f all divinity is proper to the 
Father. Similarly, wisdom is appropriated to the Son, because it resembles what is proper to 
the Son, since the Son proceeds from the Father as His Word, and word describes an intel-
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We fmd in the development of this strategy evidence of the very different 
thought-worlds of pre-modem and contemporary theology.354 For pre-modem 
thinkers the question arose: if the works o f God ad extra are undivided, how should 
we read biblical references to Jesus and Spirit? For contemporary theology a rather 
different issue is prominent: namely the grounds on which we can know distinct di­
vine persons in the first place. To take the example o f the Holy Spirit: does the doc­
trine o f common action outlined above imply that functions and actions attributed 
to the Holy Spirit in the scripture are in fact the common actions o f all three divine 
persons? If it does, in our time the question arises, what basis do we have for distin­
guishing the Holy Spirit from the other two divine persons? What inner-trinitarian 
reality grounds our appropriations to the Holy Spirit?355
Such a line of questioning would not have been so pressing for pre-modem 
generations. Before the advent of our historically-minded culture the question o f 
how we know that God is both one and three, that God is Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit would have been resolved on the basis o f a certain understanding of revela­
tion that allowed that passages like Matthew 28:19 reveal the Trinity, and the valid­
ity of such a reading of scripture would have been confirmed by the regula fidei and 
ultimately by the creeds.
In “pre-modem” period, the doctrine of the Trinity was a basic datum, the 
“classical” style o f trinitarian theology was uncontested and the issue of the plaus­
ibility of trinitarian belief simply did not arise. From this comparatively tranquil
lectual procession.
Note that the grounds for appropriation are drawn not from the economy of salvation but from the 
properties of the divine persons in the “immanent Trinity.”
354 The word “pre-modem” here does not refer to the period before the “modem” period, which is 
itself is notoriously difficult to date. It refers to the period before the impact of modem historical­
mindedness was felt in theology. In Catholic theology this impact might not have been fully felt un­
til after the Second Vatican Council. Perhaps the promulgation of Dei Verbum had the greatest im­
pact on introducing such “modem” thinking into Catholic theology, through its general theology of 
revelation and its cautious acceptance of the historical-critical method in biblical studies.
355 Coffey expands on this line of questioning especially in his 2005 Pére Marquette lecture. If  such 
questions are not faced, then the possibility of pneumatology and therefore of trinitarian discourse in 
any straightforward sense is endangered.
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starting point the issue of how to deal with the question o f reconciling biblical ref­
erences to the apparently distinctive actions o f the Son and the Spirit with the doc­
trine o f the undivided common action o f God ad extra was resolved with recourse 
to the strategy o f appropriations. Although this was originally used to allow for the 
appropriation o f one or other essential properties o f God, such as power or wisdom, 
to particular divine persons, its application was extended to the common “work” of 
God. Thus, the Incarnation is held to be the common work of the whole Trinity, but 
it is appropriated to the Son in particular, because it is the Son alone who became 
incarnate. By means of this strategy, the Western356 tradition was able, without pla­
cing itself in direct conflict with the principle of common action o f the triune God 
ad  extra, cautiously to draw from the biblical evidence certain ways o f speaking of 
particular divine persons. This allowed for the attribution of certain qualities or 
activities to one or other o f the divine persons while at the same time insisting that 
these qualities were nonetheless equally present in all three o f the divine persons, 
and this work was carried out by all three inseparably.
Karl Rahner is among the recent theologians who challenge the Western tradi­
tion’s suspected over-reliance on this strategy of appropriations. The particular fo­
cus of his attention was on the apparent use o f this strategy in relation to the Incarn­
ation. While the tradition was clear that it was in fact the Logos who became 
incarnate, the opinion of Thomas that any o f the divine persons might have become 
incarnate357 was taken by Rahner as an instance o f too extensive a use of this line of
356 According to Lewis Ayres, the interpretation of the scriptural data about the divine persons in 
the light of the doctrine of appropriation should be regarded as a pro-Nicene strategy, rather than a 
distinctively Augustinian or Western one. See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to 
Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, 297 .1 continue, nevertheless, to speak of the Western tradi­
tion since it is with this tradition that Coffey develops his position.
357 The article that Rahner refers to is Summa theologiae III, q. 3 a. 5. Rahner appears to misunder­
stand Thomas’ answer, since Thomas is in that question addressing the issue of the “power” of each 
o f the divine persons to assume a human nature. This power of God is shared by each of the divine 
person. If he had answered that only the Son had the power to assume a human nature, then he 
would have implied that there was a difference between the power o f the Son and that of the other 
two divine persons. This would then imply a degree of tritheism or partition in God, conclusions un­
acceptable to Thomas. The Dominican does not, however, doubt that it was in fact the Logos, and 
not the Father or the Holy Spirit, who became incarnate, as Rahner’s argument appears to suggest.
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argument.358 For Rahner, the logic of appropriations tended to undermine the kind 
o f correspondence between the “economic Trinity” and the “immanent Trinity” that 
Rafmer’s own theology was to propose. David Coffey mounts an analogous exer­
cise in relation to the application of appropriation to the Holy Spirit. Coffey’s argu­
ment is that the strategy of appropriations is ultimately inadequate to the task o f jus­
tifying knowledge of the Holy Spirit, because the “classical” theology of the 
“immanent Trinity” does not yield grounds for the appropriation o f any particular 
function to the Holy Spirit.359
A third feature of the Western tradition’s “classical” theology, mentioned 
above, is its adoption and development o f the “psychological analogy.”360 This too 
emerged as a response to the what Coffey identifies as the typical question of “des­
cending” theology: the question of how one God can be three persons. In search of 
an analogy for the oneness and threeness o f God, Augustine, on the basis o f the 
scriptural idea o f the human being created in the image and likeness of God 
presented an innovative exploration of the inner human being. While it was pro­
posed by Augustine as an “aid to understanding,” in later generations it rose in 
status to the point of becoming “virtually a point o f faith in medieval thought.”361 
Developed and refined by successive generations, especially by Thomas of Aquinas 
and, in recent times, Bernard Lonergan, the psychological analogy has proved itself 
as the most effective Western attempt at addressing the specific question o f “des­
358 Philip Caiy argues that Rahner here misunderstands what the doctrine of appropriations implies 
for the understanding of the Incarnation. In Cary’s view, the classical doctrine holds that the Incarn­
ation is the work of the three divine persons working inseparably, such that one can not say that the 
Incarnation is the work of the Son separate from the Father and the Holy Spirit. This does not mean, 
however, that we simply do not know which of the three divine persons became incarnate. It is a 
matter o f faith that it was the Eternal Logos that did in fact become incarnate. For Cary, Rahner con­
fuses the common “work” and the distinct “roles” of the three in the economy. See Cary, “On Behalf 
of Classical Trinitarianism: A Critique of Rahner on the Trinity,” especially p. 371.
359 For discussion of the epistemological conundrum that overuse o f the strategy of appropriations 
causes for contemporary theology see Coffey, Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: 
Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology, 10-42.
360 See p. 119f above. It is not necessary to attempt a reconstruction of the emergence and develop­
ment o f the psychological analogy for the Trinity in the Western tradition here. For a recent over­
view, see Peter Drilling, “The Psychological Analogy of the Trinity: Augustine, Aquinas, and 
Lonergan,” Irish Theological Quarterly 71, (2006): 320-337.
361 Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit, 79.
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cending” theology.362 Despite the erosion o f its position in recent theology, it con­
tinues to exert a powerful influence on at least some contemporary theologians. For 
current purposes, the point to note is that the psychological analogy offered the 
“classical” tradition an approach to the mystery o f the Trinity that depends on a re­
markably limited range of biblical texts, and its reliance on an /«impersonal ana­
logy means that it is structurally closed to any appeal to the interpersonal dynamics 
manifest in the story of Jesus.
As we will see there is in Coffey’s work a cautious but sustained challenge to 
all o f these features of the “classical” approach. The principles o f common action 
and the strategy o f appropriations are judged valid, but o f limited use in explaining 
the real presence of Son and Spirit in the economy of salvation. The psychological 
analogy is, in Coffey’s theology said to be o f benefit to “descending” theology 
only. The context for the emergence o f Coffey’s proposal is clearly set by Karl 
Rahner’s Grundaxiom, but as we will now see, Coffey suggests some important 
modifications to Rahner’s axiom.
3. “New” Approaches
At the outset o f this chapter, Coffey is quoted as stating that Spirit Christology 
offers a privileged “mode of access” for trinitarian theology. As should be clear 
from Chapters One and Two above, such a Spirit Christology is drawn from biblical 
data about Jesus and the Spirit in the economy of salvation. The question that arises 
in view o f the limits that the “classical” trinitarian theology places on appeal to the 
economy of salvation, is whether, Spirit Christology should be considered a “mode 
of access” at all. In view of the “descending” form of the “classical” statements
362 In the previous chapter, we already noted one feature of this analogy, namely that it is intrasub- 
jective rather than ¡«¿ersubjective. For defenders of the hegemony of this approach to the Trinity this 
feature, far from being a deficit is a strength, inasmuch as this feature of the psychological analogy 
provides much clearer support against the tritheist tendency than do iniersubjective analogies. In­
deed, this feature is effectively required by the “descending” form of the question that the “psycho­
logical analogy” sets out to understood, namely: how can one God be three persons.
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about the Trinity, the answer to this question would be negative. From the point of 
view of such theology, Coffey’s theological construction appears, paradoxically, to 
represent a novelty.
Before moving ahead, let us briefly recognise the paradox involved in think­
ing of Coffey’s approach as “novel.”363 The paradox is clear once we remember that 
what Coffey is proposing is not the introduction o f some new source for trinitarian 
theology, but the re-examination of none other than the oldest and original sources 
o f all theology, i.e. the story of salvation, the Christ event, mediated through the 
New Testament.364 Paradoxically, the attempt to use scripture in its integrity as the 
basis of trinitarian theology can appear to sustainers of the ongoing hegemony of 
the “descending” “classical” form of theology to be a “novelty.”
(a) Rahner’s Axiom
In Catholic thought the seminal argument in favour of a return to the “eco­
nomy o f salvation” as the privileged mode of access for trinitarian theology is that 
o f Karl Rahner,365 whose Grundaxiom states that ‘“ economic Trinity’ is the ‘im­
manent Trinity’ and the ‘immanent Trinity’ is the ‘economic Trinity.’”366 Rahner’s 
axiom continues to enjoy prominence in the theological landscape. Much of this
363 Ormerod uses the term “new” of Coffey’s approach to the Trinity, referring both to the discov­
ery of “new and different patterns in the Scriptures taken as data” and in his proposal of a “new” 
trinitarian model with which to understand this “new” data. See Ormerod, “The Goal of Systematic 
Theology,” 47.
364 Coffey is not, of course, alone in this tendency to return to the “economy of salvation” as start­
ing point. Indeed, the general strategy of appealing to the “economy of salvation” as starting point 
has come to be almost the norm in contemporary theology. The point of this presentation is not to 
point out that his project begins with the “economy of salvation” but to explain precisely what this 
means for him and how exactly he goes about presenting and justifying this attempt.
3i5 Rahner was not the first theologian, of course, to consider the relationship between what we 
might say about God in the economy of salvation and God in se. Nancy Dallavalle cites Rahner as 
himself acknowledging doubt as to the exact origin of the Grundaxiom: “We are starting out from 
the proposition that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa. I do not know ex­
actly when and by whom this theological axiom was formulated for the first time.” See Nancy 
Dallavalle, “Revisiting Rahner: On the Theological Status of Trinitarian Theology,” Irish 
Theological Quarterly 63, (1998): 133-150.
366 See Rahner, The Trinity, 22.
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prominence is due to the promise it offers to free trinitarian theology from what 
many understood, agreeing with Rahner’s diagnosis, to be its long “neo-scholastic 
exile.”
The genesis of Rahner’s Grundaxiom is to be sought in his theology o f grace 
and the consequences he draws from this for the doctrine of revelation, but also in 
his christology. In relation to the former, Rahner’s theology of grace, it is especially 
his recovery of the scholastic category o f uncreated grace,367 and his defence of an 
account o f grace in terms of quasi-formal causality, that establishes his confidence 
in an account o f revelation as the self-communication of God.368 Rahner reasons 
that when God acts in the economy, we must hold that such action is the reliable 
self-revelation o f God. Thus, we come to know the tripersonal God directly through 
the economy of salvation, without need for recourse to complicated strategies like 
that o f appropriation. God, Rahner holds, has given Godself so fully in his absolute 
self-communication to the creature that the ‘immanent’ Trinity becomes the Trinity 
o f the ‘economy of salvation.’ In the epistemological order, we can conclude in turn 
that “the Trinity o f salvation that we experience is the immanent Trinity.” God re­
veals Godself fully and reliably: “as trinity o f persons.”369 When Rahner insists, 
against Thomas and others, that only the Logos could have become incarnate, his
367 Karl Rahner, “Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Created Grace,” in Volume 1: 
God, Christ, Mary and Grace, Theological Investigations (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 
1961).
368 This Rahnerian perspective remains decisive in Coffey’s framing of the methodology of trinit­
arian theology. Philip Cary provides a fascinating critique o f what he sees as the particularly modem 
assumptions and concerns that underlie Rahner’s attempt. This critique would, if accepted, apply 
equally well to Coffey. See Cary, “On Behalf of Classical Trinitarianism: A Critique of Rahner on 
the Trinity”. I do not accept Cary’s arguments, but do recommend that the reader consult Cary’s 
article.
369 This and the previous quotation are found in Karl Rahner, “The Concept of Mystery in Catholic 
Theology,” in Volume 4: More Recent Writings, Theological Investigations (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1966), 69. Note that in the first part of this statement there is the assumption that 
the immanent Trinity pre-exists the economic Trinity, and is expressed in it. Here, at least, the dis­
tinction is supposed to be ontological.
149
reasoning is related to the reliability o f God’s self-communication. For Rahner, 
questions about whether any of the divine persons might have become incarnate im­
ply that God’s revelation is somehow deficient as a self-communication.370
Although Rahner’s theology argues for the identity o f the economic and the 
immanent Trinity, it does not thereby deny the value o f the immanent Trinity in 
guaranteeing the transcendence o f God over the economy.371 Rahner wishes to see a 
strong link between the mission of the Logos and the inner-trinitarian existence of 
the Son, which he even goes so far as to express in terms o f necessity.372 The onto­
logy o f the Symbol underpins the entire effort.373
Rahner’s Grundaxiom was welcomed as a breakthrough by much o f the theo­
logical community. The debate it provoked proved a major factor in moving the 
doctrine o f the Trinity back into focus for Catholic theology, much as Karl Barth’s 
theology had done for Protestant theology. More precise evaluation o f its signific­
ance, however, depends greatly on how exactly the terms of the axiom are inter­
preted. Rahner’s exposition of the axiom, alas, left significant areas o f ambiguity.
For current purposes, two areas o f ambiguity in Rahner’s formulation might 
be highlighted. These serve by way of introduction to Coffey’s reformulation of the 
axiom. They relate to the basic elements o f the axiom itself: (1) what should we un­
derstand by the term “economic Trinity”? (2) what should we understand by the 
term “immanent Trinity”? A brief word on each o f these.
370 As noted above, Rahner has mistaken Thomas’ argument here. See above note 358 on p. 145.
371 The need for such protections around the idea of divine transcendence is reflected, for instance, 
in the qualification “quasi” that Rahner appends to the idea of “quasi-formal” causality. It is further 
reflected in Rahner’s approach to “pure nature” where the ongoing value o f this idea is understood 
in terms o f its theoretical value as a “remainder concept” (Restbegriff) guaranteeing the gratuity of 
God’s self-gift.
372, This linking of the immanent being of God to the economy o f salvation appears to threaten the 
doctrine o f God’s immutability. Rahner deals with this objection by means of a distinction between 
changing in God’s divine being, and changing in another. God creates human nature, and the Logos 
assumes this. The changes that take place in the economy, however, are in the creature, and not in 
God’s self.
373 Karl Rahner, “The Theology of the Symbol,” in Volume 4: More Recent Writings, Theological 
Investigations (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966).
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(1) If  the “economic Trinity” is to function as starting point, it would be good 
to know exactly what this starting point is. Is it, for Rahner, the Trinity as we find it 
in the Bible? If it is, then what are we to make o f the concerns of biblical scholars 
about there being a doctrine o f the Trinity in the bible in the first place? What o f the 
lack o f consensus over how to interpret the biblical symbols o f Logos and Spirit. 
Should talk o f the “economic Trinity” be confined to the bible at all? Why not in­
clude the activity of the Son and Spirit as experienced in the church through the 
ages or today?374 The question I highlight here is the difficulty o f the “economic 
Trinity” serving as “starting point” given the obscurity o f its meaning.
(2) Rahner does not intend with his Grundaxiom to abolish the distinction of 
the “immanent Trinity” and the “economic Trinity.” His axiom does not itself, how­
ever, tell us how or why the “immanent Trinity” should be distinguished from the 
“economic Trinity.” What, for instance, does it mean to say that the economic 
Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and vice versa? If all that is meant by the axiom is 
that there is only one Trinity, in recognition o f the fact that the theological distinc­
tion between economic and immanent Trinity might appear to some to refer to two 
separate trinities, then surely none would wish to differ.375 The direct implication,
374 In this way the door can be opened to the broader theological meanings of Tradition. Following 
Möhler, Tradition comes to be seen not just as the outer, but also as the inner life of the Church. 
This inner life is that of the Holy Spirit given at Pentecost and animating the church. When Tradition 
is seen in this way, “all texts, Scripture included, have the character o f witness, though in this cat­
egory Scripture is, of course, uniquely privileged.” See Coffey, “Congar’s Tradition and Traditions: 
Thirty Years on,” 53. If the Holy Spirit truly animates the church, then on what basis is the life of 
the church to be excluded from the term “economic Trinity”?
Coffey thinks that he goes beyond Congar’s position in stating that “[wjhat is handed on in the 
Church from one generation to the next from the time of the Apostles to the fmal consummation is 
not just a body o f doctrine, nor just, as Congar thinks, “the Christian life,” but the Christian mystery 
in its entirety. In what does this mystery consist? Essentially it is the risen Christ himself, who is 
never found on his own but always in union with the Church.” Ibid., 55. If  this is so, then -  to repeat 
the question -  on what basis is the life of the church to be excluded from the term “economic 
Trinity”?
375 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine o f God, 151; Cary, “On Behalf 
o f Classical Trinitarianism: A Critique of Rahner on the Trinity,” 367; Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The 
Doctrine of the Triune God, 14.
Nevertheless, G. Gallagher Brown still fmds the view that the economic and the immanent Trinity 
are “logically and really accounts of the same one God” worth recording as one of the notable ac­
quisitions of recent theology. Quoted in Elizabeth T. Groppe, “Catherine Mowry Lacugna’s 
Contribution to Trinitarian to Theology,” Theological Studies 63, (2002), 734.
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then, must be to insist that the “economic” and the “immanent” Trinity are more 
closely linked than was commonly supposed at the time of the axiom’s formulation. 
What then is the nature of the distinction between the two: is it ontological or 
merely epistemological?376 What in brief, is the “immanent Trinity” and what is its 
function? It appears that as Rahner formulates it, the Grundaxiom leaves the mean­
ing of both its terms unclear.377
(b) Coffey’s Reformulation of Rahner’s Axiom
Coffey shows consistent commitment to some variant of the Grundaxiom ,378 
Because God reveals Godself, and not something different from God, Coffey be­
lieves we can talk about a necessary consistency “of God in his inner being and his
376 Many of the defenders of the classical tradition urge that we should conceive of this distinction 
ontologically. The principal alternative is to think of the distinction in epistemological terms, that is 
to relate it to the ways and limits of theological knowing. Nancy Dallavalle has given eloquent exp­
ression to the importance of the deciding between these alternatives. See Dallavalle, “Revisiting 
Rahner: On the Theological Status of Trinitarian Theology”. For Dallavalle, trinitarian theology has 
always been the “most speculative of systematic claims” and the “most fully theological ‘con­
struct”’(p. 134). As such, the way in which the doctrine of the Trinity is handled provides an import­
ant illustration of the way in which theology in general conceives its role. For Dallavalle, Rahner’s 
approach is less than satisfactory precisely because it conceals an unresolved tension between these 
two approaches to the distinction. She writes:
Rahner rejects the approach of neo-scholasticism, and argues for God as ‘the three-fold’ on 
the basis o f God’s action in the economy of salvation. Yet he also maintains the assertion 
that God remains distinct as eternally, immanently, ‘Trinity,’ and this clash o f a modem ap­
proach with an a priori pre-modem assertion not only occurs within Rahner’s work but also 
is evident in the mixed reception of his axiom identifying the immanent and economic 
Trinity. Rahner seems poised between preserving the ontological grounding for the eco­
nomy, that is the distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity, and pointing out 
that ‘the Trinity’ is a theological construct with no proper content outside of the missions 
of the Son and Spirit, (p. 134)
In effect, she here expresses the key difficulty that many note with Rahner’s Grundaxiom'. the per­
ceived tendency to “downgrade” the doctrine o f the immanent Trinity to the status of theological 
construct, capable only of illustrating and ordering the data of revelation.
377 One author has pithily expressed the difficulty of arriving at a clear interpretation of the 
Grundaxiom as follows: “Rahner’s Rule is an axiom in search of an interpretation.” See Randall 
Rauser, “Rahner’s Rule: An Emperor Without Clothes?,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology (2005), 81.
378' This commitment is stated as early as the beginning of his 1971 article, “The Gift of the Holy 
Spirit” where he states that he gets his conviction that “the ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ 
Trinity” from Rahner’s work, and says that this idea and the associated Rahnerian idea of the self­
communication of God have provided the “immediate impetus” for his article. See Coffey, “The Gift 
of the Holy Spirit,” 205.
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saving intervention in the world.”379 Coffey, however, especially in his later work, 
modifies Rahner’s formulation o f the Grundaxiom, offering a framework better ad­
apted to the task o f trinitarian theology. In brief, in place of the Rahnerian econom­
ic-immanent diad and Rahner’s vice versa, Coffey proposes a three-stage itinerary 
for trinitarian theology with the first stage leading to the second, and the second to 
the third. The sense of the vice versa is more clearly stated as a third stage that goes 
beyond the previous two levels.
It is only in his later writings that Coffey explicitly develops this three-stage 
itinerary. The breakthrough that allows him to reformulate the Grundaxiom came 
from his reading of one aspect of Bernard Lonergan’s thought,380 though Coffey 
finds this not in Lonergan, but in a footnote in his countryman Anthony Kelly’s The 
Trinity o f  Love. In that book, Kelly is discussing the difficulty o f imposing distinc­
tions such as functional and ontological christology and “immanent” and “econom­
ic” on Johannine theology. Kelly writes:
It seems to me that any distinction betw een ontological and functional 
Christology or Trinitarianism , as well as any distinction betw een the “ im­
m anent” and the “economic” is utterly foreign to Johannine theology. The 
later theological use o f  such distinctions [has] a lim ited role and, perhaps, a 
very provisional one against the day o f  a critical Christian realism  able to 
distinguish betw een data, understanding and judgem ent.381
Coffey is unhappy with the first sentence here, but draws our attention to the 
second sentence. The references in Kelly here to “Christian realism” and to the dis-
379 Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 2. One author who has repeatedly criticised 
Coffey’s theology for its use of this principle is Paul Molnar. Molnar, a Catholic, brings a Barthian 
tone to his insistence on the theme of the “freedom of God.” Evidently Molnar thinks that the prin­
ciple o f necessary consistency undermines God’s freedom. This concern will not be shared by many 
Catholic theologians and I propose not to give direct consideration to this point. One should cer­
tainly not draw any parallels between Coffey’s use of “necessary” here and the medieval debate over 
the use o f “necessary reasons” in arguments by Anselm, Richard o f Saint Victor and others. 
Coffey’s point is not rationalist; it relates rather to the credibility of God’s self-revelation. For docu­
mentation on the debate between Molnar and Coffey see Coffey, “In Response to Paul Molnar”; 
Molnar, “Deus Trinitas: Some Dogmatic Implications of David Coffey’s Biblical Approach to the 
Trinity”; Paul Molnar, “Response to David Coffey,” Irish Theological Quarterly 68, (2003): 61-65.
380 Bernard Lonergan, it should be clear, does not represent a particularly significant influence on 
the thought o f David Coffey. In this case, what he accepts from Lonergan is the bare outline of his 
analysis of cognitive structure. Lonergan’s theology of the Trinity is rarely mentioned in Coffey’s 
publications.
381 Anthony Kelly, The Trinity of Love: A Theology of the Christian God, (Wilmington: Michael 
Glazier, 1989), 47.
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tinction of “data,” “understanding” and “judgement” alert Coffey to the influence of 
Bernard Lonergan’s analysis of human cognition.382 Although neither Kelly, nor in­
deed Lonergan himself, saw in this analysis of cognitive structure the seeds of a re­
formulation o f Rahner’s Grundaxiom, Coffey does. In his review of Kelly’s book, 
Coffey writes:
H ere [Kelly] has an exciting point, particularly w hen it is realised that in the 
N ew  Testam ent w e have neither the im m anent nor the econom ic Trinity, 
bu t a doctrine considerably more prim itive than either -  which can be called 
sim ply the biblical doctrine o f the Trinity -  from  w hich the other two doc­
trines were later extrapolated. In this context the “data” w ould be the relev­
an t N ew  Testament affirmations, the biblical doctrine; the “understanding” 
w ould  be the immanent Trinity (the truth o f this is borne out by the actual 
history o f  the developm ent o f  the ecclesiastical doctrine); and the “judge­
m ent,” the statement o f  what actually exists, would be the economic 
Trinity .383
The insight gained here becomes a key structure o f Coffey’s mature trinitarian 
thought. Coffey develops the insight as follows:
1. The first stage in our trinitarian theology is the study o f the data, the biblic­
al witness which remains the principal and criteriological source for trinitarian 
theology.384 This data, he says, should be carefully studied with the best tools 
provided by biblical research, in a way that is open to new insights and not limited 
to those dimensions of the biblical text that commanded the attention of the “clas­
sical” tradition. Thus, if we find that later tradition worked more intensely with the 
Johannine-inspired “descending” model for the procession o f the Son and the Holy 
Spirit, we should not allow this to prejudice our reading o f the data. The New Test­
ament is much more complex than such an emphasis allows, both because the 
Johannine literature itself is not fully expressed by Logos Christology that issued
382 See Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan, vol. 3, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Bernard Lonergan, Collection: 
Papers By Bernard Lonergan, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993-11-10), 205-221.
383 Coffey, “Review of Anthony Kelly, the Trinity of Love: A Theology of the Christian God,” 
231.
334 Coffey correctly acknowledges that a more complete approach to the basic data would include 
other elements: “all our culture, tradition, education, and religious experience.” Coffey, Deus 
Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 18. For the sake of clarity here it is best to focus our atten­
tion on the public and authoritative, and therefore the primary data: the biblical texts.
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from it, and because the Johannine literature is not the only body of theological 
writing in the New Testament and there is no indication in that source that suggests 
that it should attain criteriological value.385
This does not mean that we approach biblical texts with “empty heads.”386 We 
bring our questions, concerns and expectations to the reading o f scripture. Coffey 
shows his awareness of this in his mention of the “communal and personal biases to 
which we are subject” which o f necessity “impose a certain selectivity on our 
choice o f biblical data.”387 We must allow for the inadequacies o f our engagement 
with the text. Nevertheless, each genuine attempt to engage the text should, he ar­
gues, in principle be open to retrieving new dimensions of that text, all of which 
may be added to a “store o f knowledge” such that, even allowing for wrong turns 
and errors o f emphasis, we can still think of our collectively held “knowledge” of 
the biblical doctrine of the Trinity increasing “in a never-ending cycle, through both 
simple advancement and dialectic.”388
Among the questions, concerns and expectations that we can bring to the read­
ing of the biblical texts are those arising from the church’s trinitarian faith. This 
need not mean anachronistically imposing trinitarian shape on the literal meaning 
of scriptural texts. It can mean, however, isolating and identifying certain kinds of 
data as relevant to trinitarian theology. Such data is what Coffey calls the “biblical 
Trinity.” It is clear that in identifying elements in the bible pertinent to the doctrine 
o f the Trinity, one is already engaged in a dialogue between the biblical source of 
all theology and trinitarian theology itself. As such the “biblical Trinity” is the fruit 
o f a dialogue between theology and the bible. While there is no suggestion that
385 See above p. 50f.
386 Lonergan comments on the mistaken, but popular, hermeneutical principle o f the “empty head” 
in Lonergan, Method in Theology, 157.
3S7, See Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 18.
388, Ibid. In one place, Coffey refers to this process as “illative.” See Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as 
the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 195. It is clear that Coffey sees himself, in his engage­
ment with the biblical texts, as contributing to this cycle o f advancing knowledge by “dialectic” 
rather than by “simple advancement.”
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there is already a doctrine of the Trinity in the bible, the “biblical Trinity” should 
nevertheless be the biblical data read in its literal sense. Trinitarian theology asks 
questions o f the text, but the texts are to be allowed to speak in their own voice.
The “biblical Trinity” is, for Coffey, the starting point in the three-part itiner­
ary. It has some important advantages as a candidate for this role over Rahner’s 
“economic Trinity.” The fact of the matter is that theology does not have immediate 
access to the “economic Trinity.” What theology does have is access to the biblical 
witness (implicit and undeveloped though it may be) to a trinitarian shape o f salva­
tion history, and some access to the history o f theological development that led 
from the biblical texts to the clear affirmation o f the trinitarian interpretation of 
those texts in the great councils. The biblical texts are read as the starting point in a 
process o f theological development.
2. This starting point, however, points beyond itself. Data is not enough; it 
must be understood. This understanding takes place -  inevitably -  with the tools 
proper to each intellectual culture. Historically, the culture that first, and most 
decisively, provided those tools was the classical world o f Greek thought. The yield 
o f this effort o f understanding is the “classical” doctrine o f the immanent Trinity. 
As we have seen, this doctrine emerged in a shape determined by Logos 
Christology.
The purpose o f a doctrine of the “immanent” Trinity, for Coffey is to attempt:
to im part form  to material which otherw ise w ould rem ain relatively un­
ordered, and thence to provide illustration o f  the necessary consistency o f 
God in his inner being and his saving intervention in the w orld.389
The material is the data pertinent to the Trinity in the bible, both Johannine and 
synoptic, both descending and ascending. The attempt to discern the form implied 
by such data is the theology of the “immanent Trinity.” This theology has among its 
functions the discerning of intelligibility in the data, and the assertion that this intel­
ligibility, while it is based on the data o f the economy, is also true of God independ­
ently o f the economy.
389 Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 2.
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This understanding, to the extent that it represents a valid understanding of 
the data, is true. But it can also be incomplete if  it neglects certain dimensions of 
the data. Coffey believes that important dimensions of the biblical data have re­
mained obscured, and that therefore these need to be retrieved so that they might 
contribute to further more complete understanding o f the biblical data and its im­
plications. Coffey pays particular attention to what he calls the “ascending” data of 
Spirit Christology.
Once a particular understanding o f the data (or a subset o f the data) has been 
achieved, the next step, following Lonergan, is affirmation-, one states that the res­
ults of the previous stage are true. The yield o f the second stage in this process, 
namely, the affirmation of understanding o f the primary data arrived at in the early 
centuries in the church’s teaching is what we call the “immanent” Trinity. What is 
affirmed is the reality o f the Trinity: that God exists as Trinity, as Coffey carefully 
puts it, “in its own right.”390 In moving from the “biblical” to the “immanent” 
Trinity one asserts that the doctrine of the Trinity is not merely an epistemological 
matter, but is ontological. It is however framed as a stage in a process that attends 
to the order o f our knowing: one proceeds from data to interpretation, and then to 
affirmation of the truth of this understanding.
3. What then o f the “economic” Trinity, the third stage o f Coffey’s itinerary? 
The “economic” Trinity is the fruit, he proposes, o f a second  affirmation. This is 
the affirmation that what is believed and expressed o f God as the “immanent 
Trinity” is true not just of God in se, but also o f God pro nobis.m  Were it not for
390 Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 17. Coffey here argues that we must in 
some sense affirm the reality even of the yield o f our understanding: the “immanent” Trinity. In il­
lustration of this need, he draws our attention to the difficulties experienced by those theologians 
who fail to recognise the importance of the “immanent Trinity,” and in particular to the work of 
Catherine LaCugna. The transcendence of God is protected by a proper understanding of the imman­
ent Trinity. See Ibid., n. 29 on p. 159.
39li Ibid., 17. In ordinary knowing, at least according to Lonergan’s description o f cognitional 
structure, the third level, the level of judgement is at the level of affirmation. Coffey recognises that 
his application o f Lonergan’s three-level analysis of human knowing is not exact. In his description 
o f the unfolding o f the itinerary of development of theological thinking, Coffey speaks of affirma­
tion at both the second and third level. The difference is that in ordinary thinking the affirmation of 
the yield of understanding is at the level of abstraction only, whereas in relation to the “immanent”
157
this second affirmation, one could validly ask how the theological development 
subsequent to the time o f the biblical authors, flourishing in an ontologically 
framed understanding of the Trinity “in itself,” could be helpful to any but the most 
speculative o f minds. If, to take the example o f divine personhood discussed in the 
first chapter,392 speculative development leads to the assertion that the eternal Logos 
and the Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons, how is this truly useful information 
if  it refers only to what is true of God in Godself?
For Coffey the doctrine of the immanent Trinity needs to be related once 
again to the story o f what happened and happens in the history o f salvation. The 
result o f this is, he thinks, the “economic Trinity.”
One o f the things that Coffey aims at here, by describing this third stage in the 
itinerary o f trinitarian theology, is the clarification o f the purpose o f the second 
stage, the “immanent” Trinity. The criticism that Catherine LaCugna had made of 
theologia (for current purposes equivalent to the doctrine o f the “immanent” 
Trinity) was that it represents a form of speculation about the inner being o f God 
that on the one hand goes beyond what we can validly know, and on the other hand 
is unrelated to the “God for us” dimension.393 Coffey deals with both o f these is­
sues. The “immanent” Trinity is related to the “biblical” Trinity, rooting itself ex­
plicitly in biblical texts. On the other hand, the “immanent Trinity” is justified by 
its orientation towards a further stage: the “economic Trinity.” The affirmation of 
the immanent Trinity should not, Coffey writes, be seen as an “end in itself.”394 It 
is, rather, meant to “serve our knowledge o f the economic Trinity.” Consequently,
W e affirm  its existence, therefore, for tw o interconnected reasons and these 
alone. The prim ary one is that the divine transcendence obliges us thereto; 
and the secondary one is that the im m anent Trinity is w hat “drives” the eco­
nom ic Trinity.395
Trinity the affirmation is not just of an abstraction but of a reahty. See Coffey, “Spirit Christology 
and the Trinity,” 323-324.
392' See above at p. 42f.
393, This is the major theme of LaCugna, Godfor Us: The Trinity and Christian Life.
394, Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 19.
395' Ibid. There are three stages in this process. Here he justifies the second in terms of its impact
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For Coffey, the three-stage process o f trinitarian theology is such that stopping at 
either o f the first two stages would mean leaving the project essentially incomplete. 
One begins with the biblical data, since that is the shared authoritative source of all 
theology. One must go beyond this starting data, however, lest one fall into biblical 
literalism (in non-historically sensitive versions), or in archaism (in historically 
sensitive versions).396 Similarly, if  one insists on the “immanent” Trinity as the 
heart o f trinitarian theology, the enterprise lacks soteriological relevance.
In Coffey’s view, it is in the third stage that trinitarian theology truly meets its 
objective. He writes that “the proper study o f the Trinity is the study of the econom­
ic Trinity [...] .”397 The economic Trinity is where the biblical Trinity and the im­
manent Trinity are correctly related in relation to the world.
on the third. The first stage (the biblical starting point) is presupposed.
This position might be compared to that set out by Thomas in ST 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3, where the 
Dominican master gives the reasons why knowledge of divine persons was revealed, and why such 
knowledge is necessary. The first was to give us “the right idea of creation” and the second and 
“principal” reason was “that we might think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, ac­
complished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Spirit.” In Thomas’ view the know­
ledge o f divine persons is speculative (or “contemplative”). Such speculation is not properly speak­
ing opposed to a soteriological focus. See also ST I, q. 1, a. 4.
The soteriological focus of Thomas’ work of trinitarian speculation is shown by the shape of his 
trinitarian treatise in the Summa which moves from the immanent processions to the missions in the 
economy of salvation. Both of these reasons are of interest.
In advancing a justification for reflection on the immanent Trinity as a way o f guaranteeing divine 
transcendence, Coffey offers a way to rebut the accusation o f impropriety sometimes brought 
against trinitarian thought: the theology o f the “immanent” Trinity defends divine transcendence not 
by prying into it, but by offering a theoretical space that can guarantee it. Secondly, by articulating a 
dynamic of theological enquiry whereby the “immanent” Trinity is seen as a necessary step towards 
the “economic” Trinity, he can present this not as a step away from the relevant questions o f salva­
tion history, but rather as an intermediate stage on a theological path that leads from the world back 
to the world and its concrete realities. The “economic” Trinity as the final point and end of this pro­
cess of reflection is better able to give explicit account of salvation to the extent that the actors in the 
economy of salvation are established in the second phase o f trinitarian reflection to be precisely the 
divine persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit.
396, See above at note 121 on p. 48.
397 Ibid., 16. Elsewhere Coffey laments the failure o f the Catechism of the Catholic Church to 
move beyond the presentation of the “immanent Trinity” to a consideration of the “economic 
Trinity.” See Coffey, “Faith in the Creator God,” 18.
It is interesting to note that another criticism that Coffey makes o f the Catechism relates to its insuf­
ficient loyalty to the Catholic church’s teaching on the Filioque. Coffey retains an interesting inde­
pendence of judgement in his theological work, it would be impossible to capture with any accuracy 
the contours of his theological project using crude labels like “conservative,” “revisionist” or “pro­
gressive.” It is in the nature of theological tradition that it both look back in order to look forward.
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What is proposed with this second affirmation is that theology should “return” 
from the doctrine of the immanent Trinity to the economy of salvation. Stated in 
this way, the idea can raise scruples, appearing on the face o f it to transgress a prin­
ciple enunciated by Piet Schoonenberg, who wrote:
Our whole thinking moves from reality towards God and can never move in 
the opposite direction... In no respect do we conclude from the Trinity to 
Christ and to the Spirit given to us, but always the other way around.398
It appears that in suggesting that there can be a move “from” the immanent Trinity 
back towards the data of the economy o f salvation, Coffey and any who would fol­
low him on this point, fall foul of Schoonenberg’s principle. As it happens, how­
ever, Coffey accepts this principle and states his desire to be guided by it.399 He ac­
cepts that our thinking, as Schoonenberg insists, moves from this “reality” towards 
God. There is no other epistemologically responsible starting point. But Coffey 
then refers us to Walter Kasper’s comment, where the latter states that we must:
proceed not from a ‘critique of pure reason’ but from the New Testament 
witness, according to which God has revealed his innermost being and mys­
tery to us in Jesus Christ in an eschatological and definitive manner.400
The “reality” from which the theologian moves is the “reality” described in the 
New Testament witness, it is the “reality” of historical words and deeds understood 
as revelatory o f God’s activity in the world. In effect, the theologian must proceed 
from the data o f revelation, found primarily in the bible. The bible records words 
and deeds o f history, it records -  to use Schoonenberg’s term -  “reality.” At least to 
this point, Coffey has shown himself faithful to Schoonenberg’s principle.
W hat though of the other element o f Schoonenberg’s principle, which states 
that our thinking “can never move in the opposite direction”? This too is accepted 
by Coffey, but in a carefully qualified way. We should accept this part of Schoon- 
enberg’s principle only, he states, to the extent that this criterion is understood as a 
warning against deducing from doctrines about God new positions about what hap­
pens in the world. We could never, according to Schoonenberg’s principle, come to
398 Coffey quotes Schoonenberg from Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, (Paulist Press, 1976-11), 
180,
399 Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 2; Coffey, “A Proper Mission of the Holy Spirit,” 
248; Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 16.
400 Coffey quotes from Jesus the Christ, p. 181 m Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f the Holy Spirit, 2.
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new knowledge of God based on some presumed knowledge of God drawn from 
philosophical considerations; we could never deduce from trinitarian theology new 
considerations about Christ or the Spirit. To do so would violate the correct epi- 
stemological order, which can only move from the world to God, and never vice 
versa.
As stated above, the “classical” doctrine o f the immanent Trinity is a valid at­
tempt to impart form on the biblical data, though in Coffey’s view it is not adequate 
to the whole range of biblical data. Nevertheless it is valid and binding on systemat­
ic theology. Thus, for example, where Christian theological tradition understood, 
with greater clarity than did the biblical authors, the distinct personhood o f the 
Logos and the Holy Spirit, and the relation o f these persons to each other and to di­
vine substance comes to be elaborated in terms o f a doctrine o f  the Trinity, this de­
velopment is accepted. It reflects what Schoonenberg describes as an move from 
“reality” towards God. A second affirmation, however, must follow this first, 
namely that this understanding of the distinct personhood o f Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit is valid not just o f God in Godself, but is valid o f God in God’s activity in the 
economy of salvation. This move from God to the world is itself based on a prior 
move from reality to God: it does not have another root or source.
Coffey’s description of the place of the “economic” Trinity solves some o f the 
difficulties that arise from the vice versa of Rahner’s Grundaxiom, such that it is ar­
guably the true sense of Rahner’s vice versa. The immanent Trinity is not simply 
identical to the economic Trinity, inasmuch as it transcends the events of the eco­
nomy o f salvation. In Coffey’s approach, this danger is avoided. The sense of 
Rahner’s vice versa is clarified: the affirmation that what has been acquired in 
terms o f ontological understanding of the economic data (the “immanent Trinity”) 
is valid as an understanding not just o f the immanent Trinity as detached from the 
economy o f salvation, but also as a true interpretation o f the economy of salvation
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itself. Among the things affirmed in this way is the abiding significance of what is 
understood about God’s absolute transcendence, which is well expressed in various 
ways in the doctrine of the “immanent Trinity .”
Christians have long assumed that when the New Testament speaks o f the 
Holy Spirit descending on Mary (Luke 1:35), it is the third person of the Trinity 
that is intended.401 Christians have not -  as Berkhof, Lampe and Haight imply that 
they should -  understood the Holy Spirit here as God as such apprehended in his 
action in the world. The advent o f historically sensitive readings o f the literal mean­
ing o f biblical texts suggests that the spontaneous understanding of the Holy Spirit 
as third divine person should be revised. This presents a new issue for theology. 
David Coffey responds to this issue by showing how acceptance o f the fruits o f his­
torical research need not mean that one cannot also assert the validity o f the spon­
taneous understanding of these texts. In specifying that trinitarian theology moves 
from the biblical data to theologies of the “ im m an en t Trinity” and thence back to 
the economy, Coffey offers a critical grounding for what Christians have always 
done, though uncritically.
4. Relativising the Psychological Analogy
The claim that Spirit Christology might be thought o f not just as a “mode of 
access” to the “theology of the Trinity” but indeed as the “best” mode of access402 is 
bold not just because of the role that it gives to Spirit Christology, but also because 
it promises an alternative access to the theology o f the Trinity than the traditional 
one: the psychological analogy for the Trinity.403 Before concluding this chapter, it
401 That this position is usually assumed, rather than explicitly stated, is demonstrated, for example, 
in the entirely christological rather than pneumatological application of the Council of Con­
stantinople’s deployment of Luke 1:35 (he was “made flesh from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin 
Mary”). See Coffey, “The Teaching of the Constantinopolitan Creed on the Holy Spirit,” 67-68. 
This is all the more surprising, given the pneumatomachian controversy.
402 The issue of it being the “best” mode of access is dealt with in the next chapter.
403 Coffey points to other recent theologians who take New Testament statements about Jesus 
rather than the “psychological analogy” as a point of departure for trinitarian theology: Moltmann,
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is perhaps appropriate given the dominance o f the psychological analogy in the 
“classical” approach to comment on Coffey’s benign neglect o f this “mode of ac­
cess.” Given the dominance of the “psychological analogy” in the Western tradi­
tion, the rapidity with which it has been displaced over the last few decades comes 
as something o f a surprise. Ormerod, who laments what he perceives as the wide­
spread erosion of the classical tradition of the West, acknowledges that:
[a]part from  a few who continue to operate w ithin a broadly Thom istic tra­
dition such as Bernard Lonergan ... and A nthony K elly ..., it is hard to find 
a  m ajor author who takes the psychological analogy seriously.404
In Ormerod’s view, much of the difficulty lies in the fact that contemporary 
thinkers no longer appreciate the rich heritage of thought that the psychological 
analogy communicates. Rather than recognising the full import o f the analogy, con­
temporary thinkers have tended to demote it. Rahner writes that the “psychological 
analogy:
postulates from  the doctrine o f the Trinity a m odel o f  hum an know ledge and 
love, w hich either remains questionable, or about w hich it is not clear that it 
can be m ore than a model o f hum an knowledge as finite. A nd this m odel it 
applies again to God ... it becomes clear too that such a psychological the­
ory o f  the Trinity has the character o f  w hat the other sciences call an 
‘hypothesis.’405
Jungel, Miihlen and von Balthasar. All of these, however, Coffey classes as “Paschal Mystery” theo­
logians. Coffey distances himself from these approaches in Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of 
the Triune God, 105-150. Coffey’s principal objection to these theologies is not the prominence 
they give to the “paschal mystery,” but rather the penal substitution interpretation that they bring to 
it.
For a general introduction to recent interest in the “paschal mystery” as a key to trinitarian theology, 
see Hunt, The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery: A Development in Recent Catholic Theology, Hunt, 
“Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in Trinitarian Theology”.
404 Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 18.
405 Ormerod quotes here from Rahner, The Trinity, 117-118. The text is shortened by Ormerod. 
See Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 86. This point is illustrated in Coffey’s 
treatment o f the change in analogy from the early Thomas to the later Thomas, where it appears that 
Thomas has altered the terms of the analogy to suit beliefs about the Trinity itself. See Chapter Two 
of Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit.
See also the comment of Boris Bobrinskoy, The Mystery of the Trinity, (Crestwood, New York: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary, 1999), 284.
What, in Augustine, only had an illustrative character, became a systematic criterion of 
later theological thought, with Anselm and in Thomism. This view reflects a profound 
knowledge o f pychological domains, and thereby tries to have access to the divine Mys­
tery. It is an essentialist vision which, from the outset, moves from the vision o f the One 
God to elaborate a doctrine of the Trinity.
We find here echoes of what we have seen Coffey put forward. The psychological analogy appears
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Coffey follows Rahner:
One respect in which I have not been very traditional is m y stance on the 
“psychological analogy” o f  W estern, particularly Catholic, trinitarian theo­
logy, whereby the processions o f  the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Fath­
er are understood in terms o f the divine know ledge and love, respectively.
Eastern theology is similarly critical on this matter. I note with satisfaction 
that R ahner’s theology has been said to be rather “E astern” in this regard, 
but, I have to admit, I pay even less attention to the psychological analogy 
than he does.406
This is not to say that he does not recognise good points in the analogy:
It is not that it is wrong or without value. I concede that exploring on the 
basis o f  the “image o f  God” the correspondence o f  the hum an to the divine 
spirit as revealed in the doctrine o f  the Trinity can provide a pow erful stim­
ulus to Christian life authentically grounded in and ordered to God. It can 
also explain various things about the Trinity, for exam ple, why there are 
three, and only three, persons.
But ultimately he regards the analogy as inadequate to the task o f theology:
But I see it, in all its forms (including the Lonerganian), to be no m ore than 
an illustration o f  the Trinity and therefore to lack the status o f  a theology 
properly so called. This is because in m y view  it does not have sufficient 
scriptural warrant and because m ethodologically its starting point is not the 
appropriate one, nam ely the New Testam ent statem ents about Jesus and the 
Spirit as emissaries o f the Father.
He goes so far even as to present the psychological analogy as a wrong turn. He 
writes,
T hough the psychological analogy goes back to St. A ugustine, blam e for the 
turn taken by W estern Catholic theology in this regard can hardly be laid at 
his door. O f the fifteen books o f  the De trinitate, the first seven are devoted 
to the m ystery o f  the Trinity in itself, particularly  to its scriptural revelation 
in term s o f  the missions o f  the Son and the H oly Spirit, w hile the question 
o f the im age o f  God in hum an beings is reserved for the last h a lf  o f  the 
work, from  book 8 to the end.407
Despite this evidence, I would suggest caution about simply identifying Coffey’s 
work here with the general rejection o f the psychological analogy lamented by Or- 
merod. It is not enough to claim that he impatiently sets aside a tool that has served
to represent an essentialist orientation in Western theology, one that -  in Coffey’s view -  needs to be 
balanced with the mutual love model of the Trinity.
406 This and the quotations below come from Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune 
God, 4. Coffey perhaps overstates his distance from the Western tradition on this point, inasmuch as 
in his earlier work he had attempted to use the psychological analogy in relation to questions of “as­
cending” theology.
w - See Ibid.
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the Western tradition with some success up until recent times when, for whatever 
reason, it lost whatever communicative value it once had. Rather than saying that 
Coffey rejects the analogy, it would be more accurate to say that he relativises it. 
For Coffey, it is but one model for understanding the Trinity. In keeping with his 
general approach, of which we have seen a number of manifestations, he regards 
the traditional approaches in trinitarian theology as achievements o f the past not 
simply to be set aside, but rather to be assumed into a more complete and satisfact­
ory synthesis.
Coffey’s basic move in relation to the psychological analogy can be under­
stood, therefore, not therefore primarily as criticism of the analogy itself, but a call 
to set it in context. This context is given by his distinction o f the question o f “des­
cending” theology that comes from the Johannine-inspired Logos Christology and 
the question o f “ascending” theology that is based on the synoptic “Spirit Christo­
logy.” The psychological analogy serves the function of explaining how one God 
can be three persons without this plurality damaging Christian monotheism with an 
rifrrapersonal analogy suited to that task.408 It is not at all suitable to the task o f ac­
counting for how three persons can be one God, a question for which an interper­
sonal analogy is more suited. The source o f this interpersonal analogy, for Coffey 
at least, is none other than the scriptural evidence for a Spirit Christology, evidence 
surveyed in Chapters One and Two above.409
408 It does this, however, at a cost. Coffey writes that the analogy: “has difficulty in maintaining the 
status of the Word and the Spirit precisely as persons, not inferior but equal to the Father in all 
things. They appear to be only expressions or products of an original and single divine mind, to 
which alone the status of persons really belongs.” Ibid., 47. On the matter of whether the term “per­
son” applies more appropriately to God as such or to the three divine persons, see Ibid., 66-83. 
where Coffey concludes that although the use of the word “person” is to be maintained (differing 
here from Rahner and Barth), it should also be used of the absolute personhood o f God as such.
409 Coffey’s development of an ¿«ferpersonal approach to the Trinity is not in itself unusual. Hunt 
reports: “Eschewing the Augustinian-Thomistic intrapersonal psychological analogy, most contem­
porary theologians have turned to an interpersonal psychological analogy, a social model, in an at­
tempt to render the mystery of our faith in the Trinity in meaningful and effective ways for our 
times.” Hunt, Trinity: Nexus of the Mysteries o f Christian Faith, 40. What is distinctive in Coffey’s 
approach is the link he proposes to Spirit Christology, the fact that he does not deduce a “social” 
model from the theology of the “immanent” Trinity and the framework he offers for relating the tra­
ditional approach with the newer “interpersonal” one.
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5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked at the methodological framework Coffey offers 
for his position that Spirit Christology offers a “mode o f access” to trinitarian Spirit 
Christology. In setting out this framework, I have not dealt directly with the impact 
o f Spirit Christology on trinitarian theology itself, nor with the question of why it 
represents the best “mode of access.” These tasks are left to the next chapter.
By way of conclusion I offer three final observations about how Coffey in­
tends the term “immanent Trinity,” observations that will set the stage for the work 
of the final chapter.
1. The first comment is that by moving from the biblical data about the eco­
nomy of salvation to a conclusion about the Holy Spirit in the “immanent Trinity,” 
Coffey self-consciously follows what he calls an “ascending” methodology.410 
There is nothing about an “ascending” methodology in itself that rules out the pos­
sibility of a doctrine o f the “immanent Trinity.” Historically, the development that 
led to thought about the “immanent Trinity” followed an “ascending” pattern: the 
starting point was the economy of salvation, mediated by the biblical witness, and 
on this basis the doctrine of the “immanent Trinity” was “inferred” from the biblic­
al data over a period of four centuries.411 This point is worth making, since at times 
discourse about the “immanent Trinity” can be taken as indicating a commitment to 
a “descending” theological method.
2. The second point relates to the place o f a doctrine o f the “immanent 
Trinity” in trinitarian theology as a whole. As set out above, Coffey holds that the 
doctrine o f the “immanent Trinity” need not be seen as an “end point” in theology. 
The idea that the doctrine o f the “immanent Trinity” might be such an “end point”
4I0' The usage o f the term “ascending methodology” here is the ordinary one, where one begins with 
the data o f the economy of salvation (“below” according to the metaphor) and moves towards state­
ments about God (“above” in the metaphor). This clarification is needed, because in the discussion 
above the term “ascending” is also used in a sense specific to Coffey.
4i '■ Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 195.
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is an assumption shared both by those in favour o f theology o f the “immanent 
Trinity,”412 as well as by those who read this development as the “defeat” o f the 
doctrine o f the Trinity.413 Coffey, in contrast, holds that theology o f the “immanent 
Trinity” should neither be thought of as the beginning nor as the end of the itinerary 
o f theological development, but rather as a stage halfway along this itinerary. This 
stage is important, but only acquires its full function when it points towards a “re­
turn” to the economy of salvation.
3. The final point is perhaps the most significant in terms o f the focus o f the 
current study. Whereas it is perhaps customary to assume that talk of the “imman­
ent Trinity” is univocal, for Coffey, to speak o f the theology o f the “immanent 
Trinity” is not to speak about a single theological construct. Coffey holds that there 
can be a plurality o f theologies of the “immanent Trinity,” reflecting the plurality of 
New Testament christologies. This plurality is reflected in the fact that Coffey 
presents the need to talk of two models o f the immanent Trinity: the procession 
model and the bestowal or return model. These are the topics to which we now 
turn.
412 Because in it they see, for example, a deeper penetration o f God’s self-revelation in the eco­
nomy of salvation.
413 Contemporary theology is sometimes tempted to think of theology of the “immanent Trinity” as 
something that moves theological reflection away from the economy of salvation and away from its 
soteriological moorings. The use of the term “defeat” in relation to the doctrine of the “immanent” 
Trinity is associated particularly with Catherine LaCugna, but she acknowledges D. Wendebourg as 
originator of this metaphor. See LaCugna, Godfor Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, 18.
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5. The Two-Model Approach to 
the Trinity
1. Introduction
This final chapter deals with issues that arise in the passage from the “biblic­
al” Trinity to the “immanent” Trinity. These arise precisely because “classical” trin­
itarian theology developed from but one part o f the biblical data, that suggesting 
Logos Christology. As a result, “classical” trinitarian theology is not well-equipped 
to accommodate certain implications of synoptic-inspired Spirit Christology. This 
chapter looks at Coffey’s attempt to rework the theology o f the “immanent” Trinity 
in such a way that neither the data of Logos Christology, nor that o f Spirit Christo­
logy needs to be marginalised. Coffey’s approach involves the positing o f two mod­
els of the “immanent” Trinity.
A word o f caution: the fact that this final chapter deals with the theology o f 
the “ immanent” Trinity should not be taken as indicating that Coffey’s theology 
flourishes at the level o f the “immanent” Trinity. As stated, Coffey sees theology o f 
the “immanent Trinity” as the middle stage in a three-stage itinerary of thought. 
Preceding it on this itinerary is the stage he calls the “biblical Trinity,” which he 
presents as the starting point for trinitarian theology in the epistemological order. 
Reflection on the “biblical Trinity” leads by an “immanent dialectic o f thought”414 
towards a theological reflection on God in se, to a theology of the “immanent
414 For more on this idea see above at p. 35. The “dialectic of thought” is “immanent” in the sense 
indicated in the cross-referenced passage. The word itself does not imply a direct reference to the 
“immanent” Trinity, though -  perhaps confusingly -  the process does lead there.
168
Trinity,” where theological statements about God, although they are ultimately 
based on the revelation of God in the economy of salvation, are expressed in terms 
prescinding from the economy of salvation.415
If  the theology of the “immanent Trinity” takes a theoretical distance from the 
“economy o f salvation,” however, it does so only provisionally. Theology of the 
“immanent Trinity” should not be thought of as an end in itself, but as a stage that 
prepares for an enriched return to reflection on the economy. The results of reflec­
tion at the level o f the “immanent Trinity” are brought to bear on the interpretation 
o f the economy o f salvation. This “return” to the world provides for a better under­
standing o f God’s operation in the economy of salvation.
In Coffey’s conception of trinitarian theology, this third stage is where the 
trinitarian understanding, acquired in thinking about the “immanent Trinity,” is 
brought to bear on soteriology, on the themes o f grace, o f ecclesiology, o f the sac­
raments, and to the question o f the work of the Spirit in other religions, a topic of 
urgent interest in contemporary theology. The pertinence to Christian life of trinit­
arian belief is best expressed at the level o f the “economic” Trinity.
That said, the middle stage, that o f the “immanent” Trinity is important. 
Among the reasons for its importance is that traditionally trinitarian theology spoke 
primarily o f the “immanent” Trinity. In Coffey’s view, if  it is not possible to ac­
commodate the implications o f Spirit Christology at the level o f the “immanent 
Trinity” then any attempt to apply it in relation to the issues mentioned above will 
be in doubt. Coffey wishes, on the one hand to be faithful to the doctrinal and -  as 
far as possible -  to the theological heritage that contemporary theology inherits
415, This “prescinding” from the economy of salvation is, thus, ontologically and not epistemologic- 
ally motivated.
The starting point for any theological discourse about God must be the economy of salvation. By an 
“ontological” prescinding from the economy of salvation, I mean the attempt that theology makes to 
“purify” its language from direct application of the story of Jesus to an understanding of God in se. 
The most obvious example would be the death of Jesus. A divine person cannot be said to die. Theo­
logy o f the “immanent” Trinity has the function of purifying language about God from the earth- 
bound categories of time and space, so as not to reduce Christian faith to mythology or poetry.
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while, on the other hand, also wishing to explore the new terrain opened up by 
Spirit Christology. These two impulses stand in tension with one another at the 
level o f the “immanent Trinity.”
That there is such a tension should not surprise us. We have already seen, in 
Chapters One and Two, that Coffey’s Spirit Christology contrasts in a number of 
ways with the “classical” christology, a contrast largely due to the dominance of 
Logos Christology in the tradition. We have also seen, in Chapter Three, that his 
approach to the Holy Spirit as “mutual love” of the Father and the Son differs signi­
ficantly from the classical statements o f this doctrine: methodologically, in taking 
the story o f Jesus in the economy of salvation as its starting point, and systematic­
ally, in its emphasis on the properly “mutual” character o f this love. In Chapter 
Four we noted another area of tension between “classical” approaches and Coffey’s 
proposal: advocates o f the “classical” approach resist what they see as the mis­
guided and misleading idea of “starting” trinitarian theology with the economy of 
salvation. Since discussion of this point often returns to the seminal expression of 
this “new” and “dubious” starting point found in Rahner’s Grundaxiom, we looked 
at Coffey’s clarification o f some o f the issues surrounding Rahner’s Grundaxiom. 
There is undoubtedly a tension between the two methods o f access to the Trinity.
In all o f the above cases, a dialogue implicit or explicit with various aspects of 
“traditional” or “classical” theology has been centre-stage. In the current chapter, 
the same dynamic will be reproduced: the trinitarian theology suggested by 
Coffey’s Spirit Christology stands in tension with “classical” theology not just in 
the ways alluded to above, but also in relation to a number o f  key issues o f properly 
trinitarian thought. Since these issues arise in the context o f “immanent Trinity” 
theology, it is there that Coffey must face them.416
416 It is important not to confuse the terms “classical” and “traditional,” with the term “immanent 
Trinity.” It is true that traditional trinitarian theology focused extensively and often exclusively on 
the “immanent” Trinity. It is not true as a consequence that all theology o f the “immanent” Trinity is 
to be thought of as either “classical” or “traditional.” The theology o f the “immanent” Trinity that 
Coffey proposes, to give an example, systematically goes beyond “classical” or “traditional” 
theology.
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2. Areas of Tension
Before evaluating solutions, we must illustrate problems. There are two key 
areas where the trinitarian theology suggested by Coffey’s Spirit Christology ap­
pears to be in conflict with the “traditional” or “classical” trinitarian theology o f the 
“immanent” Trinity. These are (1) the taxis and (2) the filioque.
(a) The Taxis
In “classical” trinitarian theology, o f both East and West, a central feature is 
the idea that there is an “order” or taxis among the divine persons, not an order in 
time, but an order of origin. Based on Matthew 28:19, this order is Father Son "■* 
Holy Spirit.417 The “ascending” Spirit Christology-based theology proposed by 
Coffey, however, appears to offer a rival order. We see this in two ways. Firstly, 
think of Coffey’s reading of the anointing o f Jesus. Here the Holy Spirit is under­
stood to be somehow prior to the Logos in the Incarnation.418 Secondly, think of 
Coffey’s understanding of the Holy Spirit as “mutual love” of the Father and the 
Son.419 Here the Holy Spirit is somehow thought to be between Father and Son. 
Coffey’s Spirit Christology, thus, appears to demand an alternative taxis: Father 
Holy Spirit -*■ Son.420
417 This traditional taxis has been accorded a privileged place in both East and West. Basil’s de­
fence of this taxis is the standard reference. Basil writes:
One must avoid those who confuse the order the Lord imparted to us, as men openly fight­
ing against piety, who place the Son ahead o f the Father and set the Holy Spirit before the 
Son. For it is one’s duty to maintain unchanged and unharmed the order that we received 
from the same discourse of the Lord saying, “Go, teach all nations, baptizing in the name 
of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” Epistula 125, 34.
Coffey recognises the importance of the order: for both East and West it is, he says, “sacrosanct.” 
See Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” 324.
418 See Chapter One above.
4!9 See Chapter Three above.
420 In reality, the taxis suggested by Coffey’s Spirit Christology would be more properly depicted 
as Father -*■ Holy Spirit Son -♦ Holy Spirit Father. For this part o f the discussion, however, we 
focus on the first part of this taxis.
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Coffey is, o f course, not the only one to raise the issue that the economy of 
salvation appears to offer an alternative taxis. That the adoption o f the economy of 
salvation might lead to a challenge to the traditional taxis is stated, for example, by 
Yves Congar: “[i]f all the data of the incarnation were transposed into the eternity 
o f  the Logos, it would be necessary to say that the Son proceeds from the Father 
and the Holy Spirit -  a Patre Spirituque,”421 Hans Urs Von Balthasar speaks o f an 
“inversion” o f the taxis in the economy o f salvation.422
Before coming to Coffey’s own solution to this issue, we should recognise the 
range o f possible conclusions that one might draw from this datum o f the economy 
o f salvation. On one extreme we might place authors who conclude that this very 
difficulty is itself proof that the economy o f salvation cannot be considered a reli­
able guide in trinitarian theology. In a 2006 article,423 for instance, Dennis Jowers 
proposes to test Rahner’s Grundaxiom by looking at how one might apply the ax­
iom to the New Testament accounts o f  the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit. 
He recognises the problem outlined above: it seems that alongside the traditional 
taxis there is another taxis. Jowers argues, however, that the Grundaxiom itself of­
fers no resources for adjudicating between them. Jowers argues that, given 
Rahner’s self-proclaimed desire to remain faithful to church teaching, Rahner and 
presumably those who follow Rahner’s basic project here face an intractable im­
passe. The only way beyond this impasse, argues Jowers, the only way to have a 
criterion for deciding between these alternative taxeis is that to accept some form of
421' Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 16.
422 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theological Dramatic Theory, Theo-Drama, vol. 3, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1988), 183-191. Coffey refers to this passage in footnote 71 in Coffey, Did You 
Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology, 119.
423 Dennis Jowers, “A Test of Karl Rahner’s Axiom, ‘the Economic Trinity is the Immanent 
Trinity and Vice Versa’,” The Thomist 70, (2006): 421—455. This author has also published a book 
length study of the Rahner’s axiom: Dennis Jowers, Karl Rahner’s Trinitarian Axiom: ‘the 
Economic Trinity is the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa’, (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2006).
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“verbal” understanding of revelation But if  this is the only way to proceed, says 
Jowers, then clearly the Grundaxiom cannot offer an adequate guide in trinitarian 
thought. He writes:
one cannot discern the intra-Trinitarian order of origins simply by transpos­
ing a one encounters in the economy of salvation into the immanent 
Trinity. In order to discern the order of origins, rather, one requires addi­
tional information as to the significance of the various xa^en; -  information 
the economy of salvation seems ill-suited to provide. To the extent that the 
identification of the intra-Trinitarian order of origins as Father -  Son -  
Spirit is integral to Rahner’s own filioque Trinitarianism, Rahner’s 
Grundaxiom and the economy of salvation, considered together, constitute 
an inadequate basis for a practicable and, by Rahner’s standards, orthodox 
Trinitarian theology.424
Jowers’ thus argues that one faces a difficult choice: either abandon the traditional 
taxis or revert to a “verbal” understanding o f revelation.425
Jowers indirectly illustrates here how changes in the theology of revelation 
tend to point towards changes in trinitarian theology. Not wishing to see the latter, 
Jowers calls for a reversal of the former. Let Jowers’ position stand as an example 
o f  one possible approach to the matter at hand: an approach that allows the theology 
o f the “immanent” Trinity impose a shape on our reading o f the data of the eco­
nomy o f salvation.426
424 Jowers, “A Test of Karl Rahner’s Axiom, ‘the Economic Trinity is the Immanent Trinity and 
Vice Versa’,” 454.
425 In defence in his view that one should revert to a “verbal” understanding of revelation, Jowers 
writes that:
the most plausible alternative source of information about God’s inner being, it seems, is 
Scripture and/or tradition (traditiones) conceived of as a body of statements revealed by 
God. If  one accepts our conclusions, then, consistency dictates that one either abandon any 
recognizably orthodox doctrine of the Trinity or acknowledge the existence, in written and/ 
or oral form, o f inspired testimony: testimony that supplies information as to the character 
o f God’s eternal being otherwise inaccessible to non-beatified human beings. Ultimately, 
therefore, our critique of Rahner’s Grundaxiom constitutes an indirect argument for a high 
and relatively supematuralistic conception of divine revelation, (iv)
Thus:
we intend to challenge the notion that one can, with the aid of Rahner’s Grundaxiom, de­
rive the doctrine of the immanent Trinity merely from God’s self-revelation in act. It seems 
both more plausible and more orthodox to trace human knowledge of the Trinity ultimately 
to a cognitive and at least mediately verbal revelation o f God. (vi)
Both quotations are taken from Jowers, Karl Rahner's Trinitarian Axiom: 'the Economic Trinity is 
the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa
426- We already know that Coffey will not take this approach, as it runs directly counter to Schoon-
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Other theologians have taken what can be regarded as the opposite approach, 
their reading o f the data o f the economy of salvation leading them to revise the 
“classical” taxis of the “immanent Trinity,” so as to bring it into line with the econ­
omic data. Here I cite the examples of Leonardo Boff427 and Thomas Weinandy.428
Boff sees the traditional taxis and the associated filioque  as evidence o f hier­
archical thinking in relation to God. He argues that we should also have a Spir- 
ituque taxis: the Son is begotten ex Patre Spirituque. This idea has the merit of rep­
resenting the New Testament data suggesting an involvement of the Holy Spirit in 
the coming into human existence of the Incarnate Son. For Boff, this does not mean 
that the filioque  should be abandoned. His argument intends to bring “balance” to 
this theological matter.429
Thomas Weinandy’s theology comes close to Coffey’s on a number of points. 
This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive comparison. It will have to suffice 
to affirm that the basic reasoning exemplified in W einandy’s presentation is similar 
to that found in Coffey. Like Coffey, Weinandy shares the basically Rahnerian pro­
ject o f starting with the economy of salvation and ascending to conclusions about 
the Trinity in se. Both look to the biblical data to leam how the Son and the Holy 
Spirit relate in the economy o f salvation, and hold that this can tell us about how 
the second and third divine persons should be understood in the “immanent 
Trinity.” Their theological proposals appear so close, indeed, that Ormerod thinks 
he can treat them as one on the matter o f the interpretation o f this question o f the 
taxis. This is a mistake. They clearly differ on precisely this point, as we shall see.
enberg’s principle to which he subscribes, though in a modified form. See above p. 160f.
427 See his Boff, Trinity and Society, 204—206.
428 Weinandy, The Father‘s Spirit of Sonship.
429 In support o f this position Boff cites Bolotov, Evdokimov and Moltmann. The principle that 
Boff formulates is that everything in God is triadic, that there should be no non-invertible talk of 
dependence or cause, that everything should be “Patreque, Filioque, Spirituque." See Boff, Trinity 
and Society, 145-147.
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Like Coffey, Weinandy pays particular attention to the biblical data about the 
anointing o f Jesus with the Holy Spirit and explores what this might mean for the 
“immanent Trinity.”
Setting aside the similarities between their respective arguments, we note that 
a rather distinct set of issues underlies W einandy’s project. On one level, Wein­
andy’s work is motivated by the attempt to give a theological basis for the experi­
ence o f “baptism in the Spirit” that he and others in Pentecostal and Catholic charis­
matic circles report.430 This experience explains in part a defining concern 
manifested in W einandy’s theology: the concern that the Holy Spirit be understood 
as active, since he thinks it is only when the Holy Spirit is understood as active that 
He can be understood as “person.”431 The theological tradition has suffered, Wein­
andy thinks, because it has not given account o f the active role o f the Holy Spirit 
within the Trinity. The failure to give such an active role to the Spirit is partly due 
to the fact that, according to Weinandy, both Eastern and Western tradition have 
been prevented from arriving at a satisfactory account of the Holy Spirit because o f 
their failure to shake off the philosophical legacy o f “emanationist sequentialism.” 
As Weinandy presents it, the theological tradition failed to recognise and appropri­
ate the legacy o f Athanasius, whom he regards as having successfully negotiated 
the danger o f emanationist sequentialism by means of a startling interpretation o f 
the Nicene homoousios. For Weinandy, Athanasius thought o f God as a simultan­
eous non-sequential act o f the Father bringing forth the Son and the Spirit. This 
achievement was not, unfortunately, appreciated by the tradition following him, not 
even by the Cappadocian Fathers. Theology today, however, Weinandy believes, 
should return to Athanasius’ insight, overcome the emanationist models that de-per- 
sonify the Holy Spirit, and return to and appropriate the theology o f Athanasius. 
Thus:
430 Weinandy, The Father ’$ Spirit of Sonship, ix.
431 The issue of the “activity” of the Holy Spirit in the “immanent Trinity” is o f key importance. It 
has often been claimed that Western tradition recognises only a “passive” Holy Spirit, and that this 
is the cause o f its “weak” pneumatology. Weinandy sees in this issue the core of difference between 
his and Coffey’s proposal. It is.
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A proper understanding o f  the Trinity can only be obtained if  all three per­
sons, logically and ontologically, spring forth in one spontaneous, non­
sequential, eternal act in which each person o f  the Trinity subsistently de­
fines, and equally is subsistently defined by, the other persons.432
God is this eternal perichoretic generation and spiration.433 In view o f his expecta­
tion that a trinitarian person can be understood when we can recognise a particular 
role, function, or distinctive activity to that person,434 Weinandy feels obliged to af­
firm that the alternative taxis suggested in the economy of salvation is also true o f 
the “immanent” Trinity. Weinandy summarises his position as follows:
That the Father begets the Son in or by the Holy Spirit. The Son is begotten 
by the Father in the Spirit and thus the Spirit sim ultaneously proceeds from 
the Father as the one in whom the Son is begotten. The Son, being begotten 
in the Spirit, sim ultaneously loves the Father in the same Spirit by w hich he 
h im self is begotten (is Loved).435
For Weinandy, the Spirit defines (he coins a verb: the Spirit “persons”) the Father 
and Son as Father and Son.
In using terms like “nonsequential” and “simultaneous” Weinandy is ruling 
out what he regards as the traces of emanationism in trinitarian thought. He does 
not, however, wish to suggest that there is no order. There is an order, he thinks, 
and it is the same order that we have seen resulting from the “ascending” biblical 
data: Father ■-» Spirit ■-* Son Spirit -► Father. There is a taxis, but it is not the tax­
is of traditional trinitarian theology.436
A range of theologians, in conclusion, recognise the issue of reconciling the 
economic taxis with the traditional taxis of the “immanent” Trinity. Congar, Von 
Balthasar, Jowers, Boff, Weinandy, Coffey and others have all noticed and com­
432 Ibid., 14-15.
433 For Weinandy, the genius of this Athanasian breakthrough failed to enter effectively into the 
tradition such that from the time of the Cappadocians onwards there is a reversion to emanationist 
sequentialism. See p. 13. In the West emanationist sequentialism came to be reaffirmed as a result of 
the adoption of Aristotelian epistemology and its application in the psychological analogy of the 
Trinity.
454 “By giving the Holy Spirit his proper trinitarian role we more easily recognise his personal on­
tological depth as a distinct subject.” Ibid., 17.
435 Ibid.
436' Coffey thinks that Weinandy therefore proposes a Spirituque. See Coffey, “Spirit Christology 
and the Trinity,” 335.
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mented on the fact that once one takes the economy of salvation as a starting point 
for trinitarian theology, an alternative taxis emerges. The question is whether this 
taxis applies to the “immanent Trinity” and if  so, how?
Coffey’s readers might expect him to propose something akin to the reworked 
taxis that Boff and Weinandy offer.437 How he faces this issue will be dealt with be­
low. First, however, a brief word on the associated matter o f the eternal procession 
o f  the Holy Spirit: the debated filioque question.
(b) The Filioque
In Chapter Three above I have already said something about the filioque. 
There the context was Coffey’s approach to the theme o f the Holy Spirit as “love.” 
In that chapter we saw that he presented it as a middle position between an “essen- 
tialist” or “common love” approach to the Holy Spirit and the “personalist” ap­
proach that he thinks to be suggested by the “ascending” “synoptic” data.438 Here 
we return to the filioque in its more familiar context: the ongoing debate between 
the Eastern and Western traditions over the eternal procession o f the Holy Spirit. 
This debate is central to our discussion, as I will now briefly show.
A first point to observe in discussion about the filioque  is the centrality o f the 
issue o f  the relation o f the “economy of salvation” to the “immanent” Trinity. In 
expressions o f Eastern dissatisfaction with the filioque, the relation between the 
economy of salvation and the theology o f the “immanent” Trinity often arises as an 
area o f  difference. The central text in this regard is John 15:26, a text often invoked
437 Ormerod thinks that he does. He lists Coffey alongside Boff, D ’Costa and Weinandy in “mov­
ing towards” a Spirituque. See Oimerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 74. One 
might ask what idea of theological development is concealed in this accusation of “moving towards” 
something. One finds it repeatedly in Ormerod’s writings. He appears to think that any deviation 
from what he understands to be the “classical tradition” is some kind o f erosion, or “moving to­
wards” one or other heresy. Criticising such a diverse group of theologians with the vague charge of 
“moving towards” something is, I think, unfair. In Coffey’s case, for example, he specifically states 
his allegiance to the traditional taxis, a point to which Ormerod should at least allude, even if he 
finds it unconvincing.
438' See above p. 126f.
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in Western arguments for the filioque:439 “When the Advocate comes, whom I will 
send to you from the Father, the Spirit o f truth who comes from the Father, he will 
testify on my behalf.” On the basis of this text, both East and West agree that the 
Son has a role in sending the Holy Spirit from the Father. The issue on which the 
two traditions differ is whether this temporal and economic sending has any implic­
ation for the understanding of the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit. In the West­
ern tradition, the manner of the mission is taken as revealing the eternal “proces­
sion.” Thus, the involvement of both the Father and the Son in sending the Spirit is 
taken as reflecting the involvement of the Son in the Spirit’s eternal procession. In 
the Eastern tradition, in contrast, we cannot conclude from this economic sending 
that the Son is involved in the ekporeusis (= procession)440 o f the Spirit.441 Whether 
this position is to be understood as cause or effect o f Eastern resistence to the 
filioque  (I think it is better to think of it as effect), the fact remains that the degree 
of correspondence between the economy of salvation and the “immanent” or Etern­
al Trinity is stronger, at least on this point, in the Western than in the Eastern 
tradition.
(c) The Question
Bringing these matters into dialogue with the outlines o f Coffey’s Spirit 
Christology as outlined above, we are now in a position to state the problem that
439 It is not the only important text invoked in this connection by the Western tradition. O f equal 
importance are those text that refer to the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of the Son (Gal 4:6) and the Spirit 
of Jesus (Acts 16:7).
440 Great energy has been spent in recent times on the effort to distinguish the implications of the 
Greek word ekporeusis and the more general Latin word processio. In my judgement too much has 
been made o f this distinction, especially by authors like Garrigues who attempt on this basis to argue 
for the complementarity of the Eastern (Garrigues says Cappadocian) and Western (Garrigues says 
Latin-Alexandrian) traditions. His arguments, although they have found expression in the 1995 Vat­
ican Clarification on the filioque have failed to convince all scholars of either the soundness of their 
patristic readings or their faithfulness to the Western doctrinal positions enunciated at Lyons and 
Ferrara-Florence.
441 This does not mean that we cannot conclude anything from the economic co-sending for the 
“immanent Trinity.” Theologians like Staniloae distinguish an eternal relationship between the Son 
and the Spirit and the implication of a “relation of origin.” It is thus possible to argue that the Spirit 
“rests” eternally on, or is “reflected” eternally by the Son without concluding that the Son therefore 
has a part in the origination of the Spirit. See Eugene F. Rogers, ed., The Holy Spirit: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 247-260.
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Coffey’s two-model solution is designed to answer. Chapter One above discussed 
Coffey’s Thesis A, a theological interpretation o f the biblical data suggesting that 
the Father loves Jesus and that this love is the Holy Spirit, the interpretation was 
that in the Eternal Trinity the Father loves the Son, and this love is the Holy Spirit. 
This, however, appears to be in contrast with the Western idea o f an eternal proces­
sion o f the Spirit from the Father and  the Son (filioque), since here the Spirit is the 
love by which the Son is generated.
Look, now, at Chapter Three’s “pneumatological conclusion:” the Holy Spirit 
is said to be the “mutual love” o f the Father and the Son. Here, in contrast to what 
has just been stated, drawing on “Thesis A,” the Son is somehow before the Holy 
Spirit, since the Holy Spirit is spirated as the “mutual love” o f Father and  Son.
The problem is that the taxis implied by Spirit Christology appears to contra­
dict the filioque. According to “Thesis A ” the implied taxis is Father -*■ Spirit -*■ 
Son. According to the “pneumatological conclusion,” instead, the implied taxis is 
Father "-*■ Son Holy Spirit. There is, in brief, a basic tension between Thesis A 
and the pneumatological conclusion.
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3. Coffey’s Solution: Two Models of the
Trinity
Coffey takes both these related issues seriously. In order to address the appar­
ent conflict between them he develops the two-model approach to the “immanent” 
Trinity.442 This, in turn, is based on a distinction between “two schemas” of the bib­
lical Trinity, the “mission” and the “return” schemas. It is time to introduce these.
(a) Two Schemas o f the Biblical Trinity
Throughout this study, I have invoked a distinction that Coffey shares with 
other theologians, the distinction between the Johannine and the synoptic christolo- 
gies in the New Testament. Now I introduce another distinction between the “mis­
sion” and the “return” schemes of the “biblical” Trinity. The reader might ask 
whether these two ways of categorizing the pertinent New Testament data are not 
simply different ways of stating a single distinction. They are not. In the first case, 
the distinction is framed in terms o f different ways o f understanding Jesus Christ as 
such: this distinction is christological in intent. In the case o f the “mission” and “re­
turn” schemas, instead, the difference is not between two different approaches to 
the person o f Christ. The difference is between two different phases in the unfold­
ing story o f Christ and the Spirit in the economy o f salvation. The distinction 
between the two schemas is trinitarian in intent, and is therefore more suited to of­
fering a guide to trinitarian theology.
442 In 1982, Coffey staled, in relation to the filioque, that a synthesis between the Eastern and West­
ern positions could be found, but not in a formula, but “in the mysterious and ultimately inexpress­
ible being o f God himself.” This is not obscurantism, but a recognition that the poles o f unity and di­
versity in God can only ultimately be reconciled in God. See Coffey, “The Teaching of the 
Constantinopolitan Creed on the Holy Spirit,” 73. This remains his basic position. In later writings, 
however, he applies the two-models approach to the question in ways that reflect the contours of the 
two possible starting points of divine unity and the distinction of persons. What emerges with the 
two-model account is not ultimately a “formula,” but a way of thinking about the different questions 
(“ascending” and “descending”) that human intelligence can bring to the mystery of God.
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The “mission” scheme refers to those texts that speak of Jesus and the Spirit 
as sent by God. The “return” scheme refers to those texts that speak o f a “return” of 
Jesus in the Spirit to God. I will say a brief word on each o f these, before showing 
their relevance to the questions indicated above.
The “mission scheme” presents the Son and the Holy Spirit as having been 
sent into the world to fulfil God’s plan for the world. Given the pro nobis emphasis 
o f the New Testament, it is not surprising that we fmd that mission (or sending) 
comes to be a dominant image used in the description o f the relationship o f Jesus 
and the Spirit to the Father. Coffey summarised the mission scheme in the follow­
ing terms:
the Father sends Christ his Son to be the Savior o f  the world, and after death 
Christ sends the Holy Spirit from the Father to perpetuate his saving pres­
ence and w ork in the Church and in the w orld.443
According to the “mission” scheme of the biblical Trinity, where the matter of 
“sending” is in focus the following order emerges: Father sends Son, Christ sends 
Holy Spirit from Father.444 This biblical datum (together with Matthew 28:19, of 
course) underlies the traditional taxis.
Alongside the “mission” schema, Coffey argues, we should also recognise 
another schema of the Trinity in the New Testament data: the “return” schema. This 
refers to those narrative elements in the New Testament that focus, not on the ori­
gin  and sending o f Jesus and the Spirit, but on his return in the Spirit to the Father.
443' Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 34. There are also texts that speak of a 
sending of the Holy Spirit directly from God, such as John 14:26, Gal 4:6. For Coffey, there is no 
need to think of there being two sendings, but rather one sending with two coordinated sendings. In 
the Gospel of John this sending is presented as taking place primarily on the cross (John 19:30, but 
see also John 20:22), while in the Lucan literature it is positioned after the ascension at the feast of 
Pentecost (Acts 2:1-4). The sending of the Holy Spirit by Christ is the sacrament of the invisible 
sending by the Father.
444 That Jesus is sent, be it noted, need not of itself imply that Jesus necessarily pre-exists as a di­
vine person for the biblical writers. An ordinary human being could be presented as sent by God to 
achieve some purpose, as were the prophets, for example, or Cyrus of Persia. In the Gospel of John, 
however, there is the implication of some form of pre-existence. Coffey’s reading of this Johannine 
understanding of pre-existence has been introduced above. See p. 36f.
References to the Son sending the Holy Spirit are found in the Gospel of John 15:26, 16:7, and 
20:22, but also in the Gospel of Luke 24:49, and in Acts of the Apostles 2:33. It is not necessary to 
conclude from these texts that the Holy Spirit was not sent by God prior to the Jesus event, but only 
that now the Spirit is being sent in a new way through the work o f Christ. See Coffey, “The Spirit of 
Christ as Entelechy”.
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His mission is completed by a return in the Spirit. The return scheme is, Coffey 
writes, “fleshed out in the Gospel by the Incarnation, life, redemptive death, Resur­
rection, and Ascension of Jesus, Word of God and Son of Man.”445 The New Testa­
ment indeed presents Jesus as returning to the Father not just in general terms 
through New Testament references to his life of obedience to the Father’s will, but 
also more explicitly in those places, particularly in the Fourth Gospel, where Jesus 
plainly speaks about returning to the Father. The ascension of Jesus in the Lucan 
writings can be understood in this way too: as a return.446 Coffey’s general reading 
of this return of Jesus to the Father, under the sanctifying power o f the Holy Spirit 
is presented in Chapter Two above.
The point o f speaking of a “mission” schema and a “return” schema is to 
draw attention to the narrative articulation of sending and return. The two schemes 
are articulated according to an exitus-reditus pattern. This pattern, says Coffey, is 
not at all unbiblical. It is already suggested, Coffey believes, by the logic of what is 
written in Isaiah 55:10-11. There we read:
As the rain and the snow come down from  heaven, and do not return there 
until they have watered the earth, m aking it bring forth and sprout, giving 
seed to the sower and bread to the eater, so shall m y w ord be that goes out 
o f  m outh; it shall not return to me em pty, but it shall accom plish that which 
I purpose, and succeed in the thing for which I sent it.
The word which is sent must accomplish God’s purpose, and then return. Taking up 
the symbol o f the word that goes out o f the mouth of God, and accomplishes its 
purpose returning to its source, the Johannine author himself structures his gospel 
in terms o f mission and return.447
445 Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 36.
446 In relation to ordinary human beings, the question of whether return is an appropriate image 
might also be raised, but can be solved by appeal to the fact that all human beings come from God 
by creation, and have departed from primordial communion with God through sin. The question of 
what happens with ordinary human beings is a question that for Coffey pertains to the “economic 
Trinity,” that is, in theology’s move beyond the stage of “immanent Trinity” talk to reflection on 
how belief in God as Trinity impacts on our understanding of redemption.
447 For this observation on the structure of the Gospel of John, Coffey refers us to M.-E. Boismard, 
Le Prologue De Saint Jean, (Paris: Éditions de Cerf, 1953), 108, 129, 179.
1 8 2
(b) Two Models o f the “Immanent ” Trinity
Coffey believes that these two biblical schemas, those o f mission and return, 
lend themselves to different accounts o f the “immanent Trinity.” Distinguishing 
these two models of the “immanent Trinity” is the key to Coffey’s solution to the 
problems sketched earlier in this chapter. Corresponding to the “traditional” or 
“classical” theological approach is what Coffey calls the “procession” model.448 In 
places, he calls it the “distinction” model, since it responds to the questions o f “des­
cending” theology. It mirrors the “mission” schema in the New Testament at the 
level o f the “immanent Trinity.”
Complementing and completing the “procession” model, Coffey proposes a 
second model: the “return model.” In his earlier writings, he experimented with oth­
er terms: “bestowal” model449 and “mutual love”450 model. By finally settling on the
448 The distinction of two models of the Trinity is found in different forms from as early as his 
1979 book. Of the procession model he says that it does not necessarily offend against Schoonen- 
berg’s principle, but it applies only to “descending” Christology.
Provided that theology does not make the blunder of moving from God to the world in so 
far as the discovery of new material is concerned, legitimate and useful purposes remain 
for a Trinitarian model whose correctness is independently certain, e.g. to impart form to 
material which otherwise would remain relatively unordered, and thence to provide illus­
tration of the necessary consistency of God in his inner being and his saving intervention in 
the world. Thus, while we know from revelation that the Incarnation is the union of the di­
vine Son with the humanity of Christ, and that grace is in the first instance the union of the 
Holy Spirit with human persons, our knowledge receives new order and intelligibility from 
the fact that we can invoke the principle of the consistency of God and hence see the In­
carnation as precisely the prolongation into the world of the procession of the Son in the 
Trinity, and grace as the prolongation of the procession of the Holy Spirit. The model of 
the Trinity used here may be called the ‘procession’ model because it grasps the Trinity in 
terms of two ordered processions, viz. that of the Son from the Father and that of the Holy 
Spirit from the Father and (or through) the Son. Obviously, it lends itself to application 
only to descending Christology and its implied theology of grace, which is the familiar 
scholastic theology.
See Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 2-3.
449 Referring to the Father’s “bestowing” the Spirit on the Son and the Son’s “bestowing” the Spirit 
on the Father. Chapter Two of Coffey’s 1979 book provides an extended argument for the need for 
this second model. See Ibid., 11-32.
4S0' Referring to the fact that the mutual bestowal of the Spirit is itself love: the “love” of Father and 
Son. In order to distinguish between the idea of the Holy Spirit as “mutual love,” an idea that we 
have seen Coffey attribute to Augustine, and the particular implication that Coffey himself draws 
from this pneumatological conclusion for trinitarian theology, he speaks o f the “mutual love theory” 
(of the Holy Spirit) and the “bestowal model” (of the Trinity). See, for example, Coffey, “The Holy
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term “return,” he gives the earlier emphases a clearer function: that o f  more clearly 
showing the articulation of the themes that concerned “classical” trinitarian theo­
logy with the themes that he draws from Spirit Christology, following the exitus- 
reditus pattern mentioned above.
Whereas the “procession” model deals with the outbound or “centrifugal” 
movement by which the Son and Spirit are understood to be distinguished from the 
Father. The “return” model deals with the inbound or “centripetal” movement by 
which the distinct divine persons move back towards unity with God.451 Clearly, the 
ideas o f outbound and inbound, drawn from the “mission” and “return” ideas in the 
bible, are used only analogously o f the “immanent Trinity.” Nevertheless, they cap­
ture the sense of the two types o f questions that trinitarian theology asks: the (des­
cending) question of “distinction” and the (ascending) question o f “unity.”452 In or­
der to address questions of distinction, the “descending” data o f scripture is to be 
invoked and should be systematised as the “procession” model o f the Trinity. In or­
der to address questions of unity, questions that only become possible once distinc­
tion has been recognised, the “ascending” data o f scripture is to be invoked and 
should be systematised as the “return” model o f the Trinity. These two models o f 
the “immanent Trinity” are best understood in relation to one another. At this stage 
we are in a position to show how this two-model approach helps Coffey engage 
with the issues of trinitarian taxis and the filioque  raised above.
(c) Applying the Two-Model Approach
Coffey’s general strategy is that we carefully distinguish our questions, our re­
sources, and our answers to questions. On a simple level, this means that while we 
are concerned with questions of “descending” theology, we should expect the an­
Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” 228.
451' The images of “centripetal” and “centrifugal” movements are found throughout Coffey’s work. 
See e.g. Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f the Holy Spirit, 12, 38; Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy 
Spirit in Christ,” 470.
452' For notes of Coffey’s use of the terms “descending” and “ascending” in relation to questions of 
“distinction” and “unity” see above at p. 109f.
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swers to be forthcoming from engagement with the resources o f “descending” theo­
logy. If, instead, we ask the questions o f “ascending” theology, we should engage 
with the resources of “ascending” theology. In moving from the “biblical Trinity” 
to the “immanent” Trinity, we can expect two kinds o f outcome depending on 
which type o f question and which resources we are drawing on. The “procession 
model” is suited to asking the question o f how one God can be three persons. The 
“return model” is suited to questions about how God is “one.”
The “return model” is designed, as stated, to deal with “ascending” questions 
relating to the unity o f divine persons. Specifically, however, the need for a “re­
turn” model comes from the need to reconcile the results o f Spirit Christology with 
the “classical” model. Although I have noted above the areas o f  tension, areas that 
Coffey him self recognised, these should perhaps be stated once again at this point.
Chapters One to Three above yield an “ascending” Spirit Christology resulting 
in a pneumatology of the Holy Spirit as “mutual love.” The taxis implicit in this 
“ascending” data (Father ■-» Holy Spirit -*• Son) appears to be in conflict with the 
traditional taxis (Father Son -► Holy Spirit). This is the first problem.
The second is that the procession of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the 
Father and the Son, a position we can call Coffey’s filioque, appears not to be 
reconcilable with the “ascending” taxis, since the Holy Spirit emerges there as 
third, from the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Viewed this way, the second 
problem is the problem of the internal coherence o f Coffey’s thought.453
One might expect Coffey to simply state that one taxis informs the “proces­
sion model” and the other informs the “return model.” This would be a  simple 
enough solution, and it would give his proposal some advantages over those o f Boff 
and Weinandy, inasmuch as it would at least give a place for expressing commit­
ment to the traditional taxis and the filioque in the “procession” model, while allow­
453 All o f these questions are pertinent to the matter of moving forward the East/West debate on the 
matter of the filioque, but Coffey’s answers can only hope to play a constructive role if his solutions 
prove to be internally coherent.
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ing for space to relax that commitment in the “return” model. As it happens, how­
ever, he does more than this in showing how the two models are articulated, how 
the first is related to the second, how the second depends on the first, how the 
second completes the first. We look now at how he argues these points, taking the 
idea of God as “love” as the dynamic that leads from the first model to the second, 
and how the second model is the completion of the first.
(d) From Self-Love to Mutual Love
Chapter Three above distinguished between two types o f love, “common 
love” and “mutual love.” Understanding the Holy Spirit as “common love” was 
generally attempted in the West within the parameters o f the psychological analogy, 
the first procession being understood by analogy with self-knowledge, the second 
by analogy with self-love. Understanding the Holy Spirit as properly “mutual love” 
involves, at least for Coffey, building on the economic data suggesting an identific­
ation o f the Holy Spirit with the mutual love o f the Father and the Son.454 The 
“common love” issue called for an /«/rasubjective analogy, the “mutual love” ap­
proach builds on zVzZersubjective narrative.
This distinction can now be taken up in the context o f the relationship 
between the “procession” and the “return” models. I begin by showing how the idea 
o f “love” operates in the “procession” model (the model that was developed in 
“classical” theology), and then how it operates in the “return” model (the one that 
Coffey develops).
The purpose o f the “procession” model is, as we have seen, to account for the 
distinction o f divine persons. We should begin, then, with the one God, the Father, 
the “source” o f the Trinity. This is not yet the full trinitarian understanding of the
454 A different issue is to the fore in Coffey’s 1979 book. There he is advancing an argument for 
the priority of the “notional” plane over the “essential” plane in establishing the “formal reasons” of 
the two processions. There is no direct reference there to the data of the “economic” data, and much 
of the argument is presented in terms of a type of deductive reasoning that the current study has at­
tempted to avoid. Nevertheless, Coffey’s argument there is worth comparing to the line of reasoning 
that this study highlights. See Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, 23-31.
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unity of God, it is merely the starting point, a starting point that historically gave 
way to a more “trinitarian” understanding of God’s unity. Coffey illustrates the 
movement from one to the other, as follows.
The Father generates the Son. This generation is understood as “love.” This 
“love” cannot have the Son as its object since the Son does not yet (to use the un­
avoidable metaphor of time) exist.455 Neither can this “love” be the Holy Spirit, 
since according to the traditional taxis the Holy Spirit comes third. Since, however, 
this “love” cannot be thought of as the “love” o f the Son nor as the “love” that is 
the Holy Spirit, this “love” can only be the “love” o f self. This is a first movement 
in the “procession” model: the generation of the Son as the self-love of the Father.
As a result of the above, the Father and Son both now “exist,” but not yet 
(again, time is a metaphor) the Holy Spirit. The next movement is that the Son in 
response “loves” the Father. The responding “love” o f the Son is different, how­
ever, inasmuch as it need no longer be self-love. In this responding “love” there is 
“already” a plurality of persons, so the “love” can be understood as “mutual” and 
therefore as productive of the Holy Spirit.456
This much is Coffey’s exposition of the working out o f the “procession” 
model. All o f this is possible within the limits o f “classical” theology. In this 
presentation, the traditional Eastern concern for the primacy of the Father is ac­
commodated in the first statement. This presentation also follows the traditional 
taxis.
There are, however, limits in the “procession” model. In its presentation of the 
filioque  (the second statement, here interpreted as mutual love), it appears to under­
455 In the following presentation the language o f “first” and “next” is unavoidable. It is of course 
analogical. It reflects an order not in time, but an order in relationship.
456 Coffey cites the view of John Cowbum that the Holy Spirit is the “objectification” of this mutu­
al love, but has also argued that although this view is correct, it is not necessary to state it. He uses 
the term “objectification” in Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God, 49; Coffey, 
“Questio Disputata: Response to Neil Ormerod and Beyond,” 905; Coffey, “Questiones Disputatae: 
A Trinitarian Response to Issues Raised By Peter Phan,” 862. He claims that it is not necessary in 
Coffey, Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?: Some Basic Questions for 
Pneumatology, 53.
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mine the primacy of the Father, and therefore to confuse the Father and the Son by 
involving the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit. The other limit is that it can­
not integrate the data of Spirit Christology, since in the procession model, following 
the traditional taxis, the Spirit comes after the Son, and not vice versa.
It is with his “return” model that Coffey makes his unique contribution, at 
least as far as discourse on the “immanent Trinity” is concerned. He suggests that 
subsequent to this distinction of persons, subsequent to the completion of reflection 
on the “procession” model, a new question arises, the question of how the three di­
vine persons are nevertheless “one.” The questions o f “descending” theology lead, 
therefore, to questions o f “ascending” theology. God who is distinct as three per­
sons must nevertheless also be understood to be one.
Here again, the matter of “love” is central. Because the starting point is now 
the fact that there are three distinct divine persons, we are now in a position to say 
that the Father loves the Son and that this love is the Holy Spirit. This was not pos­
sible with the “procession” model. This second model places the Spirit between the 
Father and the Son. We can say that the Son returns this love to the Father and this 
love is the Holy Spirit. We can say these things now, because unlike in the case of 
the “procession” model above where the issue was how to explain distinction, here 
we have no such difficulty, because the distinction o f persons has become a datum 
from the “procession” model. The answer to the question of how the three divine 
persons are “one” is thus: they are one because the Father and the Son love one an­
other and their mutual love is the Holy Spirit. This is not “oneness” in any straight­
forward way; it is trinitarian oneness. Although Coffey does not spell it out, this 
trinitarian unity is presumably to be understood in terms o f a perichoretic and ek- 
static love by which the Father and Son are made one by the vinculum amoris (the 
Holy Spirit). If  so, this trinitarian understanding o f divine unity is coherent with the 
“return” model, however uncomfortably it might sit in the “procession” model.
Because these two models are articulated such that the second is only possible 
after the first, Coffey is able to state more clearly than can Weinandy how the tradi­
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tional taxis still applies. The traditional (axis requires that the Father be first, the 
Son second and the Holy Spirit third. This taxis is preserved, Coffey thinks, in the 
“memory” o f the origination of Son and Spirit as described in the “procession” 
model. Although the “love” of Father and Son is “mutual” it nevertheless preserves 
the “memory” of the order in which the divine persons were generated and spirated. 
This is not as unusual an idea as it might sound: Coffey thinks that this can be read­
ily understood if  we look at the analogy of any relationship o f mutual love. If  two 
people are bound together in a relationship of mutual love, it is hue that their mutu­
al love is such precisely because it is mutual: each loves the other simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, in an interpersonal relationship of this sort, there is the “memory” of 
the one who was first to love. Although the love is now mutual, at one stage it was 
not, and one o f the partners loved first. Even as it is “mutual,” the “memory” of this 
first love persists.
The “return” model is designed to resolve the areas o f tension mentioned 
above. Coffey’s stated ambition is not to offer a definitive explantion of these mat­
ters, which would at any rate be impossible, but rather to demonstrate that Spirit 
Christology may indeed be accommodated with “classical” trinitarian theology, 
even as it moves beyond its limits. His objective is to show that the two are related 
dialectically.
Let us summarise the outcome of this second model. The purpose o f this 
second model is the systematic accommodation of the data of “ascending” Spirit 
Christology. This is preserved, because at this second stage the Spirit can be said to 
be the “love” o f the Son, since at this stage both Son and Spirit already “exist.” 
Coffey is not claiming that the Holy Spirit is involved in the generation o f the Son; 
he is stating that in the “return” model, that is, in “ascending” theology, the Holy 
Spirit can be understood to be the Father’s love of the Son. From this point of view, 
next, the love o f the Father for the Son is understood not as “self-love,” as in the 
“procession model,” but as “love” of the other. Thirdly, the filioque  is preserved, 
but is more clearly now understood as the “mutual love” o f the Father and the Son,
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since the first love is no longer the self-love, but is the Father’s love of the Son.457 
Fourthly, the primacy of the Father in the eternal procession of the Spirit is 
preserved.
This last point is perhaps the most subtle in Coffey’s solution. The primacy of 
tbe Father is preserved in a traditional sense at the level of the “procession” model, 
but in rather a unique sense at the level o f the “return” model. It is preserved there 
because in the “mutual love” of the Father and the Son, the Father first “loves” the 
Son and the Son’s “love” is a response. In the “return” model, both “loves” are the 
Holy Spirit, but the Father’s “love” is remembered as first. Hence, Coffey argues, 
we find a sense in which the Holy Spirit comes from the Father first. In the “proces­
sion” model, the Father comes first, as source of both Son and Spirit. In the “return” 
model, by contrast, the Father and the Son love one another and the Holy Spirit pro­
ceeds as “mutual love.” In so doing the memory o f the primacy of the Father is pre­
served. This, holds Coffey, is the sense o f Augustine’s famous principaliter.
4S7 Thus, Ormerod is simply incorrect to state that Coffey relativises the filioque. See Ormerod, The 
Trinity: Retrieving the Western Tradition, 16. Weinandy, in contrast, considers him to be a “strong 
supporter” of the filioque. See Weinandy, The Father’s Spirit of Sonship, 70. In Coffey’s theology, 
the filioque is asserted as true in both the procession model, and -  as mutual love -  in the return 
model.
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4. The Articulation of the Two Models
I have stated a few times that the two models are not merely juxtaposed but 
are “articulated.” The “procession” model leads to the “return” model, which not 
only complements it but also completes it. Underlying this view o f the relation of 
the two models is the relation of the two New Testament schemas, “mission” and 
“return.” There, in functional and pro nobis terms, the Son and the Spirit are sent 
into the economy of salvation, not however to remain there, but in order to draw 
created beings back into communion with God. There is an outgoing (exitus) and an 
ingoing (reditus) movement, the one ordered to the second in which it finds its pur­
pose and completion.
The same pattern is replicated in trinitarian theology. First theology must un­
derstand the distinction of persons, and here the “procession” model serves. Then 
theology must understand the unity o f persons thus distinct, and here it is the “re­
turn” model that serves. The “procession” model represents theology’s attempt to 
understand the Trinity in fieri, that is in formation, in the origination o f the divine 
persons. The “return” model that Coffey proposes represents the reflection not on 
why there are three divine persons, but how to talk about their relations. He speaks, 
thus, o f the Trinity in facto esse, the Trinity as constituted.458
Some readers might wonder whether Coffey is not here needlessly complicat­
ing matters. I would argue that, while it is true that his approach is complex, it is no 
more complex than one might expect given the fact that he intends to accommodate 
the results o f Spirit Christology in a way that coheres with, though it goes beyond, 
the “classical” approaches to the Trinity. The “classical” approach in both its East­
ern and Western forms is expressible with the “procession” model. This “model” 
did not, as we have seen, make space for the theological implications o f Spirit
458 See above at p. 99 for Coffey’s christological use of this distinction. Coffey finds an early ver­
sion of such a distinction applied to trinitarian theology in Augustine. See Coffey, Grace: The Gift 
of the Holy Spirit, 7. Coffey finds an echo of this distinction in the mysterious phrase used by Gar- 
rigues “in a trinitarian manner” repeated in the 1995 Clarification.
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Christology, and it gave rise to the difficult question o f the filioque. When Coffey 
attempts to bring these impulses to bear on trinitarian theology, he finds that they 
cannot be simply engrafted onto the “classical” model. Rather than simply offering 
an alternative model, one that would be in tension not just with the traditional taxis 
and the Western filioque, Coffey finds in this two-model approach a way to articu­
late the concerns of the “classical” tradition and the impulses o f Spirit Christology.
An important point that he makes with this account is that the “return” model 
is the properly “trinitarian” one. The question o f how the divine persons came to be 
distinct, the “descending” question, might even be thought o f as not yet a fully trin­
itarian question, since it is concerned with establishing the possibility o f God being 
triune in the first place. This line of questioning is o f course important, if  Christian 
theology is to be seen as monotheistic and rationally coherent. Nevertheless, this is 
not the type of question that the New Testament itself, as a whole, is best designed 
to answer.
A more fully trinitarian reading of the New Testament, in contrast, addresses 
not only the in fieri questions, but also the in facto  esse questions. If  trinitarian 
readings o f the New Testament confine themselves to questions about how the one 
God comes to be three, then of necessity the range of texts o f interest will be quite 
limited. They will concentrate on the themes o f the pre-existence of the Logos, the 
conception of Jesus, his anointing, and the sending o f the Holy Spirit. If, on the oth­
er hand, trinitarian theology assumes that God is three persons, it can move on to 
other questions: the questions of “ascending” theology, the questions o f the Trinity 
in facto esse.
Both sets o f questions are equally valid, but as Coffey makes clear, they 
should be carefully distinguished. In response to the concern that Coffey has com­
plicated matters by offering these two models, I would counter that he has done 
nothing other than recognise and expose the complexity o f  the work o f trinitarian 
theology. Beyond this, he has offered a biblically based exitus-reditus pattern for 
the articulation o f these questions. If trinitarian theology has traditionally concen-
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trated its efforts on the exitus stage, Coffey argues that it might now attend to a 
more comprehensive set o f questions: both exitus and reditus, both “procession” 
and “return.”459
4S9- “Now whereas outreach does not necessarily imply return, the converse is not true: return does 
imply and involve outreach. Hence a trinitarian model based on outreach texts, i.e. on Logos Chris­
tology, will be partial, whereas one based on return texts, i.e. on Spirit Christology, will be 
comprehensive.” Coffey, “Spirit Christology and the Trinity,” 325.
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5. Towards a Trinitarian Soteriology
In what remains of this final chapter, I wish to argue two concluding points. 
The first is that Coffey’s two-model approach to the Trinity, and his approach as a 
whole, offer important stimuli towards an exploration of the soteriological implica­
tions of the church’s trinitarian belief. The second is to show that the root o f these 
soteriological implications is to be found in what must, in the final analysis, be 
judged not just a “thoroughgoing” Spirit Christology, but a “thoroughgoing” trinit­
arian Spirit Christology.460
The first point may be approached by way of an observation on Coffey’s 
views on the purpose o f revelation. In brief, God’s revelation is such that it is only 
properly understood when it contemplates not just the “fact” o f God’s triunity, not 
just the “return” o f Christ to the Father in the economy, but also the return o f ordin­
ary human beings as “sons [and daughters] in the Son” to the Father. Revelation is 
completed when there is not just a “communication” of God to human beings, but a 
“self-communication” that is received and produces its aim in human beings. As we 
will see, for Coffey, this aim is the assimilation of human beings as sons and 
daughters in the Son into the return of love by Jesus to the Father.
There is, to expand on this point, an order in God’s action in the world and, 
consequently, in God’s revelation. First God creates. Then God saves. Using the 
scholastic vocabulary of causality, Coffey charaterises the first movement, creation, 
as a work o f “efficient causality.”461 There are two important things to be noted
460 The term “thoroughgoing” is borrowed from Roger Haight. For Haight, a “thoroughgoing” 
Spirit Christology “seems to eliminate Logos as a symbol designating both the discrete ‘person’ or 
distinct ‘mode of being’ in the Godhead and incarnate in Jesus. Bluntly put, can one still have a doc­
trine o f the trinity if one adopts a thoroughgoing Spirit christology?” See Haight, Jesus Symbol of 
God, 468. Bluntly put, Coffey claims that we can.
461 The idea that grace should be understood primarily in its “uncreated” dimensions, according to 
“formal” rather than “efficient” causality, is perhaps the deepest structure in Coffey’s theology, one 
that Coffey takes from Rahner but develops in his own way. A particularly important point, one on 
which I have not expanded, given the focus o f this study, is that “efficient” causality is the “defi­
cient” mode of “formal” causality. A study on the evolution of Coffey’s theology would show how 
this insight underlies many of the distinctions that structure Coffey’s thought. For more on this see
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about “efficient causality”: (1) that the result o f “efficient causality” is something 
other than the cause; (2) that in working by “efficient causality” the three divine 
persons work as one. As long as God’s action in the world is understood in terms of 
efficient causality, the three divine persons remain indistinguishable.462 As revela­
tion (we can perhaps recall the idea o f “natural revelation” here), this provides 
human beings with an understanding o f God ab extra. From the resulting point of 
view “outside” God, human beings have no access to the inner distinctions by 
which the persons are distinct. By creation there is a “communication” of God, not 
yet a “self-communication.”
In the order o f God’s action and consequently revelation, the second moment 
brought about by the Christ event (Incarnation and grace) goes beyond “creation” 
and is a work o f “formal” causality. Coffey’s use o f the category o f “formal causal­
ity” is guided by Rahner’s innovative exploration o f the benefits of restoring a fo­
cus on the uncreated dimensions of grace, dimensions that he thought better de­
scribed as works o f “quasi-formal” causality.463 Such distinctions between works o f 
God by efficient causality, and works o f God by form al causality, between creation 
and assimilation, between communication and self-communication reflect, Coffey 
argues, basic structures in the biblical narrative. These structures are the biblical 
schemas of “mission” and “return.” The second moment is different from the first 
in that: (1) the result of “formal causality” is some sort o f “assimilation” o f the 
creature to the Creator; (2) the distance between Creator and creature is overcome 
such that although the three divine persons continue to work as one, human beings 
are now able to distinguish their proper functions.
Coffey, “The Gift of the Holy Spirit”; Coffey, Grace: The Gift o f the Holy Spirit', Del Colie, Christ 
and Spirit: Spirit Christology in Trinitarian Perspective.
442 O f course, theology has happily spoken of the Trinity while also limiting in principle the ability 
of the world to distinguish the trinitarian persons by anything but inner-trinitarian means. This was 
possible as long as some form of verbal revelation was contemplated. Today, however, the difficulty 
of demonstrating that the biblical authors indeed directly intended to teach a doctrine of the Trinity 
makes such an approach impossible. Hence the timeliness of Coffey’s intervention.
443 Coffey is happy to drop the “quasi” from Rahner’s formulation, thinking that its intent is 
already covered by the analogical nature of all theological discourse.
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In the previous chapter, we noted how “classical” theology formulated the ax­
iom according to which the grounds for distinguishing the divine persons are 
strictly inner-trinitarian.464 As a result o f this second moment, these grounds are 
made available to human beings by means of the “two modalities” of the self-com­
munication o f God: the Incarnation as the “communication” o f the Son, and grace 
as the “communication” o f the Spirit. Human beings, as a result o f this “self-com­
munication” o f God, pass from contemplating God ab extra to contemplating God 
ab intra.
Coffey’s Spirit Christology offers a new perspective on the ad extra and ad  
intra distinction. We have already seen above how this distinction determined a 
certain reluctance in “classical” trinitarian theology to take the economy of salva­
tion as a starting point. The roots of this distinction go back at least to the fourth 
century, to the so-called “Arian” controversy. By refusing Arian subordinationism, 
or any kind of emanationism that would blur the transcendence o f God and the di­
vine status o f the Logos, Athanasius and his followers posited a theoretical distinc­
tion between God and world that suggests a kind of dualism that brings both bene­
fits and deficits to theological imagination.465 In that controversy, the best way of 
refuting the Arian position was to push the distinction, and show that the Son must 
be on the “Creator” rather than the “creation” side o f the ontological chasm that se­
parates one from the other. The outcome o f this debate, as illustrated in various 
ways above, was the affirmation of “descending” Logos Christology as the domin­
ant motor in trinitarian theology. A definitive moment in this process came with 
Chalcedon’s christological formula, which Coffey sees as cementing the problem of 
the “wedge” : the ontological chasm between Creator and creature is brought to the 
heart o f the hypostatic union. The Eternal Logos is Creator and the humans are 
creatures.
464- See p. 142 above.
465 See above for commentary on how Coffey adapts Rahner’s transcendental christology so as to 
overcome the deficits in such dualistic approach to the God-world relationship: p. 79f.
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If  we try to apply too easy an understanding o f this distinction, appealing to 
dualistic God-world, Creator-creature schemas then acceptance o f the “classical” 
axioms will lead us to conclude that properly speaking we can know nothing of 
God’s Triune being from the economy o f salvation, since the economy of salvation 
appears to stand on the created world side of any such dualism. As human beings, 
we would thus be confined to experience of the ad  extra dimensions o f God’s activ­
ity, and as creatures be precluded from any knowledge of the inner-trinitarian dis­
tinctions. If this is how we understand the ad extra!ad intra distinction, then indeed 
there would be little point in approaching the “ascending” data o f scripture for new 
insights into the Triune God. Much of the plausibility of Coffey’s theology, how­
ever, depends on his challenge to the supposed equivalence between the ad intra!ad 
extra distinction, on the one hand, and the Creator/creature distinction, on the other.
This challenge comes, as we have seen, from the development o f a trinitarian 
Spirit Christology. As illustrated above, Coffey adapts the idea o f the enhypostas- 
ia466 so as to speak about the Holy Spirit’s sanctification o f the human nature of Je­
sus. To put it simply, the human nature o f Christ remains a created reality, but is 
now understood as being a created reality brought to the limits o f its possibility 
such that it becomes a created reality proper to God: a theandric humanity. For 
Coffey, such a retrieval of Spirit Christology is possible in contemporary theology 
because of the contribution of Karl Rahner’s transcendental theology.467 This man­
oeuvre allows Coffey to introduce a vitally important nuance into the ad extra!ad 
intra distinction by means of his notion o f “assimilation.”
By “assimilation” Coffey intends the process by which God works to over­
come any simple dualism between Creator and creature, by assimilating creatures 
into God’s own life. The first and paradigmatic instance o f this assimilation into the
446 I have registered some doubts about the wisdom of this choice of word, but the intention should 
be clear.
447 See above at p.79.
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Life o f God is that of Jesus. The second and dependent instance is the assimilation 
o f human beings by grace into this Life. The bible contains both “mission” and “re­
turn” schemas. So, Coffey reasons, should biblically based theology.
Coffey accepts the “classical” trinitarian axiom stating that God works as one 
ad extra,46* but introduces a vital nuance into its application in the case o f Jesus, 
and therefore also o f those who become by grace sons and daughters in the Son. He 
distinguishes the act of creating the human nature o f Jesus from those o f sanctifying 
it and o f uniting it with the person of the Eternal Son. Just as God acts as one in cre­
ating the world, God acts as one in creating the humanity o f Jesus. But in sanctify­
ing this human nature and in uniting it with the Eternal Son God goes beyond a 
strictly ad extra action. There are thus both ad extra and ad  intra dimensions to the 
hypostatic union. Coffey writes:
H ow  are w e to understand the Incarnation as proper to the Son and at the 
sam e tim e including a work o f God in the w orld com m on to all three divine 
persons? In so far as it is a work o f  God in the world, the Incarnation m ust 
be a w ork o f  divine pow er and an instance o f  creation. Therefore, it is the 
creation o f  the humanity o f  Christ that is the w ork o f  all three persons.
T here is nothing new about this; it is the traditional answer. B ut as a w ork 
proper to the Son, the Incarnation m ust be by the sam e act assim ilation (or 
assum ption) o f  the sacred humanity into the Trinity so that it is united to the 
Son alone.469
The relationship between the ad extra dimension and the ad intra dimension are ex­
plained, once again, with the metaphor o f “outward” and “inward” motion. Coffey 
pictures first a dynamic “outward” movement, the creation of the human nature, 
followed by a dynamic “inward” movement, the sanctification o f that nature and its 
hypostatic union with the Son. This exitus-reditus pattern is implicit, Coffey thinks, 
in any act o f self-communication, even self-communication between ordinary 
persons:
The one act, which is essentially inward-draw ing, has inbuilt into it a prior 
outward-m oving aspect. It is the same w ith any interpersonal act. F or in­
stance, when I address a friendly w ord to som e other person, the first thing 
that happens is that my word passes from  m e to him , but the end result is 
that the other is drawn into the ambit o f  m y own person, and so com m unic­
ation takes place. Augustine saw this clearly in regard to the Incarnation
468 See above at p. 142.
469 Coffey, “A Proper Mission of the Holy Spirit,” 235.
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and expressed it in the succinct phrase ipsa assumptione creator, literally,
“ it is created by the assumption itself.”470
In dependence on this paradigmatic case, Coffey sees human beings drawn into the 
life o f  God by the action of the Holy Spirit in grace as sons and daughters in the 
Son, Coffey has devoted a great part o f  this career to justifying this interpretation o f 
what happens in grace.471 Highlighted here is how this understanding o f grace im­
pacts on the understanding of the axioms o f the “classical” Western tradition.
If  we accept the validity of such talk of assimilation, then for Coffey the trinit­
arian axioms (that suggest that the works o f God ad  extra are as one, and the per­
sons can only be distinguished on inner-trinitarian grounds), no longer determine 
our mode o f access to the Trinity. They are relegated to a similar status as the idea 
o f “pure nature” in Rahner’s theology: a theoretical Restbegriff. Logos Christology, 
as it was used in “classical” theology stressed the distinction between the case of 
Jesus and the case of ordinary human beings in such a way that trinitarian theology 
itself was unable fully to appropriate the manifestation of the ad intra distinctions 
in God. Spirit Christology, Coffey holds, by opening theological reflection to the 
parallels between the sanctification o f Christ and the sactification o f ordinary 
human beings, overcomes this impasse.
The question of whether there is a way of relating and reconciling the very di­
fferent outcomes of these two approaches is answered by Coffey in his develop­
ment of the “return” model of the Trinity. At the beginning o f Chapter Four, I 
recorded Coffey’s opinion that Spirit Christology was not only a mode o f access to 
the Trinity, but that it was the best mode o f access to the Trinity. It is the best mode 
o f access, because it approaches the mystery of the Trinity not just for an under­
standing o f how the three divine persons are distinct, but for an understanding o f 
how the Trinity is a mystery of salvation. For Coffey, salvation is not a matter of 
knowing that there are three divine persons, but o f being drawn into the trinitarian
47°- Ibid.
471 References to various Coffey and to Del Colie.
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life o f God through the gift of the Holy Spirit in grace, by which we are made “sons 
and daughters in the Son.” Coffey’s Spirit Christology leads, thus, to a trinitarian 
soteriology: the “economic Trinity.”
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Conclusions
The aim o f this study has been to examine a particular trajectory within the 
theology of David Coffey, a trajectory that begins with Spirit Christology and ends 
with his proposed reformulation of the doctrine o f the “immanent” Trinity, a refor­
mulation allowing for a new and richer appropriation o f the biblical data. As I have 
presented it, this is not the end of the itinerary: for Coffey this new and richer ap­
propriation o f the biblical data is the “economic Trinity” and it is there that trinitari­
an theology flourishes. As Coffey presents it, theology is both cyclical and ascend­
ing: “cyclical” in its constant return to its economic and biblical starting point; 
“ascending” in its ever more complete appropriation of the revelatory significance 
o f that starting point. This conclusion illustrates these general qualities o f Coffey’s 
theology by means o f an overview of this study’s findings.
1. Coffey’s Spirit Christology
I began, in Chapter One with an examination o f Coffey’s claim that the New 
Testament identifies the Holy Spirit with the God’s love for Jesus (= Thesis A), and 
that Jesus thereby becomes Son “in humanity.” Here Coffey draws especially on 
the biblical theme o f the anointing (including not only the baptism texts, but also 
Romans 1:4, Acts 10:38 and Luke 1:35 which bring the anointing to the very begin­
ning o f his human existence). I showed how these biblical data led Coffey to pro­
pose an account of the coming into existence of Jesus as the Son “in humanity” that
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gives priority to the Holy Spirit in the sanctification o f that humanity. Coffey, as we 
saw, sees this sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit as somehow logically prior to the 
assumption of that humanity by the Son.
I noted the contrast here with “classical” christology. The classical view, built 
especially on Johannine Logos Christology, and took the Incarnation o f the Logos 
as the primary explanation of the divine status o f Christ. The theme o f the sanctific­
ation o f Christ, where it appears, was thought o f as “accidental.” Coffey, instead, 
shows that the New Testament also supports an inversion of this classical order, 
with the sanctification “first” and the “assumption” second.
The first chapter set this proposal in the context o f a contemporary movement 
in theology towards a revival of an ancient form of christology: Spirit Christology. I 
took three representatives o f this contemporary movement, Hendrikus Berkhof, 
Geoffrey Lampe and Roger Haight, and outlined how these theologians draw a mis­
taken lesson from contemporary theology’s turn to history by falling into a biblical 
archaism472 suspicious of any genuine development in doctrine. Theirs was charac­
terised as a historically-motivated post-trinitarian Spirit Christology.
Coffey was found to have points in common and points of contrast with these 
post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists. Like them Coffey’s discourse is shaped by the 
results o f more recent historical scholarship. Unlike them, he was found to avoid 
the “archaism” into which they stray. Like them, Coffey proposes a Spirit Christo­
logy. Unlike theirs, Coffey’s is intended as a trinitarian Spirit Christology. The key 
differences between trinitarian Spirit Christology and post-trinitarian Spirit Christo­
logy are: (1) the former thinks of the Holy Spirit as a distinct divine person while 
the latter does not, and (2) the latter counter-poses Logos Christology and Spirit 
Christology as alternatives, while the former (as expressed by Coffey, at least) does 
not. In this first chapter, the “cyclical” and “ascending” character o f theology are il­
lustrated. Coffey assumes the church’s trinitarian faith, but “returns” to the biblical 
witness to the economy of salvation to retrieve elements formerly obscured. Rather
472 See note 121 on p. 48 for Lonergan’s use of this term.
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than pitting the results of this retrieval against the positions o f classical christology, 
Coffey makes clear his intention to effect a synthesis between the new perspective 
emerging in his work and previous perspectives. Although Coffey does not make 
significant use o f the term, it is appropriate to conclude that he intends to proceed 
by “sublation.”473
Chapter Two above completed the introduction to Coffey’s Spirit Christology 
in itself. For Coffey, Spirit Christology does not confine its attention to the adop­
tion o f the biblical symbol o f Spirit in the explanation o f the divine element in Jesus 
but also contemplates the entire data about the life, death and resurrection o f Christ 
found in the New Testament. Chapter Two looked at how Coffey reads this life, 
death and resurrection as a response o f love by the Son “in humanity” to the initiat­
ing love o f the Father. Coffey argues that the New Testament supports an interpret­
ation of this response of love on the part o f Jesus as itself the “Holy Spirit,” ex­
pressed now through the human nature o f Jesus. There is in this response of love of 
the Son “in humanity” an “incarnation” of the Holy Spirit. This response o f love is 
understood at once as love o f Jesus for God, but also as love o f Jesus for human be­
ings, since it is by loving his fellow human beings that Jesus as human being gives
473' The noun “sublation” comes from the Latin noun “sublatio,” derived from “sublatus,” the past 
participle of the verb “tollere” (= to take away). This Latin word would not offer us any help in un­
derstanding Coffey’s theological style were it not that its English descendent was taken as the stand­
ard translation for a German word “aufhebung” as used in the thought o f G.W.F. Hegel. The Ger­
man term “aufhebung,” in turn, is drawn from the verb “aufheben” meaning to raise something up. 
Apart from physically raising something, as used by Hegel it has two opposite connotations. It can 
mean to “remove” or “destroy” something. It can also mean, paradoxically, to “preserve” something.
It was probably this very ambiguity of the term that made it suitable for Hegel, for it could express 
something of his dialectical reading of history, where “lower” stages are “removed” or “destroyed,” 
and yet they are “preserved.” All three of these dimensions, the “raising,” the “destruction” and the 
“preservation” are combined in the one term: “aufhebung.”
In turn Lonergan finds this term suitable to express the dialectical rhythms o f his own transcendental 
theology. In his Method in Theology, in the chapter on “Dialectic,” Lonergan says that he himself 
uses the term in Rahner’s sense, rather than Hegel’s (p. 241):
what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts 
everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on 
the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries 
them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.
Lonergan’s reference to Rahner is Karl Rahner, Hôrer Des Wortes, (Munich: Kosel, 1963), 40. For 
commentary by Lonergan on how he distinguishes his own thought from that of Hegel, see Bernard 
Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, (Philosophical Library, 1968), 421-423.
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incarnate expression to his love of God. These two expressions o f Jesus’ love for 
God are one, since Jesus is in his mission to his fellow human beings obedient to 
the will o f  his Father.
Chapter Two also looked at the basis that Coffey identifies in transcendental 
theology for the interpretation of the “ascending” New Testament data about Jesus 
as the primary instance of such an “incarnation” o f the Holy Spirit. As Jesus grows 
and learns, and throughout his life, his human nature is ever more perfectly sancti­
fied by the Holy Spirit. It thus becomes ever more perfect as an instrument for the 
Son’s human response of love for God. This process o f sanctification, by which the 
human nature o f Jesus comes to be the ever more perfect instrument o f the Son’s 
human love o f God and neighbour, finds its culmination in Jesus’ death on the 
cross. This high point of Jesus’ life of obedience to God’s will and self-sacrifice for 
the good o f his brothers and sisters is also the moment in which the Holy Spirit is 
given to the church, the moment in which the “proper” mission o f the Spirit begins.
The key term in Coffey’s reading of the coming into existence o f Jesus and of 
the conduct and meaning o f his life, is “love.” This “love,” expressed ever more 
perfectly through the human nature o f Jesus, is interpreted as itself the Holy Spirit 
“incarnate.” Coffey admits that the scriptural evidence for this identification of Je­
sus’ love is sparse but he presents what evidence there is as an adequate basis for 
his claims. Chapter Two, in brief, discussed the position I have called Thesis B: the 
theological position that the New Testament grounds a reading o f  the life o f Jesus 
as a response o f love by the Son “in humanity,” the expression o f the “Holy Spirit.”
This Spirit Christology was found to have some features that distinguish it 
from, on the one hand, classical christologies and, on the other hand, from post-trin­
itarian Spirit Christologies. Among its more obvious advantages, Coffey’s Spirit 
Christology was shown to offer a way o f more fully appropriating the New Testa­
ment data than either of these two rival accounts. Thus, while the “classical” ap­
proach developed a Johannine-inspired Logos Christology obscuring the con­
stitutive role of the Holy Spirit, the post-trinitarian Spirit Christologists erred in the
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opposite direction, so emphasising Spirit Christology that the Johannine-inspired 
Logos Christology, and the traditional expressions o f trinitarian theology that grew 
from it, were endangered. Coffey’s theology was found to aim at a more balanced 
appropriation o f both. It emphasises the importance o f a new appropriation o f the 
Spirit Christology data of the New Testament, but does so in a way that carefully 
avoids tipping the pendulum too far to the other side as to obscure Logos 
Christology.474
Beyond the formal advantages to Spirit Christology, Coffey’s approach was 
found to encourage greater attention to the humanity o f Jesus, not in itself but as it 
is transformed by the Holy Spirit. The humanity o f which Coffey speaks is not the 
inert humanity o f much christology but the sanctified humanity o f the Incarnate 
Son. The classical distinction between Christ “in his humanity” and Christ “in his 
divinity,” at least in theological discourse, tended to appeal to the “human nature” 
o f Jesus to explain aspects of Christ’s human existence that could not be directly at­
tributed to a divine persons, aspects like hunger, thirst, suffering, doubt, death and 
so on. In Coffey’s construction the human nature o f  Jesus becomes symbol not o f 
limit, but o f transcendent possibility, since for Coffey the humanity of Jesus is 
rendered “theandric” by the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit. In arguing in this 
direction, Coffey draws on Rahner’s transcendental theology, and portrays Christ’s 
humanity as humanity at the very limit o f its possibility. He goes so far as to intro­
duce a new concept, one worthy of further study: the notion that Christ’s divinity is 
this humanity thus sanctified and brought to its limit. While the divine person re­
mains essentially beyond our understanding, this “divinity” (i.e. this divinised hu­
manity) is the proper first object of our christological attention. Perhaps the issue of 
the divine “person,” recognition of which is somewhat lacking in Coffey’s theo­
logy, should be dealt with at a second level o f discourse, so that we begin with ex­
474 In one respect he does appear to be incompletely successful in doing this; in his appreciation of 
the function in “classical” christology of the term “person.” His willingness to speak of an inversion 
of the enhypostasia may be defensible, but his engagement with the problems that this raises is 
cause for concern.
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ploration o f the sanctification of the humanity and rise to interpretations about the 
divine person of the Eternal Son who remains subject, but not the first object of 
theological reflection?
Approaching matters from this point o f view, from the “sanctification” of the 
human nature o f Jesus, Coffey was seen to open here a bridge to discourse about 
grace.475 While the current study was not directly concerned with the theme of 
grace, at various points the relationship o f Coffey’s Spirit Christology with his 
theology o f grace was alluded to. It was with Coffey’s attempt to address criticisms 
about “fragmentation” in the Catholic theology of grace, drawing especially on 
Rahner’s exploration of the uncreated dimensions o f grace, that he began his publ­
ishing career. A longer and more comprehensive treatment of Coffey’s theology 
would probably take his early work on grace as a major focus. As far as this study 
is concerned, I pointed to the fact that in Coffey’s theology what happens with the 
human nature o f Christ under the action o f the Holy Spirit is essentially the same as 
what happens to ordinary human beings when the gift o f the Holy Spirit is g iven 416 
The anointing o f  Jesus is the source and explanation o f the gracing o f human be­
ings. In the history of theology attempts to draw on grace as an explanation for 
what happens in the case of Jesus were viewed with suspicion. In Coffey’s theo­
logy, the relationship is inverted such that grace is understood by analogy with what 
happens with Jesus: the anointing of Jesus offers the template for understanding 
grace. The gift o f the Holy Spirit binds the two together, with the case o f Jesus be­
ing the primary instance, and grace understood in the light o f this primary instance. 
Adoptionism is avoided and the role of the Holy Spirit in both cases is clarified.
475 It is important to specify that it is from “this point of view” that a bridge opens here to the theo­
logy of grace. If this study had attempted a offer an account of the evolution of Coffey’s thought, or 
had adopted a consistently “epistemological” order in the presentation of its materials, the matter of 
“grace” would come first before Spirit Christology. This would be expected, because in an important 
sense it is only as a result of the experience o f grace that human beings are in a position to attempt 
christology in the first place.
476, Again, the distinction between the “offer o f grace” and the “gift of grace” is a nuance not quite 
necessary to the current study. This distinction recalls Rahner’s distinction between the “supernatur­
al existential” and “grace” as such. This theme is developed especially in Coffey, “The Whole 
Rahner on the Supernatural Existential”.
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This study focussed on Coffey’s Spirit Christology, and did not directly pur­
sue the role o f the Holy Spirit sanctifying our human nature and bringing it into 
union with the person of the Son, such that we become by grace “sons and daugh­
ters in the Son.” Nevertheless Coffey thinks that such discourse is a properly trinit­
arian matter, and is dealt with in his theology of the “economic Trinity” which fol­
lows on his work on the “immanent Trinity.” The “return” model is the trinitarian 
systématisation of Coffey’s Spirit Christology and resulting theology of grace.
Before coming to Coffey’s trinitarian theology proper, I should note some 
areas o f difficulty that arose with Coffey’s Spirit Christology. While in my view 
these do not ultimately invalidate his attempts, they may nevertheless represent 
obstacles to the reader’s appropriation o f these.
The first o f these relates to Coffey’s use of the biblical data. While his Spirit 
Christology does offer a way by which we may retrieve certain traditionally obs­
cured dimensions o f the this data, one might note that in its rhetoric, at least, it is 
perhaps too schematic. If classical theology relied too heavily on the Johannine 
Logos Christology, Coffey’s theology may be subject to the charge of making too 
great a use o f the dialectical relationship between Johannine christology and synop­
tic christology. The whole complex o f  New Testament christology is not captured 
in this dyad, nor are either the Johannine or the synoptic christologies themselves 
reducible to the Logos or Spirit explanations of the divine element in Jesus that they 
offer. Coffey knows this, but often his language suggests a more schematic view 
than the data itself would warrant. Chapter Two shows how Coffey opens the dis­
course up, beyond the coming into human existence o f Jesus as Son, to a considera­
tion of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. This is important. But here the con­
trast between Johannine and synoptic christology is not at all clear. One might 
wonder, further, how the christologies of Paul, Hebrews and other New Testament 
writings fit in. Although Coffey draws on quite a range o f New Testament texts, at 
times he writes as though the contrast between Johannine and synoptic gospels 
were indeed key to the appropriation o f the whole biblical witness.
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Although Coffey does not make it explicit, the above tendency to reduce the 
plurality of New Testament christologies to two is best understood once we know 
that the perspective adopted is not simply that o f New Testament christology as 
such. The perspective adopted is, rather, that of a theologian of our time looking 
back at the historical appropriation o f New Testament christologies. Seeing that 
Logos Christology exercised a controlling function in later theology, Coffey’s con­
cern is primarily to argue towards a retrieval o f Spirit Christology. He does this 
from an avowedly trinitarian perspective. This trinitarian perspective must be re­
cognised since it is only from this point o f view that one will fully understand his 
isolation o f Logos and Spirit Christologies. Within the New Testament itself there 
are a whole range of christologies that are not specifically mentioned: scholars con­
tinue to discuss and classify Son of God christologies, Son o f Man christologies, 
Messiah, Eschatological Prophet, Servant o f God, Parousia christologies, Exaltation 
christologies etc. The decision to isolate two from the whole range o f New Testa­
ment christologies is explained by the perspective that Coffey adopts, which is that 
o f the church’s trinitarian faith, for which the biblical symbols o f Logos and Spirit 
are affirmed to stand for the second and third divine Persons respectively. Thus, 
while Coffey’s approach to the New Testament data can be said to be firmly histor­
ical, his focus is nevertheless guided by questions arising from trinitarian theology.
Is this focus anachronistic? I would argue that it would be if  this particular fo­
cus were unacknowledged, if  it suggested an uncritical “reading” of trinitarian 
problems back into the texts. Fortunately, Coffey does not do this. Instead, what he 
does is bring trinitarian questions to texts that do not in their “literal” meanings 
contain answers. This practice of bringing trinitarian questions to biblical texts ack­
nowledged not to have been written with a developed doctrine o f the Trinity in 
mind is one that Coffey explains at some length. In brief, historically-minded bib­
lical criticism demands that we do not anachronistically claim that biblical authors 
meant more than can be established by the tools o f contemporary scholarship. 
Hence, scholars usually argue that there is no directly trinitarian discourse in the 
bible. In view, however, of the fact o f development of doctrine throughout Christi­
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an history, we are in a position to consider how certain dimensions o f  the biblical 
texts were developed in later interpretation. Biblical texts were, in fact, taken up 
and read in a directly and explicitly trinitarian sense. For Coffey, the fact that some 
of these later meanings themselves acquire the authority o f the church’s official 
magisterium means that these can then be classed as “authentic interpretations.” 
These are thenceforth regarded as non-negotiable in theology, even where they 
demonstrably go beyond the “literal meaning” o f the biblical texts. While the his­
torically-minded theologian does not impose such later interpretations on the read­
ing of the biblical texts themselves, it is nonetheless possible to argue that there is a 
plausible “basis” for such later interpretations in the biblical texts. The task of the 
theologian is to attempt to indicate the “immanent dialectic o f thought” leading 
from one to the other.
This is, to be sure, a complex line o f argument, but no more complex, I ar­
gued, than the reality it intends to explain. It is, I conclude with Coffey, perfectly 
possible to read biblical texts in both ways, once with a concern for the “literal” 
meaning, and a second time in a way informed by questions arising from later 
reflection. This is, in practice, the dynamic that Coffey calls “returning” to the eco­
nomy of salvation. As I mentioned above, the view o f the theology that emerges 
from Coffey is “cyclical” and “ascending.” He returns to the biblical data with 
questions arising from trinitarian theology in order to discover aspects o f that data 
that had not traditionally been recognised. In arguing for the assumption o f these 
aspects, theology moves to a higher appropriation o f the biblical witness. Thus it 
“ascends” by sublating the previous level in a higher synthesis. It asks “historical” 
questions, not in an archaist sense, but with an eye to the development o f doctrine, 
both past and present.
Another set o f challenges was found to lie in Coffey’s attempts to show that 
certain proposals of his Spirit Christology have a background in the Fathers or the 
scholastics. This attempt is well-motivated, but not always successful. It is true that 
Coffey quotes rather widely from the Fathers and scholastics, and he advances
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stimulating accounts of their writings. Whether these can always be shown to be ac­
curate accounts of what those Fathers and scholastics intended, however, 
sometimes remains uncertain.
To give specific examples, the current study gave a brief account of the con­
cern that I retain about Coffey’s use o f the patristic terms “enhypostasia,” “commu- 
nicatio idiomatum” and “theandric.” Coffey adopts the peculiar position that these 
terms formed part of a patristic defence against a perceived rupture (“chasm,” or 
“wedge”) brought into the heart of the hypostatic union by the dominance o f a 
Logos Christo logy.477 Two problems arise with his treatment o f these terms. Firstly, 
he has not provided an adequate demonstration o f the claim that the problem o f the 
“wedge” indeed motivated the adoption o f these terms. To raise this question is not 
necessarily to query the existence of the problem of the “wedge,” but rather to high­
light a methodological concern. He should first have provided historical demonstra­
tion that this was indeed the concern o f the authors in question before asserting that 
these concepts were designed to overcome it. The second problem is systematic, 
and apparently more serious. In his arguments for a role o f the Holy Spirit in sancti­
fying the humanity of Jesus, Coffey in fact obscures some o f the very questions that 
most readers think the above terms were historically designed to answer.
Take the example of the “enhypostasia.” Coffey thinks that this was designed 
to address the problem of the “wedge.” Most others think, rather, that this term 
emerged to address the need that emerged after after the councils of Ephesus (431) 
and Chalcedon (451) to show how the human nature o f Jesus, without itself being a 
person, was nevertheless not lacking since it was personal in the person of the Son. 
The key issue, therefore, lay in concern about the “person” in Jesus. When Coffey 
claims that the purpose o f the “enhypostasia” was to be bring the two “natures” of 
Jesus into ontological communion, he omits any significant mention o f the term 
“person.” But the reality represented by this word, i.e., the need to account for the 
“one and the same” in Christ was the very issue under consideration. The relation­
477 See above at p. 84f,
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ship o f the two natures, even if  this relationship is thought o f in terms of an actual 
ontological communication between the natures, such as Coffey suggests with his 
reading o f the communicatio idiomatum, the theandric nature and the enhypostasia, 
cannot fulfill this function.
At this point, we note a similar weakness in Coffey’s theology to that of 
Nestorius: failure to attend to the theological function o f the notion of “person.” 
Given that Coffey’s reading of these terms is so idiosyncratic, one could justifiably 
expect him to show why the generally accepted reading is incorrect. He does not. It 
is possible that, in relation to these issues, Coffey’s reading of ancient texts is 
guided more by his own theological interests than by careful historical scholarship. 
That he is willing to de-emphasise the notion of “person” in order to discuss the im­
pact o f the Spirit on the human “nature” o f Jesus is explained by the fact that the 
impact and benefit of Spirit Christology lies precisely there. His presentation is, 
however, at this point lacking in the sensitivity to traditional concerns that in most 
other instances is one of his strengths.
I do not regard these concerns as ultimately damaging to Coffey’s central line 
o f thought. It does not seem to me essential that every position in theology need be 
directly found in patristic or scholastic sources. It is perfectly possible, in my view, 
that genuine theological progress can be found in a theologian of our time, even if 
that progress is unprecedented and does not find patristic support. If  Coffey’s 
demonstration o f the patristic background to some aspects o f his theology is less 
than completely satisfactory, this need not in itself mean that his theology is unac­
ceptable. I have not cited here many o f the more successful attempts that Coffey 
makes to show a patristic background to his Spirit Christology in the writings o f 
Cyril o f Alexandria, in Augustine and others. Ultimately, my judgement is that his 
case is more compelling when it is presented in terms o f a dialectical advance bey­
ond traditional theology than when it appeals to ancient sources and attempts to 
show continuity with the tradition.
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I conclude that Coffey’s experiment in Spirit Christology is notably successful 
on its own terms. The advantages cited above outweigh the challenges. Coffey of­
fers, in my judgement, a plausible and compelling attempt at appropriating a greater 
range o f biblical data than does traditional christology; argues carefully for the 
methodological necessity of a trinitarian reading of this data, and offers a promising 
way o f relating christology with the theology of grace.
2. From Spirit Christology to Trinity
While Chapters One and Two introduced Coffey’s Spirit Christology, Chapter 
Three took a more specifically pneumatological focus, discussing how Theses A 
and B together allow Coffey to advance the pneumatological conclusion: the Holy 
Spirit is therefore the “mutual love” o f the Father and the Son. The “therefore” in­
volved in this step marks an “ascending” move from the economy of salvation to a 
statement about the Holy Spirit in se. We saw that this “therefore” marked the path 
that Coffey adopts to arrive at this pneumatological conclusion as markedly differ­
ent from that of “classical” trinitarian theology: Coffey’s approach is explicitly in­
ferred from the economy of salvation, rather than from the theology o f the “imman­
ent Trinity.”
Coffey’s particular approach to this matter was also shown to be “ascending” 
in another sense, one particular to Coffey. The Australian distinguishes, as indic­
ated, between questions related to the distinction o f divine persons and questions 
about the unity of divine persons (in his terminology these are the questions of 
“descending” and “ascending” trinitarian theology, respectively). This vocabulary 
will strike some readers as idiosyncratic, given the familiarity of these terms as they 
are commonly used in christology. I argued that this innovation in vocabulary is de­
fensible. Coffey indicates one way in which the shift in recent christology from 
“descending” to “ascending” might be translated into the rather different concerns 
of trinitarian theology with its more complex set o f questions.
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The distinction between “descending” questions and “ascending” trinitarian 
theology was shown to be a central structure o f Coffey’s theological framework. 
Classical theology in both its Eastern and Western forms is “descending”: it takes 
the unity of God as its starting point and enquires after the distinction of persons. 
Especially in its Western form, this theology has been concerned particularly to ex­
plain distinction in ways that did not damage the understanding o f divine unity. The 
theology Coffey develops, in contrast, takes the distinction of persons as its as­
sumption and enquires after the unity o f persons. This he calls “ascending” theo­
logy, and it is clear that this can take place both before and after the middle phase in 
his trinitarian itinerary. There is, therefore, the “ascending” theology characteristic 
o f the ascent towards the expression of the church’s trinitarian faith. There is also, 
however, the “ascending” theology that comes in the light of, and subsequent to, the 
church’s trinitarian faith. This second form of “ascending” theology is trinitarian 
“ascending” theology.478
In view o f the “descending” form of “classical” theology, it was not surpris­
ing to note that the emphasis on the Holy Spirit as “love” characteristic o f the West­
ern tradition turned out to be an emphasis on the “common” love: the “love” by 
which the Father and the Son together “love” the world. In Coffey’s trinitarian “as­
cending” theology, in contrast, the Holy Spirit was more clearly understood as the 
“mutual love” o f Father and Son.
In discussing these matters, I found another regrettable example o f Coffey’s 
willingness to find answers to his questions in patristic sources without first demon­
strating that those questions were indeed raised by the patristic sources themselves. 
This was the example of Coffey’s claim for an Augustinian basis for the “mutual 
love” theory, as distinct from a “common love” theory. While this distinction is, in 
itself, illuminating, it seems to me that Coffey makes too much o f the supposed Au-
478 There is thus an analogy between two distinctions: that between pre-trinitarian Spirit Christo- 
logy and trinitarian Spirit Christology, on the one hand, and that between pre-trinitarian “ascending” 
theology and trinitarian “ascending” theology, on the other. The pattern of theology is ascending and 
cyclical, each moment sublating the previous one and bringing it forward.
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gustmian basis for it.479 It is not clear to me that Augustine himself intended to 
make such a clear distinction between these two ways o f understanding the Holy 
Spirit as “love.” If the African Father did intend to make this distinction, then why 
did he not make it clear or highlight its importance. I offered a reading, based on 
Coffey’s own idea of the “descending” questions o f theology and recent discussion 
among patristic scholars about the polemical context o f Augustine’s writings on the 
Trinity, that attempted to show why it was in fact unlikely that Augustine could 
have specifically intended to speak of the “mutual love” o f the Father and the Son. 
Ultimately, however, the case would have to be settled on textual evidence, and I 
am unaware o f any evidence that shows that Augustine him self intended this 
distinction.
The more general point that Coffey makes is more convincing than his attribu­
tion to Augustine of the common love/mutual love distinction. He argues that the 
affirmation o f a “descending” form o f theology, in the wake of pro-Nicene anti- 
subordinationism limited the ability o f the traditional theology to take up that bib- 
lically-based economic data of the Father loving the Son and the Son loving the 
Father. Attempts in the tradition at elaborating a properly “mutual love” pneumato- 
logy, such as that found in Richard o f Saint-Victor were seen as interesting, but 
since they were presented in terms of metaphysical speculation rather than showing 
any explicit root in the biblical data they were deemed methodologically unaccept­
able from our point of view. Coffey’s enterprise is, therefore, to restore the basis for 
a “mutual love” pneumatology in the economy of salvation. That basis he seeks in 
what I have described as Theses A and B. Whether such an attempt can be seen as 
valid and fruitful, in view of the tradition of trinitarian theology, was discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five.
1,79 In this Coffey is not, of course, unusual. The “mutual love” theory o f the Holy Spirit is often at­
tributed to Augustine. What aggravates the attribution in the case of Coffey is, however, the clarity 
with which he has set out the distinctions between “common love” and “mutual love,” between 
“descending” and “ascending” theology. Once these distinctions are so clearly drawn, it is more dif­
ficult to use Augustine as a source for a properly “mutual love” approach to the Holy Spirit.
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Coffey’s general strategy, as introduced in Chapter Three, mirrors the one we 
saw in dealing with the relation between Logos and Spirit Christology. The con­
cerns o f “descending” theology are valid in themselves, but need to be complemen­
ted and completed by another style of questioning. “Ascending” theology, theology 
that takes the distinction of persons as it is given in the economy as its starting point 
is presented as necessary complement to “descending” theology. For Coffey, both 
“descending” and “ascending” theology take their point of departure from the scrip­
ture, and both allow for the traditional reading o f the scriptural data. In the case of 
“descending” theology, however, the scriptural basis is largely found in the idea of 
the Incarnation, developed from the Johannine prologue, and the sending o f the 
Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son also largely based on Johannine cues. The tra­
ditional development of these themes is found in the “classical” theology of the 
Trinity. “Ascending” theology too has its scriptural basis, not just in the idea of the 
“anointing” o f Jesus by the Holy Spirit, but in the whole story of Jesus’ conception, 
life, death and resurrection, all interpreted as taking place in the power o f the Spirit. 
In Coffey’s reading, the theme of the “mutual love” of God and Jesus is at the 
forefront.
As it happened, this scriptural basis is only weakly developed in the tradition 
o f pneumatology or trinitarian theology in general. By indicating the theme o f the 
Holy Spirit as the mutual love of Father and Son, Coffey offers a path towards a 
new development of these scriptural data, as well as a way towards restoring a nar­
rative basis for both pneumatology and trinitarian theology in the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus. Such developments express the “cyclical” nature o f theology, 
its “ascending” sublatory character.
Next, Chapter Four looked more specifically at a range o f issues arising from 
the attempted move from  statements about the economy o f salvation to statements 
about God in se. In so doing, this chapter moved more explicitly into the matter o f 
trinitarian theology as such.
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In Catholic theology the standard formulation o f the idea that one might move 
from  statements about the economy o f salvation to statements about God in se is 
found in Karl Rahner’s Grundaxiom. I looked at some of the resistance that contin­
ues to be expressed to Rahner’s formulation by exponents of the “classical” ap­
proach. I illustrated the concerns of those who resist the method proposed by 
Rahner and his many followers with reference to standard features o f the “classical” 
Western approach in trinitarian theology, showing how the doctrine o f “common 
action” and the associated strategy of “appropriations” tend in their operation to 
close off any sustained appeal to the economy of salvation in trinitarian theology. 
The “psychological analogy” was found to serve the “descending” “classical” theo­
logy well in that it does explain a certain distinction o f divine persons without dam­
age to the divine unity. The psychological analogy, however, is an mtratrinitarian 
analogy ill-suited to understanding the interpersonal dimensions o f the gospel 
narratives.
Against this background, Rahner’s theology was taken as representing a break 
with tradition, and an innovation that has proved far more attractive to many. 
Rahner thought o f the Trinity as a mystery of salvation, as the self-communication 
o f God. Since the Triune God is revealed reliably in the economy of salvation, the 
economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa. In practice, this axiom of 
Rahner has usually been taken up in recent theology as implying that we take the 
“economy of salvation” as starting point in trinitarian theology. The difficulties it 
raises, however, include the challenge o f reconciling the results o f this approach 
with those o f the “classical” approach.
Coffey accepts the Grundaxiom stated in these general terms. He modifies it, 
however, in order to clarify certain issues, and to show the soteriological purpose of 
theology o f the “immanent Trinity.” He proposes replacing Rahner’s two terms 
(“economic Trinity” and “immanent Trinity”) with three terms (“biblical Trinity,” 
“immanent Trinity,” “economic Trinity”). The first term in Rahner’s axiom, the 
“economic Trinity” Coffey proposes replacing with the term: the “biblical Trinity.”
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I argued that this term is, if  understood correctly, more precise than Rahner’s term. 
Rahner’s “economic Trinity” is unclear and cannot serve in any rigorous way as a 
“starting point.” If  the biblical authors are judged not directly to offer a trinitarian 
understanding of terms like God, Father, Son, Logos, and Holy Spirit, then on what 
basis may we appeal to the “economic Trinity”? Coffey’s answer is that it is not 
with the “economic Trinity” that we begin, but with the biblical data, since that is 
the shared and public source of all theology. This appears to me to be a simple 
statement o f fact, and incontrovertible.
We read the bible, however, within the tradition of the church, and if we re­
cognise the possibility of the development o f doctrine we may also recognise truth 
in those later interpretations of the biblical data that characterised and shaped Chris­
tian thinking about God. This tradition o f interpretation, however, has not managed 
to appropriate all of the important elements of the biblical witness. It has, for ex­
ample, privileged the Johannine christology upon which the classical form of trinit­
arian theology rests. Coffey argues that we must return to the biblical text in order 
to retrieve previously obscured elements in that data. It is only by “returning” to the 
biblical data having thus acquired the doctrine o f the Trinity that the economy of 
salvation can be read in trinitarian terms. But it is not the “economy of salvation” 
that can be so read, but primarily the bible itself. At that point it is better to speak of 
the “biblical Trinity.”
The bible is the publicly available and shared source for testimony about the 
“economy of salvation.” The church reads the bible through “trinitarian” eyes, and 
cannot do otherwise without detaching itself from the tradition of interpretation.480 
Coffey’s talk o f the “biblical Trinity” expresses a rich sense of the complex her­
meneutics demanded in contemporary appropriation of the bible, exemplifying, 
once again, his “cyclical” and “ascending” sublatory view o f the theological task.
480' As noted above, this does not mean that the theologian should not read biblical texts with the 
tools of historical study. If he or she reads it as a historian, the “literal” sense will come to the fore. 
If  he or she reads it as a theologian, it is likely that the relation of the “literal” sense to later theolo­
gical developments will be in focus.
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For Coffey, the Semitic authorship o f the biblical texts leads us to prefer “fun­
ctional” readings o f the “literal” meaning of biblical texts. The spread o f the gospel 
in the Hellenistic world, however, led to a translation in the interpretation of these 
biblical texts, such that they came to be expressed in the “ontological” discourse 
typical o f that cultural context. Eschewing biblical archaism, Coffey interprets this 
translation from functional language and thought-forms to ontological language and 
thought-forms as a net gain for theology. Among its benefits is the possibility it of­
fers of developing discourse about God in se, rather than simply God pro nobis. 
Thus is bom the theology of the “immanent Trinity”: a reflection on the conditions 
o f possibility for the “economy of salvation.” The theology o f the “immanent 
Trinity” is a form of thought about the data of the “biblical Trinity” that ensures the 
preservation of a proper sense in theological discourse of the freedom and tran­
scendence of God, and allows for the ordering of the “knowledge” of God we ac­
quire from the bible.
For Coffey, the theology of the “immanent Trinity” does not form an end in it­
self. The thought that it might represents one of the more unfortunate developments 
in the history o f trinitarian thought. Understanding God as though God can be best 
understood without reference to the economy of salvation means overlooking the 
altruistic character of God’s love, which is precisely what God’s saving action 
demonstrates. To suggest that God can be best understood when we theoretically 
exclude that which is most significant to human beings would be to go against 
God’s salvific plan expressed especially in the Incarnation and in the outpouring of 
the Spirit.
Accordingly, Coffey posits that the doctrine o f the “immanent Trinity” is rel­
evant precisely when it effects a transition “back” to the economy of salvation. Cof­
fey does not contravene Schoonenberg’s principle that we must argue from the 
world to God and not vice versa because he places the “economic Trinity” third. 
W hat Schoonenberg’s principle excludes is the introduction o f extraneous material
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(from philosophy for example). The God of the “immanent Trinity” from which 
one “returns” to the economy, in Coffey’s schema, should be verifiably none other 
than the God based on the data o f the “biblical Trinity” in the first place.
While Coffey adopts a positive attitude towards the emergence of a theology 
o f the “immanent Trinity,” he is attentive both to the point just made, the need to 
recognise the soteriological finality o f “immanent Trinity” talk, and to the import­
ant matter o f balance in theology of the “immanent Trinity.” If  the theology o f the 
“immanent Trinity” emerged historically in a way that appeared to bind it particu­
larly to a Logos Christology, that need not mean that it cannot now work on the 
matter o f balancing that theology by exploring the implications of Spirit Christo­
logy. Clearly, Coffey will want to show how these implications do not simply des­
troy, but sublate the concerns of the “classical” tradition.
In brief, Chapter Four showed how Coffey’s tripartite portrait o f the itinerary 
o f trinitarian theology addresses significant ambiguities in Rahner’s formulation, 
but also shows the soteriological orientation o f theology of the “immanent Trinity.” 
Implicitly, it responds to some of the concerns raised by exponents o f the continued 
hegemony o f the “classical” approach, at least to the extent that it promises to sub- 
late rather than destroy those concerns. I judge this attitude on Coffey’s part far 
more helpful and potentially fruitful than that of theologians who proceed as though 
trinitarian theology proper only began when historical method affirmed itself in 
biblical studies.
Chapter Five, finally, looked at some particular issues surrounding the attempt 
that Coffey shares with many recent theologians to take the “economy of salvation” 
(mediated as the “biblical Trinity”) as the starting point in trinitarian theology. The 
particular issues discussed here arise only when one attempts to do this in continu­
ity with a theological tradition in its “classical form.”
It is precisely Coffey’s desire to place his Spirit Christology and trinitarian 
theology in continuity with the theological tradition, even while it is presented as an 
advance in that tradition, that leads to the development o f the two-model approach
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that occupied our attention in Chapter Five. Such a stance as Coffey’s need not be 
assumed: one could certainly attempt to develop a trinitarian theology ex novo from 
the resources found in the bible, as Ormerod appears to suggest is the case with 
Coffey.481 To do so, however, would mean having to re-engage with all of the is­
sues faced by the great Councils, since these are implicitly raised by the scriptural 
source itself. One would not be certain in undertaking such an enterprise that one 
would indeed end up with something like the doctrine o f the Trinity.482
David Coffey is determined, instead, to remain within the tradition of ecclesial 
thinking for which the doctrine of the Trinity represents a non-negotiable datum, 
but one that needs to be continually re-examined in the light o f the “cyclical” and 
“ascending” return to the biblical ground from which it takes its departure. He does 
not view the tradition as a closed story, or as something that can be passed on only. 
For Coffey, thinking within the tradition allows for some fairly significant re-work­
ing at the centre o f the traditional construct. One may “ascend” from one synthesis 
to a higher synthesis, an ascent in which the results o f previous syntheses will be 
sublated rather than simply destroyed.
Accordingly, Chapter Five looked at certain issues arising from the attempt to 
relate the data o f the “biblical Trinity” (especially, the Spirit Christology suggested 
by the synoptic gospels) to the “classical” theology o f the “immanent Trinity.” I fo­
cused on the matter of trinitarian taxis and on the debate between Eastern and West­
ern tradition over the eternal procession o f the Holy Spirit. Coffey’s theological 
agenda here was shown to be the effort to accommodate all o f the various positions 
within a comprehensive framework. Thus, he wants to find a place for the “econ­
omic taxis’'’ according to which the Holy Spirit also comes before the Son, but also 
for the traditional taxis of the “immanent Trinity” according to which the Son
481 See, for example, Ormerod, “The Goal of Systematic Theology,” 47. See above note 56 on p.
24.
4S2' The fact that a close reading of the bible does not automatically guarantee a properly trinitarian 
theology can be easily illustrated by sketching a history of theological efforts at attempting just such 
a reading and failing to reach a fully trinitarian outcome. This history would not begin with Alius 
and would not end with Roger Haight.
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comes before the Holy Spirit. He also wants to find a place for both the Eastern tra­
dition’s insistence on the primacy of the Father as “cause” in the Trinity and its 
concern to ensure non-confusion of Father and Son, and for the Western tradition’s 
position on the involvement of the Son in the eternal procession of the Spirit.
I showed how it was from these issues that Coffey developed his two-model 
approach to the Trinity. The first model he calls the “procession model” and it cor­
responds to the “classical” theology. In both its Eastern and Western forms, the ba­
sic objective o f the “procession model” is to respond to the questions o f  “descend­
ing” theology. This model developed largely on the basis o f a Logos Christology, 
and was found incapable of accommodating the implications of Spirit Christology. 
Coffey argued that another model was required to accommodate these implications. 
This model he calls the “bestowal” model, the “mutual love” model, or the “return” 
model. The theme o f “return” is based ultimately on the biblical portrait of the life 
o f Jesus as a return in the Spirit to the Father. Coffey’s way o f expressing the rela­
tion of the two models is elegant. “Mission” (or “Procession”) is completed in “Re­
turn.” Exitus is ordered towards reditus, descent towards ascent, and creation to­
wards assimilation.
3. Upwards and Onwards
This study has not attempted to engage with all of David Coffey’s theology, 
but it has indicated what I take to be its central trajectory. Once his theology has se­
cured its economic starting point in the bible (a starting point to which one must re­
turn repeatedly, in order to capture ever more fully the profundity o f the ascending 
dynamic implied in the mysteiy of the Anointing/Incarnation), once it has establ­
ished its relationship of dialectical continuity with the traditions o f trinitarian theo­
logy o f East and West, it opens up multiple avenues o f theological exploration.
Among these we might certainly list the theology of grace, the redemption, the 
church. One would also list, however, certain areas o f particular interest in theology 
today, such as ecumenical theology and the theology o f religions. Coffey’s theo­
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logy has attracted the interest of some evangelical theologians because of its strong 
pneumatology and the unexpected overlaps it shows with the theology of the 
revered American theologian Jonathan Edwards.483 In relation to discussion o f the 
debated question o f the eternal procession o f the filioque, Coffey’s approach may 
still bear fruit (although it would need to be reformulated to respond more directly 
to the concerns o f Eastern theologians).484 Fortunately, however, Coffey has offered 
various stimuli that would help attempt such a refomulation, not least of which are 
his attempts to engage with various points from the theology of Gregory Palamas 
(not covered in the current study).
Another area, one of almost “burning” urgency among Catholic theologians is 
the area o f the theology of religions. Coffey has indeed recognised the potential of 
the approach that he offers and has recently expressed it as a way of mediating 
between the concerns of Peter Phan (to take a prominent example), on the one hand, 
and the American Bishops Conference/Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
on the other.485 Since the most basic issue raised in this debate is the relation o f the
483 These overlaps are explored especially by Steven Studebaker. The latter is currently publishing 
a book on Coffey and Edwards. In the meantime, see Studebaker, “Integrating Pneumatology and 
Christology: A Trinitarian Modification o f Clark H. Pinnock’s Spirit Christology”; Steven 
Studebaker, “Integrating Social and Augustinian Theories of Divine Person: A Proposal From the 
Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards and David Coffey,” Canadian Evangelical Review 34- 
35, (2008): 3-19.
484 Lewis Ayres in a review of Thomas Weinandy’s comparable attempt at overcoming the impasse 
writes:
1 find it hard to believe that finding some sort of compromise solution to the question of 
the filioque will actually solve the theological disputes between East and West. Orthodox 
theologians have for many years (though I am not sure when this train of argument began:
I suspect it is much more recent than we tend to imagine) argued that the filioque is a 
stumbling block because it has led to a whole host of other insurmountable theological 
problems and mistakes by the West -  of modem theologians perhaps Lossky puts this argu­
ment most starkly. Until East and West are able to read each other’s theological traditions 
both more charitably and with more historical accuracy the filioque remains the least of our 
problems.
See Lewis Ayres, “Review of ‘the Father’s Spirit of Sonship’,” Journal of Theological Studies 50, 
(1999): 430-432. The point made by Ayres applies equally to Coffey: the resolution of the filioque 
issue will only take place within a much broader context, that of ecclesial reconciliation. In the 
meantime, this need not mean that fruitful theological innovation cannot make a vitally useful 
contribution.
485 Coffey has published an article responding to theological issues underlying the debate over 
Phan’s contribution. Peter Phan, Being Religious Interreligiously: Asian Perspectives on Interfaith 
Dialogue, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004). Phan’s book gave rise to a response from the Vatic­
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Son and the Spirit in the economy of salvation, or more precisely the question of 
how to understand the Spirit working through other religious traditions, it is clear 
that the issues discussed in Coffey’s trinitarian Spirit Christology are o f deep 
interest.486
The current study does not directly engage with these various areas. It does 
however explore the basis for such an engagement. It has explored the central tra­
jectory proposed in Coffey’s theology and found that it might be judged both plaus­
ible and potentially fruitful. Further work on Coffey’s theology might engage with 
some of the weaker points indicated above. It would do so, however, motivated by 
the great potential that Coffey’s theology offers as a basis not just for the range of 
issues listed above, but more importantly for a trinitarian reconsideration o f soterio- 
logy itself and the Spirit-guided dynamics o f theology itself, unfolding through 
history.
an and from the American bishops. Coffey’s response is found in Coffey, “Questiones Disputatae: A 
Trinitarian Response to Issues Raised By Peter Phan” . Coffey also discusses the question of reli­
gions set in the context of a cosmic pneumatology directed by entelechy towards the Christ event in 
Coffey, “The Spirit of Christ as Entelechy”.
486 Coffey writes that “The traditional theology is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go far 
enough to solve the thorniest ecumenical and interreligious questions of the present time, namely, 
the Filioque the uniqueness of Christ, and the salvific validity of the non-Christian religions. For 
these it is necessary to range wider and invoke the mutual-love theology.” Coffey, “Questiones 
Disputatae: A Trinitarian Response to Issues Raised By Peter Phan,” 865.
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